1. **Name of Property**
   Historic name: Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation)
   Other names/site number: Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site; VT-RU-40; VT-RU-39; VT-RU-352
   Name of related multiple property listing: n/a
   (Enter "N/A" if property is not part of a multiple property listing)

2. **Location**
   Street & number: 5696 Monument Hill Road
   City or town: Hubbardton  State: Vermont  County: Rutland
   Not For Publication: X  Vicinity: 

3. **State/Federal Agency Certification**
   As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended,
   I hereby certify that this X nomination ___ request for determination of eligibility meets the documentation standards for registering properties in the National Register of Historic Places and meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60.
   In my opinion, the property X meets ___ does not meet the National Register Criteria. I recommend that this property be considered significant at the following level(s) of significance:
   X national  ___ statewide  ___ local
   Applicable National Register Criteria:
   X A  X B  ___ C  X D

   Signature of certifying official/Title:  Date
   Vermont Division of Historic Preservation
   State or Federal agency/bureau or Tribal Government
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In my opinion, the property ___ meets ___ does not meet the National Register criteria.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Signature of commenting official:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **National Park Service Certification**

I hereby certify that this property is:

___ entered in the National Register
___ determined eligible for the National Register
___ determined not eligible for the National Register
___ removed from the National Register
___ other (explain:) ____________________

| **Signature of the Keeper** | **Date of Action** |
5. Classification

Ownership of Property

(Check as many boxes as apply.)

Private:  

Public – Local  

Public – State  

Public – Federal  

Category of Property

(Check only one box.)

Building(s)  

District  

Site  

Structure  

Object
Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation)
Name of Property

Rutland County, Vermont
County and State

Number of Resources within Property
(Do not include previously listed resources in the count)
Contributing Noncontributing
0 8 buildings
10 12 sites
0 0 structures
1 1 objects
11 21 Total

Number of contributing resources previously listed in the National Register 1

6. Function or Use

Historic Functions
(Enter categories from instructions.)
DEFENSE/battle site
AGRICULTURAL/subsistence
LANDSCAPE/natural features

Current Functions
(Enter categories from instructions.)
LANDSCAPE/state park
RECREATION AND CULTURE/museum
RECREATION AND CULTURE/monument/marker
7. Description

Architectural Classification
(Enter categories from instructions.)
Colonial: Georgian
Federal
Mid-19th Century: Greek Revival
Modern
Other

Materials: (enter categories from instructions.)
Principal exterior materials of the property: Wood

Narrative Description
(Describe the historic and current physical appearance and condition of the property. Describe contributing and noncontributing resources if applicable. Begin with a summary paragraph that briefly describes the general characteristics of the property, such as its location, type, style, method of construction, setting, size, and significant features. Indicate whether the property has historic integrity.)

Summary Paragraph

The Battle of Hubbardton was the most significant battle of the American Revolutionary War fought completely within boundaries of what would become the State of Vermont. Fought on 7 July 1777, the American rear-guard action was an important part of the pivotal Northern Campaign. Although a British tactical victory, the battle at Hubbardton is considered by many to be an American strategic victory in the larger Northern Campaign of 1777. Under the skilled military leadership of Seth Warner and Ebenezer Francis, the Continentals showed that not only could they fight, but that they could also successfully disengage from a pursuing enemy. Casualties suffered on both sides were high given the number troops engaged. The extent of British losses and the firm and skillful resistance offered by the Americans against some of Burgoyne’s best troops indicated a stiffening American resistance. That resistance yielded its first victory at Bennington on 16 August and subsequently at the two pivotal battles of Saratoga in September and October.

Today, the site is in almost pristine condition, and the battlefield is home to the one of the earliest Revolutionary War monuments emplaced in New England. The Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site was established in 1937 as one of Vermont’s first State Historic Sites, and includes 891.4 acres of public land, with 412.9 acres owned by the Vermont Division for Historic Preservation (VDHP) and 478.5 owned by the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources.
Narrative Description

Battle Summary
The precipitous abandonment of Fort Ticonderoga and the heavily fortified post at Mount Independence by the American army led by General Arthur St. Clair and the subsequent capture of those fortifications on 6 July 1777 by the Royal Army commanded by Lieutenant General John Burgoyne set the stage for the battle of Hubbardton. A disorderly retreat of the American forces along the Military Road leading to Castleton, VT, was initially covered by the 11th Massachusetts Regiment commanded by Colonel Ebenezer Francis. They were later joined by Colonel Seth Warner and his “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers, Colonel Nathan Hale’s 2nd New Hampshire Regiment, and the stragglers of various other formations. This rear-guard force reached the vicinity of Sucker Brook and Monument Hill near the intersection of the Military and Castleton Road (modern Monument Hill Road) and went into bivouac, with several regiments of militia encamped at the site of Ransomvale about two miles further south towards Castleton.

The Royal Army’s pursuit of the Americans began almost immediately following the seizure of Mount Independence on the Vermont side of Lake Champlain. Brevet Brigadier General Simon Fraser commanded the Royal Army’s Advanced Corps, consisting of British light infantry and grenadiers, as well as some of the battalion companies of the 24th Regiment of Foot. Fraser’s Advanced Corps, which was composed of the elite of the Burgoyne’s Army, reached the area known as Lacy’s Camp toward evening on 6 July. Fraser was also supported by Major General Friedrich Adolf Riedesel, Freiherr zu Eisenbach, and his brigade of Brunswickers, which consisted of the Regiment Riedesel, a grenadier battalion under Maj. Otto Von Mengen, and a light Infantry battalion under Maj. Ferdinand Von Bame. Baron Riedesel’s force bivouacked along the Military Road about three miles to the rear of Fraser.

Early on the morning of 7 July (about 4am) Fraser’s Advance Corps resumed its pursuit. Eyewitnesses agree that initial contact was made around 5am. As the American sentries fell back toward Sucker Brook, Fraser’s scouts slowly moved along the road to the crest of Sargent Hill, where they could see the Continental Army forces encamped about one-half mile ahead along Sucker Brook (Figure 2).

Fraser reconnoitered the American position and learned that there was a larger force opposing him than he had initially assumed. Fearing that Warner’s regiments would be reinforced by local militia if he did not attack, Fraser determined to engage the enemy and started the battle about 6:30am. Depending on which source is used, Americans were either getting ready for breakfast or already preparing for the march when Fraser’s men attacked. The encounter along Sucker Brook drove the Americans back. During the fighting, Fraser lost one of his key British officers, Major Robert Grant, commander of the 24th Regiment of Foot. Fraser’s formations deployed...
from column to line and Warner’s forces established a battle line along the western ridge of Monument Hill.

From 7:30am to 8:45am, the British and American forces engaged in a battle along Monument Hill, across the hill and along a “hill of less eminence” – to the south – and across the Castleton Road (today’s Monument Hill Road), around the Selleck cabin, and along a log and brush fence east of the road. Tactical maneuvering had strengthened Fraser’s right flank at the expense of his left and Warner and Francis were prepared to exploit the weakness. As the American forces rallied behind a log fence on the east side of Castleton Road, Fraser found himself in a difficult position and dependent on the arrival of Baron Riedesel’s Brunswick troops.

It was almost 9am before Baron Riedesel’s Brunswick reinforcements reached the battlefield. Baron Riedesel reportedly used an outcrop on Sargent Hill to observe the battle, reconnoitered the tactical situation, and then insightfully deployed his troops on Fraser’s threatened left flank. Baron Riedesel’s timely arrival quickly turned the tide of battle in Fraser’s favor. The Americans stubbornly defended the log and brush fence, and Colonel Francis was killed in the fighting.

Francis’ death dealt a severe blow to the American morale. Shortly after 10am, American forces decided on a full retreat across Selleck’s wheat field and up Pittsford Ridge, halting occasionally to fire at their pursuers, who nevertheless chased them to the summit of Pittsford Mountain. The Royal Army’s pursuit continued until early evening, when Fraser’s and Baron Riedesel’s forces returned to the battlefield and encamped.

There were high percentages of casualties on both sides, particularly among the British forces. Burgoyne lost five officers because of the battle with twelve additional officers wounded. A total of 44 rank and file soldiers were also killed with 128 wounded, for a total of 189 casualties. Total American casualties were higher but exact figures are difficult to ascertain. The best estimate indicates that 41 soldiers were killed, and 96 soldiers were wounded. An additional 234 prisoners were wounded as well, for a casualty total of 33 percent when prisoners are included but 12 percent when only soldiers are considered.¹

In the morning of 8 July, Baron Riedesel and his Brunswickers departed, leaving Fraser’s Corps, the wounded, and the prisoners behind. Fraser’s men departed on 9 July, but left behind some 140 wounded Royal forces and dozens of wounded and sick Americans under guard. The last of the British wounded did not leave the Hubbardton area until the last day of July, making their way slowly over the Military Road back to Mount Independence.

The Hubbardton Battlefield is situated in the town of Hubbardton at the northern end of the Taconic Mountain Range. It is bordered on the east by the Valley of Vermont, which is bounded to its east by the Green Mountains, and to the north and west by the Champlain Lowlands. Lake Bomoseen is located approximately 2.3 miles (3.7 km) west of East Hubbardton (Figure 1). At 2,364 acres, Lake Bomoseen is the third largest lake in Vermont after Lake Champlain and Lake Memphremagog. The town of Hubbardton is located within the northernmost portion of the Taconic Physiographic Zone. This Zone covers an extensive area in southwestern Vermont, running some 75 miles north-south from Lake Bomoseen to the Massachusetts border. It is characterized by “low, rounded mountains, ground into soft knobs.”

In 1881, Hamilton Child noted in his gazetteer for Rutland County that Hubbardton’s “surface is hilly and broken and towards the east, mountainous; but in the valleys and lowlands there are many excellent farms” that “the country is well watered by numerous streams, lakes and ponds, which lend a pleasing diversity to the landscape. The streams, however, are all quite small.” The glacial till soil was “once covered with a rich vegetable mould that initially produced the finest wheat” crops, however, its fertility was quickly exhausted and by the late nineteenth century was considered “better adapted to pasturage than tillage.” In the early 2000s the Hubbardton Town Plan commented that “…many of the old farms are largely classified as marginal agricultural land.” The original forest was composed of beech, “birch and maple, interspersed with pine, hemlock and cedar,” which by the mid-to late 1800s had been mostly cut.

The terrain of the battlefield consists primarily of rolling hills that are surrounded by higher mountain peaks to the south, north, and east (Photograph 1). The top of the hill overlooking the Battle Monument lies at an elevation of 1,040 feet above mean sea level (amsl). To the southwest, Mount Zion prominently rises above the rolling terrain, at an elevation of 1,200 feet amsl (Photograph 2). To the northwest, and situated at the base of Sargent Hill, Sucker Brook slowly meanders southwest at an approximate elevation of 840 amsl. Sargent Hill rises to a height of 1,340 amsl, with the saddle at approximately 1,200 feet amsl. Pittsford Ridge is located 1.4 miles east of the Battle Monument and reaches to an elevation of 2,035 feet amsl at its summit. Castleton Creek, on the western side of Pittsford Ridge, cuts through the valley to the south, dropping rather precipitously in elevation from 1,040 to 840 feet amsl in its course within the limits of the battlefield. At the time of the battle, there were several areas of difficult terrain that presented obstacles for movement, like funneling features (e.g. the narrow valley between Zion Hill and Monument Hill) and Sucker Brook and Hollow. There were also numerous minor obstacles across the field of battle, such as ravines, steep slopes, thick woods, fences, brooks, cultivated fields, and areas of felled trees, slash, and stumps.

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Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation) Rutland County, Vermont

Name of Property County and State

The first forty-three-acre parcel of land of the state-owned historic site was purchased in 1937 by the State of Vermont under the auspices of the Hubbardton Battlefield Commission. In 1943, easements were executed with two bordering landholders to prohibit commercial development on portions of their land. In 1947, the State Legislature created the Board of Historic Sites, which then took over the property. In 1967, the 235-acre Fuller farm located west of Monument Hill, including Sucker Brook and Sargent Hill, was purchased by the State and added to the protected property. Most recently, in the fall of 2016, an additional 224 acres were acquired by the State (the former Davidson tract), bringing the total of public lands to approximately 891 acres.

As a result of minimal development, the battlefield site blends in with the agricultural landscape of wooded, rolling hills and cultivated fields of rural Rutland County. The visitor portion of the site is located just west of the main road. The name of this road has changed over the years from Castleton Road, to East Hubbardton Road, and now is called Monument Hill Road, reflecting the historic changes in the area. A State of Vermont metal roadside historic site marker and a hanging wooden sign reading "Hubbardton Battlefield" mark the entrance to the site’s parking area. The entranceway has a log swing-gate barricade. This gate opens onto a short driveway leading into the gravel parking area, which is delineated by horizontal logs. Directly southeast of the parking area is the marble Hubbardton Monument, erected in 1859. It is encircled by a nineteenth-century iron fence, erected in 1875, and ornamented by several mature flowering trees. To the south of the parking area is a grass field and a magnificent view of the Taconic Range to the south, and Mount Zion directly to the southwest. A slate walkway leading to the Visitor Center is situated at the southwest corner of the parking lot.

The Visitor Center sits at the base of Monument Hill. At the top of the hill is a tree line and stone wall delineating the approximate location of a principal portion of the battle (the stone wall is a post-battle construction). A stone wall was present at this location in 1940 when the state mapped the parcel, and the wall was reconstructed in the mid-1970s. The original one-room museum was located on Monument Hill. A new Visitor Center was erected at the base of the hill in 1971, and the earlier museum was demolished in 2001. A mown grass interpretive path begins just north of the Visitor Center. It heads to the northwest up the hill and follows the stone wall southward. Interpretive signs are present at various locations along the mown path to orient visitors within the landscape and explain pivotal details of the battle. Important geographic landmarks that are not entirely visible from this part of the battlefield are noted on these markers. These include the Military Road that extended up through the saddle of Sargent Hill and Sucker Brook, both of which are located on the other side of the Monument Hill to the southwest.

The interpretive path continues to the southeast, leading to the Selleck Cabin site. The Selleck Cabin, only a few years old at the time of the battle, stood just northwest of the junction of the Military Road (St. John Road) and the Castleton Road (modern Monument Hill Road). However, no structure has been standing at this site since the mid-nineteenth century. The cellar hole and foundation walls are still extant. The cellar hole is enclosed by a modern wooden post-and-rail fence. Archeological investigations of the cabin site were conducted in 1977. A small interpretive plaque is present at the site. Across the road to the east are
agricultural fields on a hillside where a major portion of the battle took place. At the bottom of the hill, a small stream runs into North Breton Brook, a tributary of Castleton River. To the east of the small stream stands the towering Pittsford Ridge, which marks the American retreat route from the battlefield.

Hubbardton Battlefield is a well-preserved cultural and natural landscape that conveys the essence of the battle to visitors and scholars. The battlefield includes battle-related archeological deposits. The 2010 ABPP study of the battlefield included a military terrain analysis and reviewed the land through the KOCOA process. Military-historical research is integral to the battlefield interpretive process developed by the ABPP. As part of the ABPP methodology, surveyors apply the precepts of KOCOA military terrain analysis to the battlefield environment. The KOCOA acronym stands for the analytical concepts of Key Terrain/Decisive Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach and Withdrawal. KOCOA elements were defined using a variety of sources including historical documentation, previous battlefield surveys, maps, and the extant natural landscape.

Analysis of the aspects of military movement, position, and combat – as they apply to a given battle location – combines documentary research and field survey, and enables identification of Hubbardton Battlefield’s Defining Features (Table 1). Identification of a battlefield’s defining features, in turn, allows for the establishment of an appropriate boundary. The research examines and analyzes primary sources for information about the battle (e.g., participants’ letters, journals, and memoirs, and early post-battle accounts based on direct experience of the terrain) to discern locational references for KOCOA elements. The KOCOA process, and the supporting research, is directly applicable to archeological investigation at battle locations, providing documentation for the military actions that took place at those locations.

The major defining features of the Hubbardton Battlefield landscape are physical topographic features (hills, streams) and the road network with antecedents that date to the period of the battle. The contemporary map (Figure 2) prepared by German deputy quartermaster general P. Gerlach identifies many of these landscape features. The careful examination of the Gerlach map during the 2010 ABPP study, and the application of KOCOA, confirms these resources within the battlefield. Hubbardton Battlefield retains a high degree of battlefield integrity.5

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**Table 1. Hubbardton Battlefield Defining Features**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Battle Relevance</th>
<th>Note/Field Comment</th>
<th>Integrity Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selleck Cabin</td>
<td>North of Monument Road / St. John Road intersection</td>
<td>Structure Garden</td>
<td>Minor LOS obstacle American HQ British Hospital</td>
<td>Open Cellar Hole</td>
<td>Good Protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Independence Road</td>
<td>West side Monument Hill</td>
<td>Historic Road/Trail</td>
<td>British Advance Route</td>
<td>Cut in 1776; route still extant</td>
<td>Protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monument Hill Road</td>
<td>Runs North-South across battlefield</td>
<td>Historic Road/Trail</td>
<td>Planned/Intended American Retreat Route</td>
<td>Graded/Paved</td>
<td>Modified by cut and fill in places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Ravine/Drainage</td>
<td>Runs North-South West of Selleck Cabin Site</td>
<td>Incised Drainage</td>
<td>British Advance Route</td>
<td>Small steep sided ravine</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnamed Drainage/ Ravine</td>
<td>Runs North-South at western toe slope of Monument Hill</td>
<td>Incised Drainage</td>
<td>British Advance Route Area of Picket Skirmishing at Beginning of Battle</td>
<td>Shallow drainage</td>
<td>East edge Partially altered by the construction of St. John Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Independence and Monument Hill Road Intersections</td>
<td>Large area covering both intersections</td>
<td>Historic Road /Trail Intersection</td>
<td>Overrun American position</td>
<td>Post-war Modification with Construction of St. John Road Southern intersection not determined</td>
<td>Modified by cut and fill in places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sucker Brook/Sucker Brook Hollow</td>
<td>Between base of Sargent Hill and Northwest toe slope of Monument Hill</td>
<td>Stream/ Crossing</td>
<td>British Advance Route</td>
<td>Wide Valley</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentinel Rock</td>
<td>On southwesten slope of Monument</td>
<td>Place-name/Location</td>
<td>Minor Tactical Lookout</td>
<td>Boulder</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
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National Park Service / National Register of Historic Places Registration Form
NPS Form 10-900 OMB No. 1024-0018

Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation) Rutland County, Vermont
Name of Property County and State

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Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Property</th>
<th>Rutland County, Vermont</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hill</td>
<td>County and State</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monument Hill</th>
<th>West of “Hill of Less Eminence”</th>
<th>Place-name/Location</th>
<th>Advance of British Battle lines</th>
<th>Open Fields</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Hill of Less Eminence”</td>
<td>Crossed by Monument Hill Road; East of Monument</td>
<td>Place-name/Location</td>
<td>Advance of British Battle lines/Location of American Log Fence</td>
<td>Open Field Site of current Visitor Center and parking lots</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Contributing Elements

#### Monument Hill: Site Contributing (Photograph 1)

Monument Hill is key terrain because if the Americans could have repulsed the British by seizing and holding its crest, they may have changed the outcome of the battle. Taking the hill would likely have prevented General Simon Fraser from shifting his reserve troops to the south, and cutting off the American retreat route. As it was, the British were able to take advantage of the high ground and push the Americans back. One of Fraser’s officers, British Lieutenant William Digby of the 53rd Regiment of Foot recalled, “…we no sooner gained the ascent, than [sic] there was such a fire sent amongst them as not easily conceived.”

#### Sargent Hill Outcrop: Site Contributing (Photograph 2)

The Sargent Hill Outcrop is a rocky ledge outcrop on the upper portion of the south-facing slope of Sargent Hill, which was reportedly used by Baron Riedesel to observe the battle while it was in progress, and determine his point of attack. His deployment therefore prevented the Americans from turning the British left flank. As one author stated, “At last the Brunswick troops, after a rapid march of a quarter of an hour, arrived terribly heated, upon an eminence from which could be seen the contending forces. Baron Riedesel saw at a glance that the Americans were moving more and more to the right with the evident intention of surrounding Fraser’s left wing. He therefore, resolved to out maneuver them and get into their rear.”

#### Zion Hill: Site Contributing (Photographs 3 and 4)

Zion Hill looms over the battlefield to the south. No significant combat took place on Zion Hill, but it did serve as an observation point. There is some evidence to suggest that a group of British and Native American warriors observed the battle from this vantage point. They may have descended the slope in order to intercept and capture a significant number of American soldiers.

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trying to escape to the south. In the nineteenth century, the use of Zion Hill was noted by Jared Sparks in a letter from the 1830s or 1840s indicating that Indians were observing the battle from Zion Hill. The letter also described an American force that scrambled up Mount Zion, while the Indians watched from behind the trees. When they reached the summit, the Indians jumped out of the trees and captured the American force.8

The “Hill of Less Eminence”: Site Contributing (Photograph 5)
The historical record of the battle identifies an area called the "Hill of Less Eminence." This is a rise in elevation situated east of the crest of Monument Hill and today hosts the battlefield Visitor Center. This hill was the location of considerable battle activity and had a log fence that the Americans used for defense.

Pittsford Ridge: Site Contributing (Photographs 3, 5 and 6)
Pittsford Ridge is a long north-south trending ridge situated to the east of the battlefield. After the American line collapsed at the log fence adjacent to the Selleck wheat field, the American forces retreated across Pittsford Ridge rather than take the southern route along the Castleton Road (today’s Monument Hill Road). The log fence that formed the American defensive line on the east side of Monument Hill Road was mentioned by several eyewitnesses as the point of the strongest American resistance during the battle and was highlighted on the Gerlach map as a key feature (Figure 2).

Mt. Independence-Hubbarton Road or the Military Road: Site Contributing (Figure 3, Photograph 7)
The Military Road, opened in 1776 to Mount Independence on the east side of Lake Champlain, provided the British forces their primary access to the battlefield. Beginning in the mid-1940s, extensive topographic research, historical research, and oral interviews were conducted by Joseph and Mabel Wheeler regarding the trace of the Military Road.9 The road's trace on the Hubbardton Battlefield is well documented as an Avenue of Approach for the Royal Forces and as an Avenue of Retreat from Mount Independence to Castleton for the American Forces. The trace of the Military Road is still discernable west of Sucker Brook, as the road winds up Sargent Hill (Photograph 2).

The use of this road as an Avenue of Approach is supported not only by the Gerlach map (Figure 2), but also by the account given by Pvt. Joseph Bird of the 12th Massachusetts who stated, “...Monday morning, I was boiling chocolate, and carried it down to the road, coming in from Mount Independence; when one of our men jumped up, and cocked his gun to fire, they didn’t let him fire. Then, I turned and looked, to see what he was going to shoot at and I saw the enemy, forming about 15 rods [250 ft / 76.2 m] from us.”10

8 Jared Sparks, MS Sparks 141g p. 95. Houghton Library, Harvard College Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
A broad area in the southern part of the battlefield which includes both the Mt. Independence-Hubbardton Road and Monument Hill Road (formerly known as the Castleton Road) intersection is depicted on the Gerlach map (1777). This area includes the East Hubbardton Baptist Church and Baker House (aka Allen House). This area is considered to be decisive terrain. The capture of this area by the British sealed the fate of the American forces. The importance of this landscape feature is highlighted on Gerlach’s map and in eyewitness accounts. General Fraser noted that he ordered the grenadiers to “….support the right, with directions to prevent, if possible the Enemys’ gaining the road, which leads to Castleton and Skenesborough.”

Monument Hill Road (Castleton Road): Site Contributing (Photograph 8)
Although not utilized by the attacking force in its approach, Monument Hill Road constituted the most obvious avenue of retreat for Warner’s rear guard, as St. Clair’s army had already used the road for that purpose. The loss of effective control over this important feature forced many Americans to retreat by way of Pittsford Ridge. Monument Hill Road today is a paved road.

Selleck Cabin Site (VT-RU-39): Site Contributing (Photograph 9)
The Selleck Cabin Site is an archeological site within the state-owned historic site. Located near the intersection of the Military Road and the Castleton Road (today’s Monument Hill Road), the cabin was the home of John Selleck and his family during the battle and was one of only a few buildings in the immediate vicinity. The building was used by the Americans as their headquarters prior to the fight and subsequently by the British forces as a hospital after the battle. Archeological investigations were conducted here in the 1970s. The field work resulted in the recovery of domestic artifacts related to the eighteenth and nineteenth century occupations of the site, but no battle-related artifacts were found. This study found that the cabin site consists of an open cellar hole with three foundation walls constructed of slate and stones. The open area of the cellar hole is 7.9 m (26 ft) north to south by approximately 7.3 m (24 ft) east to west.

Hubbardton Battlefield (VT-RU-40): Site Contributing (previously listed)
The State of Vermont has designated the entire Hubbardton Battlefield as VT-RU-40.

The Hubbardton Battle Monument (#1108-28): Object Contributing (Photographs 10 and 11)
The Hubbardton Battle Monument is an early commemorative marker for the American Revolutionary War and one of the earliest in the New England states. The location was first marked by a plain pole erected on July 30, 1840, sixty-three years after the battle. At that time, the citizens of Hubbardton “…turned out and erected a pole on the battle-ground, on which was a

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board fastened with this inscription painted in large letters and figures: ‘Hubbardton Battle was fought July 7th, 1777, on this ground.’"\(^{13}\)

Interested citizens soon laid plans for a better, more appropriate marker.\(^{14}\) The Hubbardton Battle Monument Association was chartered by the legislature in 1846 to residents of Castleton. The charter was canceled the following year and reissued to residents of Hubbardton.\(^{15}\) On June 25, 1859, Francis Gault sold a small lot near where the pole was erected in 1840 (measuring 10.1 m/33 ft on a side) to the Hubbardton Battle Monument Association for one cent.\(^{16}\)

The new monument was fashioned of Vermont marble by J.E. Manley of West Rutland, Vermont.\(^{17}\) The monument is about 21 ft (6.4 m) high and is four-tiered and four-sided, with text on each side, and surmounted by a four-sided pinnacle. The monument measures approximately four feet at the base. Amos Churchill, who was an eight-year-old resident of Hubbardton at the time of the battle, was one of the chief contributors funding the monument.\(^{18}\) The wrought iron fence surrounding the monument was added in 1875, ordered by the legislative committee of Keene, New Hampshire. Corner posts were initially intended to be stone, but the wrought iron posts were found to be acceptable and are the posts that are present today.\(^{19}\)

The Monument was formally dedicated on July 7, 1859, on the 82nd anniversary of the battle. The paper reported "the assembly was large, numbering we judge, nearly five thousand people, gathered mainly from the counties of Rutland and Addison."\(^{20}\) Rev. Barna Allen read scripture, Rev. Dr. Childs of Castleton made a prayer, Henry Clark of Poultney gave a history. Addresses were made by Hon. D.E. Nicholson (Wallingford), Col. Allen (Fair Haven), and E.P. Walton (Montpelier). The *Burlington Free Press* added that, "to us a very interesting part of the occasion was the meeting of several of the descendants of Vermonters personally engaged in the battle, and among them Mr. Churchill, now ninety years of age, who was a lad of eight years at the time of the battle. We also heard of Benjamin Hickok, now living in Benson, who was taken prisoner at the time. His presence was expected, but his great age prevented him."\(^{21}\)

There are varying thoughts about how the location of the monument was selected. One explanation for the monument’s placement was offered by Abby Hemenway in a historical gazetteer for Vermont published in 1877. Hemenway asserts that “an appropriate monument of marble was erected on this ground near the spot where [Colonel Ebenezer] Francis was killed, by

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\(^{13}\) [Amos Churchill], “A Sketch of the Dangers and Sufferings, During the Revolutionary War, of the Inhabitants of the Town of Hubbardton.” *The Rutland County Herald* (Rutland, Vermont) December 29, 1854.

\(^{14}\) Hubbardton Land Records, 8:133.

\(^{15}\) Donald R. Sondergeld, *History of Hubbardton, Vermont* (Collierville, Tennessee, 2005), 85.

\(^{16}\) Hubbardton Land Records, 8:133.


\(^{18}\) *Burlington Free Press* (Burlington, Vermont) July 16, 1859.

\(^{19}\) "Hubbardton Battle Ground.” *The Rutland Daily Globe* (Rutland, Vermont) June 17, 1875.

\(^{20}\) *Burlington Free Press*, ibid.

\(^{21}\) *Burlington Free Press*, ibid.
the citizens of Hubbardton and vicinity.”22 A few years later another source suggested that the choice of location for the monument had a slightly different origin. In the 1881 gazetteer for Rutland, Vermont, Hamilton Child wrote that the monument was a burial site for human remains collected after the battle. He noted that the local settlers “…upon their return to their homes after the battle, they found the bones of those who fell, still lying upon the field of battle, bleaching in the sun; gathering them up, they were all buried in one grave, where for 82 years it remained unmarked and nearly forgotten, until on Thursday, July 7, 1859.”23 Child’s explanation traces its history to the placement of the pole in 1840. The remembrance of early Hubbardton resident Amos Churchill, printed in 1854, recalls that human remains were often found on the battlefield and that “occasionally they have been carefully taken care of and buried… here they lay neglected and almost forgotten until July 30th, 1840….” when the residents of Hubbardton erected the pole at the location of the burial.24

**Sucker Brook and Hollow: Site Contributing (Photograph 12)**

Sucker Brook is situated between Sargent Hill and the northwest slope of Monument Hill. The hollow, or valley, was the location of the American rear-guard encampment on the night of 6/7 July, and was the location of the initial clash of arms between the British and American forces. The time of the initial fighting varies according to the source. Based on the ABPP study completed in 2010, the opening move of the battle belonged to British Major Robert Grant and his skirmishers. Grant encountered the American pickets that were probably stationed along Sucker Brook and in its broad valley. The American pickets were soon driven into the main body of American forces, possibly into the camp of Capt. James Carr’s company of the 2nd New Hampshire and some of the stragglers. Grant was killed in this attack.25

**Landscape**

Hubbardton had only been recently settled in the summer of 1777. At the time of the battle, there were nine families living on a scattering of farms near present-day East Hubbardton, located on the old military road from Mount Independence to Castleton - the general vicinity of the battlefield. Amos Churchill recalls that the buildings were all constructed of log.26 Several residents of Hubbardton participated in the battle and several others were taken prisoner by the British forces after the battle. Others abandoned their farmsteads and fled south. The region surrounding Castleton was essentially abandoned during the summer and fall of 1777, since it was occupied by an invading army. Only after the surrender of the Burgoyne’s Army at Saratoga in October of 1777 were the settlers able to return to their homesteads. Soon joined by others, they began to establish farms throughout the town wherever expanses of land would accommodate crops and grazing. With a saw mill tapping the waterpower of Lake Hortonia in the northwest corner of town by the turn of the nineteenth century, wood frame houses began to

22 Hemenway, 760.
26 Ibid.; Amos Churchill reported that the nine families were those of Benjamin Hickok, Uriah Hickok, William Trowbridge, Samuel Churchill, Jesse Churchill, John Sellick, Abdial Webster, Benjamin Boardman, and William Spaulding.
appear on many farms. The historic architecture of Hubbardton now reflects both its early agricultural economy and this later role as a summer recreational haven.27

The landscape over which the battle of Hubbardton was fought in 1777 has changed little over the centuries. Although the land is largely classified as marginal agricultural land, the town has supported many farms since the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Today, land use within the Hubbardton Battlefield is mostly forest and agricultural field, a landscape reflective of centuries of regional farming. There is a very small amount of land within the general project area that has been developed for single-family housing. Fortunately, since the 1930s this important Revolutionary War site has been largely protected through state ownership, limited local development, and the town’s and state’s sustained commitment to preserving the integrity of the site. Although the extent and type of forest cover has changed since the time of the battle (e.g. the surrounding area is presently more cleared than it was at the time of the battle) and despite some significant alterations in the course of Frog Hollow Road and St. John Road, this battlefield is one of the most pristine in the United States. Using the standard definitions of battlefield integrity: Good (75-100%); Fair (50-75%); Poor (25-50%); and Lost (0-25%), the Hubbardton Battlefield rates as Good.

The predominately agricultural character of the battlefield and the surrounding landscape is a contributing element to the interpretation of the battle. Landscape features such as dense woods log and brush fences figure prominently in the battle narrative. Wooded areas were more extensive in 1777, owing to the relatively recent settlement of the area and the sparse number of inhabitants at the time of the battle. Tactically, wooded areas or dense vegetation are double-edged swords. Wooded areas may provide effective cover and/or concealment, but they also have lower visibility, can restrict use of artillery (direct fire), and cause trouble with command and control. At Hubbardton they appear to have provided effective concealment. For example, British Lieutenant Thomas Anburey noted that “…the action [at Hubbardton] was chiefly in the woods, interspersed with a few open fields...the woods so thick, that little or no order could be observed in advancing upon the enemy; it being totally impossible to form a regular line.”28 The steep wooded western slope of Monument Hill (with some felled trees), detailed on the 1777 Gerlach map (Figure 2), appears to have obscured the British approach, allowing the British to surprise several American units at breakfast or preparing to march, especially those located near the Selleck Cabin. Capt. Moses Greenleaf noted, “Francis came to me & desired me to parade the Regt, which I did, at ¼ past 7 he came In haste to me told me an Express had arrived from Gen.l St Clair Informing that we must march with the greatest Expedition or the Enemy would be upon us, also that they had taken Skeensborough will all our Baggage, ordered me to March the Regt Immediately March’d apart of the Regt at 20 Minutes past 7 the Enemy appear’d within Gun shot of us we fac’d to the right then the firing began, which Lasted till ¾ past Eight a.m. without Cessation.”29

28 Hall, 15-16.
Period descriptions as well as known trends in fence building indicate that brush and log stump fences were commonplace on the frontier. The fences at Hubbardton were most likely a mix of uprooted stumps and cut brush/slash gathered at the edge of field. These impermanent fence enclosures were effective temporary breastworks or barricades used by the defending Americans. Private Bird of the 12th Massachusetts recalled that, “on seeing the enemy forming, we were ordered to form, on the East side of the log fence” and “…We drove them back twice, by cutting them down so fast. We didn’t leave [the] log fence or charge them…They couldn’t drive us from the fence, until they charged us.”

A brush/stump fence was located along the eastern side of the Selleck wheat field that provided cover for some limited stands taken by groups of retreating Americans. American Sergeant Major Edward Finel noted that he, “raced mostly southeast down the long open meadow [the Selleck wheat field], exposed to enemy fire on their rear. They [the British] had some difficulty crossing the brush fence, came to the brook and then to the forested land that rose into a mountain that peaked at Pittsford Ridge. Arriving at the forested edge of the land, the Continentals took place with many casualties.”

In largely unsettled country, such as Vermont during the Revolutionary War, roads and/or tracks, no matter how rough, were the only practical way to move troops an extended distance overland. These road networks are also part of the landscape. The individual roads have been mentioned above as contributing elements. It is important to note that the road network as it is currently configured is strikingly like the 1777 road system, with some slight modifications or realignments.

**Non-contributing**

**Battlefield Visitor Center (Building Non-Contributing) (Photograph 13)**

The present Visitor Center, which is located on the west side of Monument Hill Road, was built in 1970 near the location of the former Juckett residence, which was torn down in the 1940s. This new Visitor Center replaced an earlier museum building located further west and closer to the crest of Monument Hill. In 1989, an addition extended the new structure farther to the north to provide restrooms and handicapped accessibility.

**Stone Wall (Object Non-Contributing) (Photograph 1)**

The stone wall situated along the crest of Monument Hill, west of the Visitor Center, was not present at the time of the battle. It appears to be the product of many years of stone clearance from agriculturally used fields. No stone wall is mentioned in any of the firsthand accounts of the battle nor is it depicted on the 1777 Gerlach map. A boundary wall is present on the topographic survey map prepared by the State of Vermont in 1940. It was also noted in the *Burlington Free*.

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31 Hall, 18, 19-20.
Frog Hollow Cemetery (#1108-16) (Site Non-Contributing) (Photograph 14)
The Frog Hollow Cemetery is located on the northwest slope of Monument Hill at an elevation between 262.1 and 268.2 msl (or 860 and 880 fsl). The cemetery is approximately 1.2 acres and contains approximately 275 headstones that date from 1798 to c. 1926. This cemetery contains the graves of several early settlers and Revolutionary War soldiers, including members of the Selleck family. It is owned by the town and has no direct association with the battlefield or state-owned historic site’s mission for commemoration.

Barber-Calvin House (#1108-17) (Building Non-Contributing) (Figure 4)
Built circa 1865, this house is an example of a house type that became popular in Hubbardton in the period after the Civil War. The house was likely built for Milton G. Barber, the son of David Barber who originally settled in Hubbardton circa 1784. The house is situated on the west side of Monument Hill Road (Castleton Road) southeast of Mount Zion, on state property.36

Charles Barker House (also known as Allen House) (#1108-18) (Building Non-Contributing) (Figure 4; Photograph 15)
This house, built in 1795, is an example of the late Georgian tradition, exhibiting an I-house plan with a central chimney, hip roof, and 5 by 2 bays marked by window openings. Locally, the house is known as the Allen House, after a prominent family of that lived there in the mid-nineteenth century. Nothing is known about the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century occupants of this house. This house, privately owned, is located directly south of the Baptist Church. The house was listed to the State Register May 7, 1980.

Baptist Church (#1108-19) (Building Non-Contributing) (Figure 4; Photograph 16)
The Baptist church property on the east side of Monument Hill Road, just south of the St. John Road intersection has a long history. A decade after the battle, the people of the town of Hubbardton built a log meeting house. This building was “large, well supplied with benches, and seats on the sides for the singers. At one end was a platform and a sort of desk for the preacher, while at the other end was a wide stone back for a fire-place, with a large chimney above, built of split sticks well plastered.” In 1800, a 30 x 40 ft (9.1 x 12.2 m) frame meeting house was built on the site by the Baptist Society. In 1854, the church was thoroughly repaired at an

37 Hamilton Child, Gazetteer Business Directory of Rutland County, VT, for 1881-1882 (Syracuse, 1881), 144.
38 Child, 144; Abby Maria Hemenway, The Vermont Historical Gazetteer, Volume III (Claremont, New Hampshire,
expense of $850. At the time, it was rehabilitated in the Greek Revival style and “only the presence of double entries indicates its earlier construction.” Presently, the Baptist Church owns two parcels of land within the general study area: 0.52 acres where the church and an associated outhouse with a gabled roof are located (which was deeded to the church by John Rumsey on March 17, 1801); and a larger 3.9 acre lot south of the church (gifted to the church by the estate of Norman Jones on November 5, 1873). This latter lot was “where the former parsonage stood before it burned on June 17, 1958.”

**Sargent Hill Features (Site Non-Contributing)**

Within the state’s property on Sargent Hill, on the land that formerly belonged to the Fuller family, there are several other landscape features that are representative of early settlement in the region. It is possible that the cultural features on the hill, including some stone walls, a foundation, and a well, may have once been associated with members of the Sargent family who lived in Hubbardton in the 1820s-1840s. No residences are indicated in the vicinity of Sargent Hill on any of the historic maps. Although in-depth land record research remains to be conducted for these sites, it is possible that the sites could have been owned by Junia Sargent. Sargent “bought a farm in Hubbardton, wither he removed and resided six or seven years.” His mother, Ann, died in Hubbardton in 1829 and is buried in the Frog Hollow Cemetery. Subsequently, Junia Sargent “returned to [Pittsford] and spent the remainder of his life with his son Leonard.”

**Discontinued Frog Hollow Road Segment (Site Non-Contributing) (Photograph 17)**

Located north of Schoolhouse #9, this segment runs east to west between Monument Hill Road and Frog Hollow Cemetery. The road was initially established in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century and was discontinued sometime between 1895 and 1940. The topographic survey plat dated 1940 prepared by Vermont Forest Service depicts the former road bed as only a property line. The trace of the road is apparent as a cut through the trees with an overhead powerline marking a portion of the route.

**Relocated Frog Hollow Road (Site Non-Contributing) (Photograph 18)**

In place by 1940, the relocated section of Frog Hollow Road runs north to south between St. John Road and Frog Hollow Road at western foot slope of Monument Hill. The trace of this road is over an altered ground surface. The road is covered with gravel.

**St. John Road (Site Non-Contributing) (Photograph 19)**

St. John Road on the battlefield is an east-west trending road that intersects with Monument Hill Road immediately south of the Selleck Cabin site. The relocated Frog Hollow Road intersects

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40 Hartgen, 7-8.


43 Hubbardton Battlefield Topographic Survey, 1940.

44 Ibid.
with St. John Road along the western base of Monument Hill. A gravel road, St. John Road does not follow the precise course of the former Military Road (Mt. Independence-Hubbardton Road) but historical research indicates that Military Road was in this general corridor between Mt. Zion and Monument Hill. Military Road was used as an avenue of approach by the attacking Royal army to seize the strategic intersection at Monument Hill Road near the Selleck Cabin.45

**Fuller Barn (Building Non-Contributing) (Photograph 20)**
Located west of the Frog Hollow Cemetery, the Fuller barn is located on the north side of Frog Hollow Road. Map evidence suggests that the farm complex dates between 1869 and 1897. J. Wright Peters is shown on the 1869 F.W. Beers’ *Atlas of Rutland County* as the occupant. The barn appears to date from this period as well. In 1907, J. Wright Peters sold the property to John Gerry, who conveyed it in 1908 to William Ray. The parcel was acquired by Harry M. Brown in August of 1931 and remained in the Brown family until 1962. In that year the 235-acre tract containing the house and farm buildings was sold by Edith Wright Brown, widow of Harry M. Brown, to Carl and Susan Fuller. The Fuller’s sold the 235-acre farm to the state in 1967.46 The purchase of the Fuller farm included the location on Sargent Hill containing the trace of the Military Road. The former farmhouse, demolished in 2017, is described below.

**Schoolhouse #9 (#1108-27) (Building Non-Contributing) (Figure 4; Photograph 21)**
The old schoolhouse located north of the Visitor Center on the western side of Monument Hill Road was initially built in the spring of 1786.47 Although undoubtedly repaired and/or extensively remodeled over time, its location appears to be consistent as the structure appears on Scott’s map (1854), the Beers map (1869), and the 1897 USGS topographic map at this location. Part of the lot on the north of the school was sold to the district by Huldah Whitlock November 13, 1854.48 Owned by the state, this structure is leased to the Hubbardton Historical Society. The schoolhouse is not listed to the State Register.

**David Fisher House (tax parcel 6:33) (Building Non-Contributing) (Figure 4; Photograph 22)**
Located east of Monument Hill Road, nearly opposite Schoolhouse #9, is a modern, non-historic building. The parcel is 0.5 acres.

**Ruth Paul House (Building Non-Contributing) (Photograph 23)**
Located at 5300 Monument Hill Road is a non-historic, modern building.

**Archeological Sites**

45 Kenny and Crock, *Hubbardton*, 121.
47 Child, 143.
Presently, the battlefield contains several non-contributing archeological resources. One is included in the Vermont Archeological Inventory and several others are potential archeological resources that have not been fully investigated. Except for site VT-RU-352, these resources are associated with the post-battlefield landscape of Hubbardton.

**VT-RU-352 (Site Non-Contributing)**
Pre-contact Native American archeological site situated along Sucker Brook.

**Fuller Farmhouse Site (Site Non-Contributing) (Photograph 24)**
Located west of the Frog Hollow Cemetery, the Fuller farmhouse was situated on the south side of Frog Hollow Road. The farmhouse appears to have been built between 1869 and 1897 (Beers 1869; USGS 1897). It may have been a second residence built on the Peters farm, either for a son or to replace a dilapidated building. In 1907, J. Wright Peters sold the property to John Gerry, who conveyed it in 1908 to William Ray. The parcel was acquired by Harry M. Brown in August of 1931 and remained in the Brown family until 1962. In that year the 235-acre tract containing the house and farm buildings was sold by Edith Wright Brown, widow of Harry M. Brown, to Carl and Susan Fuller. The Fuller’s conveyed the tract to the State of Vermont in 1967.49 The farmhouse was razed in June 2017 and the foundation filled above grade.

**Whitcomb-Gault House (Site Non-Contributing) (Figure 4)**
The site is located on the west side of Monument Road immediately south of the St. John Road intersection. Dating to the early to mid-nineteenth century, this house was razed circa 1960-70. The cellar hole was filled.

**Whitcomb-Gault Barns (Site Non-Contributing) (Figure 4)**
The site is located on the east side of Monument Road immediately south of the St. John Road intersection. The barns may have been constructed in the late eighteenth century and were enlarged in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. They were razed circa 1974. Like the Whitcomb-Gault House site across Monument Road, the cellar hole was filled.

**Peters House (Site Non-Contributing) (Figure 4)**
This site is situated on the north side of Frog Hollow Road a short distance west of the Fuller Barn. Based on map evidence, the house was constructed in the early to middle decades of the nineteenth century and was gone by the twentieth century, prior to 1962. A cellar hole for the house has been filled.50

**Juckett House (Site Non-Contributing)**
This archeological site is situated in the Visitor Center parking area close to the Battle Monument. The structure was constructed circa 1880 and was razed circa 1940. The location was filled.

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50 Kenny and Crock, *Hubbardton*, 144.
filled, but subsurface evidence of foundations and shafts features (wells, privies) may be present. 51

**Baptist Church Parsonage (Site Non-Contributing) (Figure 4)**
Associated with the Baptist Church, this archeological site is situated approximately 200 yards south of the church building. The Parsonage burned in 1958 and there is no obvious surface evidence of the building.

**Private Landholders**
Most of core battlefield is owned by the State of Vermont, which also owns a large proportion of the broader battlefield boundary area. Only a handful of private individuals and organizations currently own land that is likely to have been the site of military maneuver or combat on 7 July 1777. Post-dating the events of the battle, the private properties with structures are shown above as non-contributing resources.

One parcel of 6.8 acres (parcel 6:51) within the core area of the battlefield consists of a mix of open ground and wood lot, situated along the lower northwest slope of Mt. Zion south of St. John Road and abutting the state-owned lands. There is no structure or residence.

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51 Ibid., 147.
8. Statement of Significance

Applicable National Register Criteria
(Mark "x" in one or more boxes for the criteria qualifying the property for National Register listing.)

- Property is associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history.
- Property is associated with the lives of persons significant in our past.
- Property embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction or represents the work of a master, or possesses high artistic values, or represents a significant and distinguishable entity whose components lack individual distinction.
- Property has yielded, or is likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history.

Criteria Considerations
(Mark “x” in all the boxes that apply.)

- Owned by a religious institution or used for religious purposes
- Removed from its original location
- A birthplace or grave
- A cemetery
- A reconstructed building, object, or structure
- A commemorative property
- Less than 50 years old or achieving significance within the past 50 years

Areas of Significance
(Enter categories from instructions.)

Archeology
Conservation
Military

Section 8 page 24
Social History

Period of Significance
July 1777-1937

Significant Dates
7 July 1777
7 July 1859
7 July 1927

Significant Person
(Complete only if Criterion B is marked above.)
Seth Warner

Cultural Affiliation
Unknown

Architect/Builder
N/A

Statement of Significance Summary Paragraph (Provide a summary paragraph that includes level of significance, applicable criteria, justification for the period of significance, and any applicable criteria considerations.)

Statement of Significance Summary
Hubbardton Battlefield is nationally significant as the site of an important military encounter during the Northern Campaign of 1777, and a formative event in the development of the Northern Department Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War. A tactical loss for the American forces, historians conclude that, strategically, the battle was an American success because it allowed General St. Clair's withdrawing Northern Army to unite with General Schuyler’s forces near Fort Edward on 12 July, thus keeping alive the American army that blocked further movement south by British General John Burgoyne. The battle lasted more than three hours, probably closer to five, and involved soldiers from Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Several important Americans participated in the engagement, including Colonel Seth Warner of Vermont, and Colonel Ebenezer Francis of Massachusetts. Brigadier General Simon Fraser of the British 24th Regiment of Foot commanded the Advance Guard, while Baron Riedesel commanded the Royal Army’s Left Wing composed principally of Brunswick formations. The significance of this site is materially enhanced by the high integrity of its natural, cultural, and visual landscape as well as its archeological potential to improve upon or even radically change site interpretation. Archeological surveys conducted on the battlefield in 2001 and 2002 confirmed the presence of battle-related artifacts, such as lead shot, buttons, buckles, and other detritus of war. The Hubbardton Battlefield is an example of early attempts to preserve, and commemorate Revolutionary War battlefields, with a local grassroots effort that
included veterans and eyewitnesses to the event. This initial mid-nineteenth-century effort was followed by official state involvement in the acquisition, development, and management of the site in the second quarter of the twentieth century as a historic site. This later phase of preservation was a part of a larger national trend in which organizations, and states sought to place monuments, and create battlefield parks that coincided with both the expansion of automobile-based cultural tourism, and a period of recalling our colonial, and revolutionary past. Hubbardton Battlefield was listed in the National Register of Historic Places in 1971. As part of ongoing research, and stewardship of this cultural, and historical resource, this amended nomination recognizes the battlefield’s larger significance under Criteria A, B, and D, and Criterion Consideration F, with a period of significance from July 1777, when the battle occurred, to 1937, when the State of Vermont purchased the land to establish a commemorative site.

Historical Context - The 1777 Invasion from Canada

The summer of 1777 was the third time that the Champlain Valley served as a theatre of war during the American War of Independence. Setting out from Crown Point in August 1775, Irish-born General Richard Montgomery led an American force to the gates of Fort Saint-Jean (St. John), which surrendered on 2 November 1775. Montgomery next turned his army towards Montreal, which surrendered on 13 November. On 2 December, Montgomery joined his troops to those of Benedict Arnold at Pointe aux Trembles, 18 miles upriver from Québec. British Governor Sir Guy Carleton inside Québec City refused to surrender. Montgomery was killed during an attack on the city during the night of 31 December, and the British captured many his men. Benedict Arnold, now in command of American forces in Canada, was however able to maintain the siege of Québec once reinforcements and additional supplies had arrived.

Upon hearing the news of American military successes in Canada, the British government in London embarked on an ambitious plan to attack the rebels from Canada along the Lake Champlain-Hudson River route, and to carry the war into New England. The 10,000-man expedition stood under the command of General John Burgoyne, who arrived in Canada in May 1776. His forces lifted the siege of Québec, and on 8 June 1776 in the Battle of Trois-Rivières routed the American forces attempting to stem the Royal advance. Carleton allowed the approximately 2,000 American survivors to retreat to Montreal, and by 15 June that city, too, was in British hands. Carleton continued to push south into New York State along the Richelieu River towards Lake Champlain. Upon reaching the lake he ordered the construction of a fleet of small vessels, which defeated Arnold’s similar fleet in the Battle of Valcour Island on 11 October. By this time, Carleton had reached a point just north of Mount Independence and Fort Ticonderoga. In view of the lateness of the season Carleton decided to end his pursuit of the rebels and returned to Canada. Although he had re-established British control over the Lake Champlain area by the end of the year, Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were still in American hands, and no British soldier had set foot into the Hudson River Valley.52

52 See R. Arthur Bowler, “Sir Guy Carleton and the Campaign of 1776 in Canada” The Canadian Historical Review vol. 55 no. 2 (June 1974), 131-140. An excellent overview of the importance of the Lake Champlain defenses of Fort Ticonderoga and the equally important works at Mount Independence is Donald H. Wickman and the Mount Independence Coalition, Strong Ground: Mount Independence and the American Revolution (Orwell, VT: Mount
Burgoyne returned to England where he succeeded not only in convincing King George III and his government that it was Carleton’s fault that Ticonderoga was still in American hands, but also in getting himself appointed, on 28 February, to lead the 1777 expedition into the Hudson River Valley. Burgoyne arrived in Québec on 6 May 1777. When Carleton learned of Burgoyne’s appointment he resigned his governorship in protest, on 27 June, but had to remain at his post for another year before he could return to Britain in mid-1778. Burgoyne’s plan, which he had devised and developed himself, called for British forces under his command to follow the same avenue of attack taken in 1776, but with the aim of capturing Ticonderoga, and marching on to Albany. Here he would meet up with a smaller British force under Barry St. Leger, which was to approach along the Mohawk River valley north-west of Albany in New York State. As he continued along the Hudson River, St. Leger would meet up with forces under General Howe marching inland from New York City. Once these columns merged, New England, considered the center of the rebellion, would be cut off from the rest of the United States. Burgoyne was convinced that New England could then be reduced to obedience to the crown rather easily. That unified strategy, however, never materialized. Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, was loath to exercise close control over his field commanders from far-away London, and instead issued instructions that left much of the campaign strategy for 1777 to the generals’ own discretion. Germain had wanted Burgoyne, Clinton, and Howe to cooperate but instead each of them followed his own plans and fought his own battles. Historians still argue whether Burgoyne knew of Howe’s campaign plans for 1777 when he departed from Québec on 13 June 1777 on his march south toward the Hudson. That same day, Howe moved his forces out of winter quarters at New Brunswick, New Jersey. Rather than move north along the Hudson to meet up with Burgoyne, Howe chose his own campaign, and sailed southward, landed his forces near Elkton, Maryland, and marched on Philadelphia, the center of American political power, which he occupied on 26 September. Barry St. Leger was forced to cease the siege of Fort Stanwix on 22 August after losing his Indian allies, who were dissatisfied with the siege warfare. Sir Henry Clinton carried out some token movements up the Hudson that turned out to be of little help to Burgoyne.

Equally important for the eventual failure of Burgoyne was his overconfidence in the abilities of the large force under his command, and in his belief that large numbers of Canadians, Indians,
and Loyalists would rally round his flag once he entered New York State. The New York loyalists never materialized, and of the around 2,000 militia Burgoyne had hoped to find in Québec, Carleton was only able to raise three small companies. Similarly, Burgoyne was only able to raise half of the 1,000 Indians he had hoped would accompany his forces.

On 13 June 1777, Burgoyne and Carleton reviewed their forces at Fort St. John just north of Lake Champlain. Burgoyne assumed command of about 7,000 regulars, and 138 pieces of artillery from 3-pound battalion guns to 18-pounders as well as mortars, and howitzers. For the invasion of New York, Burgoyne organized his army into an advance force under Brigadier General Simon Fraser, and two divisions: Major General William Phillips with 3,900 British regulars, and Baron Riedesel with some 3,100 Brunswickers, and Hanauers. Initially things went well for Burgoyne. His men occupied the deserted fortifications at Crown Point on 30 June. Two days later British advance forces reached Fort Ticonderoga. By 4 July most of the American forces had withdrawn to either Fort Ticonderoga or Mount Independence on the Vermont side of Lake Champlain. In the process they had, unknowingly, opened the way for British artillery to move onto Sugar Loaf Mountain, today’s Mount Defiance. American General Arthur St. Clair had mistakenly considered the mountaintop impassable. Claiming that, “Where a goat can go, a man can go. And where a man can go, he can drag a gun,” Phillips’ men had successfully dragged two 12-lb cannons, later howitzers and 24-lb cannon, to the mountaintop. From here British artillery could bombard the fort as well as Mount Independence, making American positions indefensible. St. Clair had no choice but to hastily withdraw his forces during the night of 5/6 July, leaving behind large amounts of supplies. In the morning of 6 July, British forces occupied Fort Ticonderoga virtually unopposed, and hard on the heels of the retreating Continental Army. The capture of Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence ended the first phase of Burgoyne’s campaign. St. Clair retreated to Castleton, then to Rutland, and on to Fort Edward, and left Colonel Seth Warner as a rear-guard at Hubbardton.

The Battle of Hubbardton
Phase 1: 7 July 1777 from 5:00 a.m. to 6:30 a.m.: Pursuit from Mt. Independence, and Initial Contact


Burgoyne’s Orderly Book was published by Edmund Bailey O’Callaghan, Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne: from his entry into the state of New York until his surrender at Saratoga, 16th Oct. 1777; from the original manuscript deposited at Washington's head quarters, Newburgh, N. Y. (Albany: J. Munsell, 1860).

The retreat from Fort Ticonderoga early in the morning of 6 July was disorderly and confused. Patrick Cogan, quartermaster in Colonel Joseph Cilley’s First New Hampshire Regiment, complained bitterly to General John Stark about American leadership.

Surely we were fifty thousand times better off than General Sullivan was in Canada last year; our men was in high spirits, and determined to a man to stick by the lines till they lost their lives, rather than quit so advantageous a Post […] there never was a field officer consulted, whether we should retreat or not, which makes them very uneasy; so that the blame of our Retreat must fall on our Commanders; never was soldiers in such a condition without cloaths [sic], victuals or drink & constantly wet. Caleb and I are just as our mothers bore us without the second shirt, the second pair of shoes, stockings or coats.58

One year later at Fort Ticonderoga, Cilley stated the British on 6 July, “Drove us a long two or three & thirty miles that day, till the Rear Guard got to Bowman's Camp; the men being so fatigued were obliged to stay, and were attacked in the morning by the Regulars, who travel'd all Night, and just got up by the time we were beginning to march in a disorderly manner; our men being in confusion, and made no great of a Battle.”59 Compared to the pursuing Royal forces, Continental Army troops were at the very least discouraged as they trudged south-east down the Military Road, a grand name for a road trace slashed through a long stretch of wilderness cleared only the previous year - from Mount Independence toward Hubbardton. Behind General Arthur St. Clair’s forces came the rear-guard under Colonel Ebenezer Francis with the remnants of the 11th Massachusetts Regiment, growing larger along the way by the addition of stragglers, sick, and wounded from various units it swept up along the way. St. Clair had initially planned to wait for Francis but having waited a few hours in the afternoon of 6 July decided to move on to Castleton with his main force. Before he continued his withdrawal, St. Clair detached Colonel Seth Warner with his “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers, Colonel Nathan Hale’s 2nd New Hampshire Regiment, and some militia as his rear-guard. This group had orders to join him at Castleton once Francis reached Hubbardton. Upon arrival at Hubbardton, Francis was to place himself under the command of Warner. Once united, this rear-guard, drawn from the best units St. Clair had available, would constitute a force of somewhere between 1,000 and 1,200 men under Warner and Francis, two experienced, and highly regarded officers.60

59 Ibid.
60 A “General Return of Troops at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence” dated 28 June 1777 gives Hale 126 men present, and fit for duty, Francis 206, and Warner 99, for a total of 431; 110 were present, and sick, and 332 “on command” for a total of 883. Seven men were sick absent, and three on furlough. The rear-guard that departed Mt. Independence was about 450 strong; adding Hale’s, and Warner’s, 225 men plus some 300 stragglers, sick etc we arrive at a number of around 1,000 men at Hubbardton. For a discussion of troops strengths see appendices A, C, D, and E, in John Williams, The Battle of Hubbardton. The American Rebels stem the Tide. (Montpelier, 1988). Besides Williams this battle narrative is based on Henry Hall, Battle of Hubbardton, ms 149, Vermont Historical Society, Barre, VT; Bruce Venter; see The Battle of Hubbardton: The Rear Guard Action that Saved America (Charleston, South Carolina: The History Press, 2015), and Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton. A brief and easily accessible account
Colonel Francis finally reached Warner’s bivouac around 4:00 p.m. The three colonels met in John Selleck’s cabin and decided to settle down for the night rather than march an additional six miles to join up with Continental Army forces under General St. Clair encamped in Castleton. There were several good reasons for this decision. Although his own men were ready to march on, the sick, and wounded in Francis’ detachment were exhausted, and unable to continue marching that day. Leaving them behind in the bivouac was not an option they considered. Warner had faith in the fighting ability of his men and was in a highly defensible position. Furthermore, about 2½ miles south of him, two New Hampshire militia regiments under Colonels Bellows and Olcott were blocking the road. These men were on the verge of mutiny, having leveled their muskets at their own officers the previous day when ordered to let the Continental Army pass. Fearing that they might be sacrificed to the pursuing British army while the Continentals saved themselves, these militiamen were almost certain to refuse passage to Warner and his men. Warner knew that he was being pursued by Royal forces, but he also knew that the pursuers would be struggling just as hard as his men over the stumps littering the road from Mount Independence and would likely have to rest a few miles behind him. Having posted sentries along the perimeter, and along the road to Mount Independence, the men went to sleep, assuming that they would join up with the main army the next day. Captain Enos Jones of Colonel Samuel Brewer’s Regiment entered in his diary “…6. [July 1777] 3 o’clock in m: orders came to march. We marched to Hulberton [Hubbardton] with much furtigue [sic], Lodged that night.”

General Simon Fraser’s pursuing forces had indeed struggled as much as the Continentals and went into bivouac on the Military Road about two miles from Warner’s men. Fraser, lieutenant colonel of the 24th Regiment of Foot with the temporary rank of brigadier while commanding the advance guard, had 22 companies (approximately 850 men) under his detachment. The men included ten companies each of Light Infantry, and Grenadiers, and two companies from his own regiment. He had been the first to enter Fort Ticonderoga shortly after midnight on 6 July, but his pursuit of the retreating Americans had been delayed when some of his men started to help themselves to the American supplies in equipment, food, and above all the liquor, stored in the fort. It was already daybreak before he could set out along the Military Road. Francis, and his forces, was about four miles ahead of him.


61 For a discussion of the role of the militia see also Kenny and Crock, *Hubbardton*, 21; a detailed discussion, and table of American forces ibid., 29.

62 “Journal of Captain Enos Jones” *New England Historical and Genealogical Register* vol. 15 (1861), 299-304. Jones was taken prisoner at Hubbardton. Like some of the other sources quoted in this narrative Stone is not listed among the “Primary Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Hubbardton” in Kenny and Crock, *Hubbardton*, 43. Kenny and Crock list six British/Loyalist, and Brunswick accounts, and eight American accounts.


65 General Fraser’s account in the form of a letter to John Robinson from Skeensborough, dated 13 July 1777, is
As Fraser was resting his men around 4:00 p.m., Baron Riedesel caught up with him. He had orders from Burgoyne to pursue the fleeing Americans with the Brunswick Prinz Friedrich Regiment of Infantry, and a battalion each of Jäger, grenadiers, and chasseurs, totaling a force of 1,100 men. When he met up with Fraser he had with him a company of Jäger, a detachment of grenadiers of about 80 men, and a few chasseurs for a total of around 180 troops. Although riled by the presence of an officer who outranked him, Fraser agreed to march ahead another three miles, and bivouac there while Baron Riedesel bivouacked where he was. Both units broke camp, and continued their pursuit the next morning at 3:00 a.m. If Fraser encountered a large number of enemy troops, he was to inform Baron Riedesel, and await his arrival before attacking. Fraser was convinced that this circumstance would not occur, and instead expected to encounter only about 500 men or so under Colonel Ebenezer Francis.

It was around 4:00 a.m. when Fraser’s column finally got on its way. Lord Francis Napier of the 31st Regiment of Foot recorded in his journal that the column “Marched at daybreak,” which would have been even later, but Napier was not part of Fraser’s force. Civil twilight on 7 July 1777 in the Hubbardton-Castleton area was around 5:45 a.m., civil sunrise about 40 minutes later around 6:20 a.m. Ensign Hille, who was not present at the battle, recorded that “At dawn, Fraser's corps near Hubbardton met with the very strong rear guard of the Provincials and had a lively fire from 5 - 7:30 o'clock.” Fraser’s scouts near Hubbardton met with the very strong rear guard of the Provincials and had a lively fire from 5 - 7:30 o'clock.” Fraser’s scouts near Hubbardton met with the very strong rear guard of the Provincials and had a lively fire from 5 - 7:30 o'clock.”

Phase 2: 7 July 1777 from 6:30 a.m. to 7:30 a.m.: British Advance Guard deploys as Americans line up along Sucker Brook

The battle-lines were drawn, but before he ordered the attack Fraser wanted to know how many Americans he would face (Figure 2). When his scouts returned an hour later at around 6:15 a.m., they brought the unwelcome news that his opponents were considerably stronger then he had assumed. Knowing that Baron Riedesel was less than three miles behind him, he sent aides to the Brunswick officer with the news, and an order to speed up his men. He then went on a reconnaissance with Major Robert Grant. Fearing that Warner would gather strength by the published in an appendix to Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society vol. 4 (1898-1902), 139-147; the Battle of Hubbardton on 145-147.

66 Garrison Life, 75.
68 Francis Napier also placed initial contact at “About five O’Clock.” S. Sydney Bradford, “Lord Francis Napier’s Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign.” Maryland Historical Magazine vol. 57 No. 4 (December 1962), 300.
69 A partially unpublished account of the Battle of Hubbardton from the Brunswick perspective outlining Riedesel’s movements is the official journal of the Brunswick troops kept by Riedesel’s aide-de-camp Captain Friedrich Christian Cleve. The section covering the period from 6 November 1776 to 10 July 1777 was however published by
absorption of local militia, Fraser, lacking artillery and low on musket ammunition, and with at most 850 troops plus a few Native Americans under his command, gave orders to attack around 6:30 a.m. 70 Loyalist Joshua Pell, a volunteer in the 24th Regiment of Foot, recorded that on, “7th July, Part of the Advance Corps came up with the Rebels at Hubberton [sic], about six in the morning.” 71 Lt. Henry Sewall of the 12th Massachusetts recorded that, “The British Regulars, Hessians & Indians attacked us a little after Sunrise,” around 6:30 a.m. 72 As Royal forces quickly approached down Sargent Hill, the Continentals encamped in a delaying position along Sucker Brook had little time to prepare for action. Captain Jones wrote that, “7 in m[orning]: the Inemy [sic] came upon us without warning.” 73

Depending on where they were located in the morning of the battle, Americans were either getting ready for breakfast or already preparing for the march when Fraser’s men attacked. Ebenezer Fletcher was completely surprised by the attack. “The morning after our retreat, orders came very early for the troops to refresh and be ready for marching. Some were eating, some were cooking, and all in a very unfit posture for battle. Just as the sun rose, there was a cry, ‘the enemy are upon us’ Looking round I saw the enemy in line of battle. Orders came to lay down our packs and be ready for action. The fire instantly began.” 74 Corporal Fox of the 47th Regiment of Foot, who was not present at the battle, had shared another sequence of the battle. Americans “were encamp’d upon a hill and Cooking in Camp. Just leaving they were surprised at that time. when we was [sic] at the bottom of the hill we engaged them. the fire was hot on both sides three quarters of hours our granadiers [sic] and light Infantry made a volly [sic] and a charge and took possession of the ground. they retreated not having time to take their napsacks with them [sic].” 75 James Whelpley, on the other hand, told Jared Sparks in 1830 that:

The soldiers were slinging their knapsack preparing to march when Francis and Warner heard that the advanced troops of the British were near at hand. They had encamped three miles back during the night, in a valley near the present site of


70 “On July 7, at a distance of 2 or 3 miles, Brigadier Fraser attacked and beat the enemy with his Advance-Guard of about 732 men but without artillery.” Helga Doblin, “Journal of Lt. Colonel Christian Julius Prätorius 2 June 1777-17 July 1777” The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum vol. 15 No. 3 (Winter 1991), 57-68, 65. Prätorius was commanding officer of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment.

71 “Diary of Joshua Pell, Junior an Officer of the British Army in America 1776 – 1777” The Magazine of American History with Notes and Queries Edited by John Austin Stevens, vol. 2 No. 2 (February 1878), 107-12, 107.

72 Diary of General Henry Sewall (1752-1845), from March 1776-31 December 1842. MAHS Ms. N-905. Sewall served as a lieutenant in the 12th MA from 1 January 1777 to 25 June 1779.

73 “Journal of Captain Enos Jones” New England Historical and Genealogical Register vol. 15 (1861), 299-304


Hubbardton Meeting House, and by an early march had overtaken these rear divisions of Gates’s army.

Firing was heard in the woods at the foot of the hill, or rather across a ravine on the south of Warner’s encampment. He and Francis immediately formed their men and marched to the top of the hill on the side towards which the British under Frazer were approaching. The Americans retreated from the brow of the hill and formed behind a log fence in a wheatfield where they stood till the enemy came up, and the action commenced. The firing was warm and well sustained on both sides. The British line was formed in the edge of a wood having the log fence in front. The two lines were stretched from north to south directly over the top of the hill having a road between them. Warner is said to have placed himself in a conspicuous place during the action, and to have animated his men by his language and his deeds.76

Lieutenant Thomas Anbury of the 62nd Regiment of Foot wrote that, “about five, we came up with the enemy, who were busily employed cooking their provisions.”77 Private Joseph Bird of the 12th Massachusetts Regiment remembered that he, “was boiling chocolate, and carried it down the road, coming in front Mount Independence; when one of our men jumped up, and cocked his gun to fire, they didn’t let him fire. Then, I turned and looked to see what he was going to shoot at ad [sic] saw the enemy, aforming about 15 rods [about 250 feet] from us.”78

Francis’ men along Sucker Brook may not have had, “time to take their knapsacks with them,” but Fraser may have quickly regretted his decision to attack. Taking the lead with the two companies of his 24th Regiment, Major Grant was among the first casualties of the battle. Francis’ men had waited behind a crude abatis of felled trees on Sucker Brook. When the smoke from the first volley of Francis’ men cleared, the regiment had taken 22 casualties. Fraser gave orders for his men to deploy from the column in which they had marched on the Military Road to line formation. Switching to battle formation gave Warner’s men valuable time to deploy along the ridge of Monument Hill.

Phase 3: 7 July 1777 from 7:30 a.m. to 8:45 a.m.: Battle for Monument Hill and Monument Hill Road

Captain Moses Greenleaf of Francis’ 11th Massachusetts recorded that he had had breakfast with Colonel Francis up on Monument Hill when,

76 MS Sparks 141g, pp. 93-96. Houghton Library, Harvard College Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Whelpley was born in 1747 in Wilton, CT, and settled in Hubbardton in 1787, where he died in 1838. He did not fight in the Battle of Hubbardton. His Pension Application S 41332 identifies him as a Quartermaster and Captain in 4th Connecticut Regiment, though the debate over his rank and length of service stretches over a number of years.
78 Quoted in Hall, Hubbardton, 18.
At seven o'clock Col' Francis came to me & desired me to parade the Regt, which I did, at ¼ past 7 he came in Haste to me told me an Express had arrived from Genl St Clair Informing that we must march with the greatest Expedition, or the Enemy would be upon us, also that they had taken Skenesbrough with all our Baggage, ordered me to March the Regt Immediately March'd apart of the Regt at 20 Minutes past 7 the enemy appear'd with Gun shot of us we fac'd to the right then the firing began which Lasted till ¾ past Eight a.m. without Cessation.\(^7\)

Lieutenant William Digby recalled that on the 7\(^{th}\),

After marching 4 or 5 miles we came up with above 2000 of the enemy strongly posted on the top of a high hill, with breast works before them, and great trees cut across to prevent our approach; but not withstanding all these difficulties, they had no effect on the ardor always shewn by British Troops, who with the greatest steadiness and resolution, mounted the hill amidst showers of balls mixed with buck shot, which they plentifully bestowed amongst us ...we no sooner gained the ascent, than there was such a fire sent amongst them as not easily conceived; they for some hours maintained their ground, and once endeavoured to surround us, but were soon made sensible of their inferiority, (altho we had not more than 850 men engaged, owing to our leaving the camp in so great a hurry, half of our companies being on guard and other duties), and were drove from their strong hold with great slaughter.\(^8\)

Richard Pope of the 47\(^{th}\) Regiment of Foot recorded that while Fraser ordered the Light Infantry to take, “a commanding ground on the left …the advanced guards under Major Grant of the 24\(^{th}\) Regt. was by this time engaged, & the grenadiers were advanced to sustain them, and to prevent the right being turned. The Brigadier remain’d upon the left, with part of the light Infantry, when the Enemy from behind Logs and trees, defended themselves long, but at length gave way.” That, however, was not the end of the battle. Brigadier Fraser, who had run “up the hill” in front of him with his Light Infantry when he saw that Warner was trying to turn his left flank, had opened that option to Warner when he had,

ordered the Granadiers to support the right, with directions to prevent, if possible the Enemys’ gaining the road, which leads to Castletown and Skeensborough, our left was much weakened by this manœuvre, but I still depended on the arrival of the Brunswick troops; the Light Infantry beat the Enemy from the first hill and drove them to a hill of less eminence, which was their original post, they were

\(^7\) Donald H. Wickman, “‘Breakfast on Chocolate’: The Diary of Moses Greenleaf, 1777” The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum vol. 15 No. 6 (1997), 483-508, 497.
\(^8\) James Phinney Baxter, The British Invasion from the North, The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, 1776-1777, with the Journal of Lieut. William Digby, of the 53D, or Shropshire Regiment of Foot (Albany, 1887). The journal for the campaign of 1777 can be found on pages 185-323, the Battle of Hubbardton on 209-220, the quote on page 209.
pushed so warmly here, that they left it, & when they wished to gain the Castletown road, by filing off to their own left, they were met by the Granadiers who obliged them to attempt a retreat by scrambling up Huberton mountain, and march towards Pitsford falls, here the Granadiers moved on the right flank of the Enemy, and we got possession of the top of this hill before they could, they were now put to flight on their left, but a party that were desireous to gain the road leading from Huberton towards the lower part of Otter Creek by Chimney point observed the weakness of my left, where I was in person, and made some demonstrations to renew the attack.81

As the Continentals rallied behind a log fence on the east side of Monument Hill Road (then Castleton Road), Fraser found himself in a difficult position, and “depending on the arrival of the German Brigade.”

Phase 4: 7 July 1777 from 8:45 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.: Arrival of Baron Riedesel, End of Main Battle, Americans retreat to West Rutland

It was almost 9:00 a.m. before Baron Riedesel’s forces reached the battlefield. Francis Napier attested to Baron Riedesel’s good judgement in deploying his troops when he wrote that, “Major General Reidzel [sic] arriving with the Chasseurs Company and 80 Grenadiers & Light Infantry, took up his ground with great judgment upon the Left of the Brigadiers troops.”82

Mond. July 7. The regiment continued its march early in the morning. The Fraser Corps had the têtê and was followed by the Advance Guard of the Grenadiers and Chasseurs. At 9 o’clock in the morning, we came upon the enemy in Hubbardton in the woods behind a strong barricade. The Fraser Corps were the first to get in close combat with the enemy. In the beginning, the enemy did not want to retreat but when Gen. v. Riedesel rushed to the aid of the Fraser Corps with the Advance Guard of the Germans and the Jäger Company, they quickly took to flight. Three hundred were taken prisoners without [counting] the dead. The Fraser Corps had also lost quite a number of people. Of the Braunschweig troops there were about 40 killed and wounded.83

Concurrently the 11th and 12th Massachusetts in the center, and southern, parts of the battlefield took cover behind a log fence, “just opposite the west of Mount Independence Road …but didn’t fire much, till the enemy formed on the clearing,” wrote Private Bird of the 12th Massachusetts. While the enemy were forming, Captain Enos Stone:

81 Venter, 95.
82 Napier, 300.
83 “The battles of Saratoga from an ‘Enemy’ Perspective (Fragment of a diary from the Lower Saxony State Archives, Wolfenbüttel),” Helga Doblin and Mary C. Lynn, transl. and eds., Tamkang Journal of American Studies vol. 3 (Spring 1987), 5-35, 8. Von Hille wrote that “The English troops were already said to withdraw but because the jager company of Capt. von Schottelius and a detachment of 80 of our grenadiers and light infantry hurried to their aid, the Provincials were made to withdraw in a short time and very many taken prisoners.” Garrison Life, 75.
went forward, and from the rail fence, East of the garden, next to the Selleck House, on the west side of the …road, removed the three top rails, for seven or eight lengths, so that we could have a better chance at them. We drove them back twice, by cutting them down so fast. We didn’t leave [the] log fence or charge them. The action began on our right which soon gave way. They couldn’t drive us from the fence until they charged us. I was near the center, opposite the west road, under Col. Francis. Hale commanded our right. We fought, before they drove us till I had fired nearly 20 cartridges.84

Talking to Jared Sparks in 1830, Whelpley told him:

The Americans held their ground, till Riedesel came up with the Germans on Frazer’s left. This made such fearful odds in numbers, as they were entirely outflanked, that they soon broke and retreated down the hill through the wheatfield into the woods. The British pursued.

A party of Americans under Col. Hale, retreated up a steep hill, half a mile from the battle ground, pursued by the enemy. When he reached the top of the hill, he was encountered by another party of Provincials, Canadians, and Indians, who had not been in the action, and who were not known to be in this place. They had preceded St. Clair’s army the day before, and committed depredations, and taken prisoners. The orders were that they should take all the men prisoners, whom they found from home. When St. Clair approached, they had ascended this hill for concealment and defence. It was steep and covered with thick wood, as it is in fact to this day.

It was accidental, therefore, that Hale and his men were met by this party but being thus unexpectedly brought between two fires he was obliged to surrender. In this way nearly all the prisoners were taken, that fell into the hands of the British on that day. Several of Hale’s men fled into the woods and escaped.85

Baron Riedesel’s timely arrival quickly turned the tide of battle in Fraser’s favor. Fraser informed John Robinson that when,

Major Bernard [Barner] with some of the German Light troops came up, they entered into action in the handsomest manner possible, the firing slackened immediately & ceased entirely in about six minutes after the arrival of any part of the Germans but before it was altogether over Mr. Redeisell sent me an Aid de Camp to know in what manner I would have the Battalions of his Brigade disposed of. I desired he would succour my left, with all his Chasseurs and one Battalion, and send the other two to support my right, he then came to the rear of

84 Quoted in Hall, Hubbardton, 19/20.
85 MS Sparks 141g, pp. 93-96.
the place where I stationed myself; a few scattering shots were still flying from the Enemy, I stepto the General, and the rebels disappearing. There was no more firing to be heard anywhere.\textsuperscript{86}

Joshua Pell wrote that “our Men form’d briskly, ascended the Hill within thirty yards of the Rebels and immediately began a brisk fire, which lasted one hour and half, three Companies of the Germans arrv’d time enough, to have a share in the action, and behav’d exceedingly well, particularly the Company of Chasseurs; the Rebels was totally routed.”\textsuperscript{87} Digby thought, “The action lasted near three hours, before they attempted retreating, with great obstinacy.” The retreat occurred in part because, “A party of Germans came up time enough also to share in the glory of the day, and the regular fire they gave at a critical time was of material service to us.” General James Hamilton in his “Orders” of 10 July 1777, informed his troops that,

On the 7th Brigad. Gen. Fraser at the head of a little more than half the advanced Corps and without artillery (which with the utmost endeavours it was impossible to get up) came up with near Two thousand of the Ennemy strongly posted, attacked and defeated them with the loss on the Ennemy’s part of many of their principal officers, Two hundred men killed on the spot, and a much greater number wounded and Two hundred made prisoners.

Major General Riedesel with his advanced guard consisting of the Chasseurs Company and 80 Granadiers and light Infantry arrived in time to sustain Gen Fraser and by his judicious orders and a spirited execution of them obtained a share for himself and for his troops in the Glory of the Action.\textsuperscript{88}

Baron Riedesel, as well as his grenadiers and Jäger, would have vigorously disagreed with the description of the Battle of Hubbardton proffered by their British allies. Fraser had disobeyed his orders and attacked without properly establishing how many Americans he faced. He knew that Baron Riedesel was close behind, yet he had needlessly risked the lives of his men. Baron Riedesel and his men had not come “up time enough also to share in the glory of the day” – they had saved Fraser’s command from defeat. Baron Riedesel knew it, and so did his men. The anonymous batman of Stabskapitain Friedrich Wilhelm von Geismar of the Erbprinz Regiment, recorded in his diary for 9 July 1777 that,

\textsuperscript{86} “Gen. Fraser's account of Burgoyne's campaign on Lake Champlain and the Battle of Hubbardton: (Stevens' Facsimiles, vol. XVI, no. 1571). Therein entitled "Brigadier General Simon Fraser to [John Robinson]. Abergavenney manuscripts at Eridge castle." Endorsed "Copy from Brig'r Fraser, 13th July, 1777, Skeensborough." Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society October 18 and November 2, 1898 (Burlington, Free Press Association Printer, 1899), pp. 139-147, p. 146.

\textsuperscript{87} Pell, 108. Captain Enos Jones thought “the ingagement [sic] held one hour 10 minutes” only with “as hot a fire as ever was kept up. many fel on Both sides”.

His excellency Major General von Riedesel himself arrived here, and confirmed
the certain news that Brigadier General Frazer encountered in the morning of the
7th a corps of rebels not far from Hubbardton in an earthwork which he
immediately attacked with a lively fire and beat back, they nevertheless reformed
immediately and in the greatest rage fell upon the left flank of the British, which
Brigadier general Frazer had just before weakened in order to strengthen the right
wing, this occasioned that the English left wing had to retreat, at that moment
however Major General von Riedesel with the Brunswick Jaeger, grenadiers and
light infantry arrived, who opened such a heavy fire on them that they preferred
not to remain long, thus they retreated immediately. In dead they left behind many
officers and more than 200 common soldiers, among them their brave leader
Colonel Frances, according to the testimony of the prisoners they had over 600
wounded, many of whom perished in the woods through which they tried to
escape.

Corporal Johann Jakob Schmidt on Baron Riedesel's staff was even more blunt in his assessment
of events as he recorded them in his diary about the Battle of Hubbardton:

We succeeded in hacking out the idiotic Englishman Fraser and his people ("den
idiotischen Englaender Fraeser") and lost 180 men. From my group Hannes Mogk
from Angersbach and Karl Kimple from Steinhausen were killed. General
Riedesel rages with anger because the Englishmen had gotten himself into trouble
completely needlessly which we had to pay for with much blood. General
Riedesel mentioned to the Colonels Meersbrueck and Baum that only his oath to
the King and that his wife Charlotte had followed him here still kept him in
Canada.

Baron Riedesel could not afford to confront Burgoyne quite so openly, but in a letter to the
Erbprinz of 10 July 1777, from Skeenesborough he laid bare his emotions:

The affair at Hubbardton has showed me quite distinctly what envy one nation
entertains against another. Brigadier Fraser lost 12 officers and about 170 killed
and wounded, only because he did not want to wait for me. Yet afterwards he was
compelled to call on me to help him and this little help saved him. I would have
wished your Serene Highness to be present, you would have been happy about the
bravery of our Brunswickers. Our little group acted perfectly and Fraser himself
had to report to Genl. Burgoyne in writing that we had saved him. I would never
have thought that the Rebels fought so stubbornly as they did that day. Having

89 Tagebuch eines Burschen von Staabs-Capitain Friedrich Wilhelm von Geismar vom Hessen-Hanauischen
Erbriniz Regiment und Brigade-Major zu Brigadier-General von Gall, 15 März 1776 bis 14 December 1778.
Staatsarchiv Marburg, Bestand 12 b 1 Nr.23; photostatische Kopie in Library of Congress, Ms. Div., Facsimilies
from German Archives, Box No. 2443. Transcript courtesy Henry J. Retzer; translation Robert A. Selig.
90 Excerpts from the Diary of Corporal Johann Jakob Schmidt from Lauterbach (Oberhessen) on Major General
Riedesel's Staff, February 20, 1776 October 15,1783. Donald M. Londahl-Smidt Collection.
one bullet and four small ones in the musket, they fire and poor Lieutenant Cruse was wounded with one such shot.91

The timely arrival of Baron Riedesel had saved Fraser, but Digby pointed out another reason for the American defeat. “On Coll Frances [sic] falling, who was there [sic] second in command, they did not long stand.” The death of Francis some time during the engagement as described by Bird dealt a severe blow to American morale.92 The other circumstance was the developments, “on our right which soon gave way,” upon the arrival of Baron Riedesel’s Brunswickers.93

Shortly after 10:00 a.m., American forces were in full retreat across John Selleck’s wheat field, and up Pittsford Ridge, halting occasionally to fire at the pursuers who chased them all the way to the summit of Pittsford Mountain.94 It was 5:00 p.m. in the evening before Crown forces broke off their pursuit. An anonymous non-commissioned officer from one of Baron Riedesel’s regiments wrote that, “On the retreat, the enemy threw their muskets ad [sic] equipage away, which caused some of our [men] to make quite a booty. The prisoners brought in resembled bandits rather than soldiers but were so confused that they begged for their lives like children.”95

Although the retreat did not turn into an outright rout, Lieutenant Sewall probably was not the only officer who was wondering where he was. The retreat was more like a flight. Lieutenant Henry Sewall only found out the next day where he was:

[H]aving “rec’d 2 balls thro my Cloaths – Retreated precipitately thro the Woods, over the Mountains & arrv’d in the evening at a house in Rutland – Our party consisting of about 100 (?) was composd of different Regts promiscuously collected under the Command of Col Warner [sic].” The next day, “About 7 o’Clock, on our Retreat found out where we were, & which way the main body of

91 Saratoga National Historical Park Collection, Courtesy of Park Ranger and historian Eric Schnitzer.
92 For accounts of the death of Francis see Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton, 63-65.
93 For a detailed analysis of events on the American right see again Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton, 68-70. Colonel Hale’s 2nd New Hampshire, and the wounded, and sick among its ranks, viz. Ebenezer Fletcher, had been stationed along the Military Road and Sucker Brook, and taken the brunt of the British attack; on the question in how far the supposed cowardice of Colonel Hale when captured by the British, and the role this, may have played in the American defeat see Williams, Hubbardton, 32-34.
94 St. Clair was aware of the battle raging in his rear. Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin reported for 7 July “in the morning a heavey fire in the rear for some time near an hour a heavey battle, but as the rear consisted of the feeble part of the army they, after an obstinate resistance were obliged to give way to superior numbers. the body of the army Marchd to Rutland, dind at Col. Meedses where we were Joind by a No. of Col. Warners Men & those that had been in action [sic].” The Revolutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin 1775-1778 Thomas Williams Baldwin, ed., (Bangor, 1906), 109/10. St. Clair sent Major Henry Livingston to the two militia regiments with orders that they support Warner but the men flatly refused, see Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton, 71. Not surprisingly conspiracy theories soon arose with some of Colonel Joseph Cilley’s First New Hampshire Regiment convinced that they had intentionally been abandoned: “The Rear Guard were mostly Invalids, and our Genl took away the main Body, and even refused to send assistance when the Cols, begged him to do it.” Documents and Records New Hampshire, 641.
95 Enemy Perspective, 8. Digby wrote that “Our men got more plunder than they could carry, and great quantities of paper money which was not in the least regarded then, tho had we kept it, it would have been of service, as affairs turned out. I made prize of a pretty good mare.” Digby, 211.
the army had gone, - & that Skeensboro was taken by the Enemy – Got down to Otter Creek – Rain’d [sic].

Phase 5: 8 July 1777 to 31 July 1777: The Battlefield after the Battle

During the hours and days immediately following the victory over the Continentals, General Burgoyne faced two urgent tasks: 1) burying the dead of both sides, and 2) tending to the wounded. As Burgoyne’s aides surveyed the battlefield and the reports from Fraser came in, the high cost of the victory became apparent. In the hours following the battle, Crown forces collected their dead, and burying parties dug graves for the 34 fallen British non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men, and the 10 dead Brunswickers. The American corpses apparently were left to rot where they had fallen. “In the spring of 1784 the inhabitants turned out and made a general search over the battle-ground, and woods adjoining, gathering up what bones they could find, which had lain bleaching in the sun, wind, and rain for 7 years (amounting to many bushels), and buried them. Since that time there have not been many found. But, occasionally, when they have been discovered, they have been carefully taken care of, and buried.”

Adding up the human cost, Lord Napier recorded that Lieutenant James Douglas of the 29th Regiment of Foot serving with the Light Infantry was killed, as were two sergeants and 17 rank and file. Additionally, the Light Infantry suffered five wounded officers, two wounded sergeants, and 70 wounded rank and file. Of the Grenadier Battalion, 13 rank and file were killed, and seven officers and four sergeants wounded, as were 37 rank and file. One of the wounded officers, Captain Francis Samuel Stapleton of the 9th Regiment of Foot serving in the Grenadier Battalion, later died of his wounds. Additionally, Major Grant of the 24th Regiment of Foot and Lieutenant Haggard of the Marines doing duty with the Grenadiers were also killed, as were four enlisted men of the 24th Regiment of Foot. Two sergeants of the 24th were wounded. Also killed were ten Brunswickers, who also suffered one lieutenant, one sergeant and 12 rank and file wounded. The battle cost Burgoyne five officers killed, and twelve wounded, and 44 rank and file killed, and 128 wounded for a total of 189 casualties. Total American casualties were higher but exact figures are difficult to ascertain. The best estimate indicates that 41 soldiers were killed, and 96 soldiers wounded. An additional 234 Americans were taken prisoner, some of them wounded, for a total casualty rate of 33 percent when prisoners are included but only 12 percent in dead and wounded.
The days leading up to the Battle of Hubbardton had been miserably hot. During the aftermath of the battle, however, torrential rains moved into the area and lasted for days. Baron Riedesel and his Brunswickers departed in the morning of 8 July, leaving Fraser, his wounded, and prisoners behind in the rain. Digby recorded that, “we had no covering to shelter us, our poor huts being a wretched security against the heavy rain [that] poured on us. …we made sort of huts covered with the bark of trees for our wounded, who were in a very bad situation, as we had nothing to assist them till the return of an express which was sent to Ticonderoga for surgeons.”

When Fraser’s men departed on 9 July, they left behind some 140 wounded Crown forces, and dozens of wounded, and sick Americans, with a small guard commanded by Sergeant Roger Lamb. He “was directed, that in case I should be either surrounded or overpowered by the Americans, to deliver a letter, which General Burgoyne gave me, to their commanding officer. Here I remained seven days with wounded men, expecting every moment to be taken prisoner.”

Ebenzer Fletcher was one of the captured wounded Americans. He remembered that “The enemy soon marched back to Ticonderoga and left only a few to take care of the wounded. I was treated as well as I could expect. Doctor Haze [i.e. Hayes] was the head Doctor, and he took true care that the prisoners were well treated. Doctor Blocksom, an under surgeon, appeared to be very kind indeed: indeed: he was the one who had the care of me: he never gave me any insulting or abusive language.” In a letter to his friend Mellish written “In the Woods of Huberton, 25 Miles From Mount Independ’d.” on 13 July 1777, John McNamara Hayes provides a graphic description of the desolate situation in Hubbardton.

It happened in the most unfortunate place in the World, as assistance by either land or water could not be procured less than 25 Miles, and that no Cart Road. I was sent for & arrived the 8th. In the Mornª, after travelling five and twenty miles thro’ a Wood withª a Guide and here remain with the Wounded to give them every assistance in my power; which you must allow can not be great, without an House or any other necessary on the face of the Earth […] were it not for the defeat of the Rebels and the Rout they were put to, which obliged them to leave their Blankets, Napsacks & a few Camp Kettles, I know not what woª become of the Wounded; The Most of them are in sheds made of Boughs, which are no defense from Rain and wª unfortunately set in these three or four days past almost constantly. I have not a pleasing prospect of their Recovery, and as Opportunity & their Situation admits, I send them to Mount Independant, where the Rebels were building a Noble Hospital. I never experienced more uneasiness at seeing the Wounded Suffer, nor do I wish ever to be in so Disagreeable a situation again […] My hands embued in Blood, My face as dirty, my beard as long as a Capuchen fryar with every thing filthy on me is my presª Situation.
Beginning on 11 July, Brigadier Fraser recorded expenses for tending to the sick, and wounded, left behind in Hubbardton, “To Cash paid for Cattle at Huberton for the Corps, & some left with the Sick. 15 [pounds]. 17 [shillings]. 6 [pence].” Or on 16 July: “To cash paid Several Guides & express’s from Skeansborough to Huberton, employed about the wounded preceeding this date. 6 [pounds].” The last entry referring to wounded dates to 31 July: “To Cash paid Remington of Castletown for flower & other necessaries furnished to the wounded at Huberton. 8 [pounds].10 [shillings].”

Those that could be moved were transported to Skenesborough (today Whitehall, New York) about 16 July but the severely wounded British, and American, troops remained in Hubbardton until 29 July when, “a detachment of the 62nd and Pr. Fr. Regmts., consisting of 200 men” under Ensign von Hille was sent to Hubbardton, “to transport the sick together with the hospital to Mount Indep. from there.-- The detachment did not arrive in Hubbardton before July 28. It had been assumed that the stretchers for the transport had already been prepare instead, they were just starting to fabricate them. Although this day was lost anyway, an attempt was made by the detachment to speed up the work so that all the stretchers could be ready for all those wounded there, 34 officers and privates, partly Englishmen and Germans, partly Provincials, on July 29 at noon. When the stretchers were ready, the march back was started immediately.” Sometime during the night, “a mortally wounded Provincial died”, and it was only late in the evening of 30 July that, “everyone had arrived in the camp and a hospital had been established on Mount Independence. It was generally thought that the 31 stretchers with the gravely wounded, each one of whom was carried by 4 soldiers on their shoulders” presented a sad, and distressing, sight.

**Outcome of the Battle**

1777” Saratoga National Historical Park Collection, Courtesy of Park Ranger and historian Eric Schnitzer. For a general overview see Paul Kopperman, “The Numbers Game: Health Issues in the Army that Burgoyne led to Saratoga.” History Cooperative Database, copy in Saratoga National Historical Park Collection, Courtesy of Park Ranger and historian Eric Schnitzer.

106 There are numerous references to the wounded left behind at Hubbardton in Fraser’s account books, viz. on 17 July: “Paid horses & express Sent to Huberton with nurses necessaries & provisions to the wounded. 5. 10.0[sic].” National Archives Great Britain, Treasury, Class 1, Volume 572, folios 102-113. The transcription of Fraser’s account was kindly provided by Todd Braisted.

107 “July 13 A number of horses were transported to Skenesborough for the army and taken to Hubbardton from there. For their escort, the reg. provided one subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corp., 1 ens.[ign], 54 privates; the 62nd Reg. provided 1 capt., 1 subaltern, 2 serg., 1 ens., 46 privates. With the help of this detachment, the sick and wounded of the army were taken to the hospital there.” Prätorius, “Journal”, 66.

On 11 July 1777, Burgoyne’s ADC Francis Carr Clerke had informed Riedesel that, “General Burgoyne desires you would order a Detachment of a Captain & 100 men from Brigadier General Specht’s command, to march to Hubberton; there to wait till a detachment of the same Number arrives from Ticonderoga with Horses; this Detachment from Brig’ General Specht to receive the horses and conduct them to Castleton, where a Detachment from Skeenes borough will arrive, to escort them hither. The Detachment from Brigad’. General Specht will march to morrow morning.” Lidgerwood Collection, File 107, Letter HZ-1, Part 1, Morristown National Historical Park, Morristown, New Jersey.

108 Garrison Life, 77. Fletcher wrote that “On the 22d of July, a number of men came down from Ticonderoga, with horses and litters sufficient to carry off the remainder of the wounded.” Fletcher, 22.
Ordered by General St. Clair on 30 July to take the sick and wounded by boat to Skenesborough, Colonel Pierce Long skirmished successfully with Burgoyne’s vanguard as he approached Skenesborough. Having met up with American forces under Colonel Henry van Rensselaer, Long and Rensselaer’s forces mauled a British advance party commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hill of the 9th Regiment of Foot in the Battle of Fort Anne on 8 July. Upon arrival of the 20th Regiment of Foot, and artillery, under Phillips outnumbered, and outgunned, American forces set Fort Anne on fire, and withdrew.

As Burgoyne established his headquarters at Skenesborough on 6 July, he had to choose between two alternative routes to reach Albany (Figure 3). He could backtrack to Fort Ticonderoga where his army’s equipment, particularly the heavy artillery, was still onboard vessels on Lake Champlain. From there he could portage them to Lake George, and sail on the lake to Fort George, where the equipment and supplies could be carried overland to Fort Edward on the Hudson River. If all went well, Burgoyne would reach Albany before the onset of winter. Alternatively, he could march directly overland from Skenesborough to Fort Edward. Although historians still debate the merits of Burgoyne’s route selection, to march overland on the longer route to Fort Edward leaving American-held Fort George in his rear, the route had the advantage of easier water transport once the difficult portage to Fort Edward was accomplished. More importantly, Burgoyne, for political reasons, believed that he could not backtrack with his troops to Fort Ticonderoga as it would have appeared like a retreat, and encourage American resistance. Critics later claimed that Burgoyne had also been swayed by Loyalist Philip Skene, in whose house he was staying, and whose property would greatly benefit from a road to Fort Edward. 109

Having heard the news of the surrender of Fort Ticonderoga, General Philip Schuyler, commanding officer of the Northern Department, hurried to Fort Edward, and found it garrisoned by about 700 regulars and 1,400 militia, and in a poor state of defense. General St. Clair reached Fort Edward on 12 July with the remnants of his forces. With the fort's defenses beyond repair, Schuyler’s only option was to delay Burgoyne’s advance by making roads to Fort Edward impassable by felling trees across the roadway and tearing down bridges. Helped by heavy rains, Schuyler succeeded in reducing the British advance to a crawl. 110

Although American forces suffered about 50 percent more casualties than Royal forces at Hubbardton, the costly fight there, combined with the engagements at Skenesborough and Fort Anne, proved to Burgoyne that Americans could put up stiff resistance. British successes had done little to increase the flow of Loyalists to join the British forces. Indeed, while the influx of militia made up American losses, Burgoyne had no opportunity to replace the 1,500 men he had lost by mid-July. Only about 200 were combat casualties, but Burgoyne also had to place a 400-man garrison at Crown Point, and another 900 in Ticonderoga. Burgoyne, convinced that all that remained to do was sweep scattered American forces before him on his way to Albany, decided to halt his campaign to gather supplies, re-establish his supply lines with Canada via Lake Champlain, and make Fort Edward his base. Most of his equipment, artillery, and ammunition,

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109 Skene owned more than 60,000 acres around Skenesborough, today’s Whitehall. Skene as well as Franz Joseph Pfister, another proponent of the route via Skenesborough, and 55 other Tories, were at Fort Edward on 1 August.
110 A Congress angry over the loss of Fort Ticonderoga relieved Schuyler of his command on 4 August, and replaced with Horatio Gates, who assumed command of the Northern Department on 19 August.
was still onboard vessels off Fort Ticonderoga, waiting to be transferred to Fort George. Fort George, still held by the Continental Army behind him on Lake George, had to be taken to establish secure lines of communication and supply.

But there was another, little-mentioned, reason for the long stay at Skenesborough. The victory at Hubbardton had cost Burgoyne dearly. The 60 British and 10 German troops killed, and 134 British and 14 Brunswickers wounded, came almost exclusively from the British Light Infantry, and Grenadier, battalions, which were Burgoyne’s best and most difficult to replace troops. The Americans lost only between 30 and 41 men killed, and 96 wounded. However, the presence of more than 230 American prisoners, many of them sick or wounded, and in need of care, constituted a mixed blessing for Burgoyne, and helps explain his long sojourn in Skenesborough from 6/7 to 23 July 1777, when the advanced corps moved to Fort Anne while the rest of the army followed on 25 July.

Notes on Commanders
Several of the commanders associated with the Battle of Hubbardton are deserving of mention for their actions during the battle. On the American side, Ebenezer Francis of Massachusetts was outstanding, while on the British side, Simon Fraser and Friedrich Adolf Riedesel, Freiherr zu Eisenbach, were responsible for the way the battle was fought. For Seth Warner, see Criterion B, page 47.

Ebenezer Francis. Colonel Ebenezer Francis (1743-1777) is a significant individual who fought and died at Hubbardton. His actions in the battle, like those of Seth Warner, helped to check the advance of the royal forces, and his leadership abilities were exemplary, noted by American, British, and Brunswick participants. Francis’ death in the battle contributed to the collapse of the American will to fight. He was thirty-three years old at the time of his death. A monument to the memory of Ebenezer Francis is located at North Beverly Cemetery in Beverly, Massachusetts. The inscription includes a statement that “he entered the Continental service & was distinguished as a brave & energetic officer” and that “his early and deeply lamented death deprived the Army of the Revolution of a bright ornament.”

Ebenezer Francis was from Medford, Massachusetts and living in Beverly at the time of the Lexington Alarm, where he served as a lieutenant in the militia. In May 1775, he became captain in Colonel John Mansfield’s Massachusetts regiment, a position he held until the end of the year. On 6 November 1776, he became colonel of the 11th Massachusetts Regiment with which he took the field in the summer of 1777 to oppose the invasion of New York State.

Colonel Francis played an important role at the Battle of Hubbardton, inspiring his regiment and leading by example. During the retreat from Fort Ticonderoga in the night of 6 July, General

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111 Venter, Hubbardton, 112.
112 The dates are based on “Appendix C: Table showing daily positions, and movements, of Stark, Schuyler, Lincoln, Burgoyne, Baum, Breymann, and St. Leger, in the Campaign preceding Bennington, July-Aug., 1777” in: Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association vol. 5 (1905), 94/95.
Arthur St. Clair placed him in command of the rear-guard, an indication of the high trust St. Clair put in Francis' command abilities. Francis’ late arrival at Hubbardton on 6 July was one of the reasons why Warner decided to spend the night there. Francis’ men encamped along Sucker Brook and were preparing their breakfasts, when the 24th Regiment of Foot attacked them a little after 7 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel George Reid of the 2nd New Hampshire Regiment told his brother that "it was not over ten minutes from the time we had the first notice until [sic] we received a very [sic] heavy fire from the enemy.” Under Francis’ leadership this disparate group of soldiers, created from a large number of units, and consisting to a large degree of sick and wounded soldiers, put up a spirited resistance for between 20 and 30 minutes: their first volley caused 21 British casualties, among them Major Robert Grant of the 24th Regiment of Foot. Colonel Francis’ death late in the engagement sapped American morale and their will to fight. Lieutenant Digby pointed out that “On Coll Frances falling, who was there second in command, they did not long stand [sic].” Author Bruce Venter describes Francis as “a bulwark for the American forces.”

General Burgoyne thought Francis to be “one of their best officers,” as Francis’ leadership and stalwartness at Hubbardton ensured the tough fight that so surprised Baron Riedesel. An anonymous British officer identified him as “an officer of reputation amongst them,” both for his courage as well as common sense. A single lapse of this common sense may have cost him his life. When Jared Sparks made a tour of battlefields in New England in 1830, he recorded in his journal that, “When the Americans gave way Warner and Francis walked deliberately off the ground together in the rear of their men,” Whelpley told Sparks as they walked the battlefield. “When they had got to the foot of the hill, three or four hundred yards to the south east of the place of action, the enemy began to press close upon them. Francis proposed to quicken their step, to which Warner replied, that he had never yet run from a Red Coat, and never would. Almost at that instant Francis was shot and fell dead. Warner escaped unhurt.” Upon reaching the site, “The spot where Francis fell is pointed out” to Sparks.

After the battle, Baron Riedesel is said to have personally officiated at the burial of Francis as a show of respect. For decades, locals remembered the spot where Francis fell, and routinely pointed it out to visitors. An unidentified minister from Plainfield preaching on the Hubbardton battlefield decades after the war, “the place where once was heard the din of war & where garments were rolled in blood,” recorded in his journal that he stood “just by where Col. Frances

115 James Phinney Baxter, The British Invasion from the North, The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, 1776-1777, with the Journal of Lieut. William Digby, of the 53D, or Shropshire Regiment of Foot (Albany, 1887). The journal for the campaign of 1777 can be found on pages 185-323, the Battle of Hubbardton on pages 209-220.
116 Venter, Hubbardton, 99.
118 MS Sparks 141g, 96. Houghton Library, Harvard U. Cambridge, MA.
Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation)
Name of Property: Hubbardton Battlefield
County and State: Rutland County, Vermont

[sic] of Beverly was shot.” When the Hubbardton Battle Monument Association erected the current monument in 1859, Francis had entered the pantheon of Vermont’s Revolutionary War heroes. A biographical essay recalled his sacrifice at Hubbardton while his remains were honored with a burial under, or at least near, the battlefield monument.

**Simon Fraser.** British General Simon Fraser (1729-1777) shared with Ebenezer Francis the fate of having been killed during Burgoyne’s Northern Campaign. Fraser’s role at Hubbardton is significant. Without Fraser, the Battle of Hubbardton would not have happened. Operating as an independent command, all British forces’ strategy and tactics in the battle stemmed from Fraser alone. He was the one who recommended that Baron Riedesel move to support the left of the line, a move which ended the battle soon after. Most historians agree that Fraser and his detachment were saved from defeat only by the timely arrival of Brunswickers under Baron Riedesel. In the end, he kept the field, but at a very high cost. That high cost in dead and wounded not only prevented the British from reaching St. Clair, but also severely weakened Burgoyne’s Advanced Corps, the only men in Burgoyne’s army with any measurable experience. To lose these elite soldiers hurt Burgoyne far more than the American losses hurt the cause of American Independence. General Schuyler’s losses could be replaced, Burgoyne’s losses could not.

Born in the Scottish Highlands in 1729, Fraser fought at Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747 in the Dutch Army before joining the British Army as a lieutenant in 1755 at the beginning of the French and Indian War. Fraser’s regiment was deployed to Canada, and he took part in the siege of Louisburg in June/July 1758, and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, in September 1759. In 1768, he became Lieutenant Colonel of the 24th Regiment of Foot. At the outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1776, his regiment transferred to Quebec in Canada. Governor Sir Guy Carleton promoted Fraser to Brigadier in 1776, and Sir John Burgoyne put Fraser in charge of the Advance Corps for the Northern Campaign of 1777.

When Fraser entered New York State in June 1777, his detachment consisted of his own 24th Regiment of Foot, a Grenadier Battalion, a Light Infantry Battalion, a company of marksmen, as well as a few Canadian militia, and Indians, for a total of around 1,800 men. At Fort Ticonderoga on 5 July, his men were the first to enter the abandoned fort, and the first to pick up the pursuit of the retreating Americans, on 6 July. Early next morning, on 7 July, Fraser’s detachment, now consisting of around 850 men, encountered Continental Army forces under colonels Warner, Francis, and Nathan Hale. These American forces numbered between 1,000

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119 Dartmouth College - Rauner Special Collections Library, Hanover, NH.
121 Venter, Hubbardton, 118-120.
122 General Fraser’s account of the Northern Campaign in the form of a letter to John Robinson from Skeensborough dated 13 July 1777 is published in an appendix to Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society vol. 4 (1898-1902), 139-147; the Battle of Hubbardton on 145-147.
123 Kenny and Crock estimate that Fraser’s Advance Corps consisted of ten companies of British light infantry (about 550 men) under Major Alexander Lindsay, the Earl of Balcarres (of the 53rd Regiment), ten companies of British grenadiers (about 570 men) under Major John Dyke Acland of the 20th Regiment, and eight battalion
and 1,200 men, forming the rear-guard of General St. Clair’s forces, and were about to march for Manchester. After a brief hesitation, Fraser decided to attack the American forces that he estimated at only about 500. In the ensuing battle, the Americans proved surprisingly resilient to the repeated attacks by Fraser’s Light Infantry, and grenadiers.

On 9 July, Fraser departed Hubbardton to join General Burgoyne, and fought with his men at Freeman’s Farm on 19 September, as well as at Bemis Heights on 7 October. It was in the morning of 7 October that the 48-year-old Fraser was shot and mortally wounded. Fraser died later that day and was buried in Saratoga Battlefield National Park, where a memorial plaque marks his grave.

At Hubbardton, Fraser’s decision to attack the Americans without waiting for the reinforcements under Baron Riedesel influenced the outcome of the Northern Campaign. Arguably, General Fraser took unnecessary casualties that cost Burgoyne valuable time at the height of the campaign season. Fraser did not achieve his goal, and orders, of destroying the American rear-guard. Later in the summer, when Burgoyne ran low on supplies, he ordered the expedition to Bennington. Burgoyne’s decision to send a detachment for needed supplies led to the destruction of Baum’s detachment at the Battle of Bennington and sealed the fate of the Royal Army in the Hudson Valley.

**Friedrich Adolf Riedesel.** Friedrich Adolf Riedesel, Freiherr zu Eisenbach (1738-1800) was studying law in Marburg when he entered the service of the Landgraf of Hesse in 1755. Initially stationed near London, Baron Riedesel befriended several British officers whom he would later meet again in America. Recalled to Germany at the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in 1756, he was attached to the staff of Ferdinand Duke of Brunswick and fought in the Battle of Minden in 1759. By 1761, he was the colonel of two Brunswick regiments. Wounded in August 1762, he spent the rest of the war, and the years until the outbreak of the American War of Independence, in Wolffenbüttel. Promoted to Lieutenant General, Baron Riedesel sailed with the Brunswick troops numbering around 4,500 to Quebec in March 1776. Arriving in June he spent the winter of 1776/77 in Canada.

In June 1777 Burgoyne placed Baron Riedesel in command of all German and Native American troops for the Northern Campaign. Baron Riedesel proved to be an experienced officer with an eye to both the political traits of the war as well as the need to adapt to the military needs occasioned by fighting in the American wilderness. His experience as a battlefield commander showed in the morning of 7 July on the battlefield of Hubbardton. It was almost 9:00 a.m. before Baron Riedesel’s forces reached the battlefield. Francis Napier attested to Baron Riedesel’s good judgement in deploying his troops when he wrote that “Major General Reidzel arriving with the Chasseurs Company and 80 Grenadiers & Light Infantry, took up his ground with great

companies of the 24th Regiment (about 440 men) under Major Robert Grant, providing an estimated total of 1,816 officers and men. However, Fraser left about 540 men (possibly including several whole companies of the 24th Regiment) at Ft. Ticonderoga and Mount Independence after their capture on 6 July. Therefore, only about 1,276 of his men assembled for the pursuit of the Americans to Hubbardton. Interestingly, Fraser claimed that his force of British soldiers at Hubbardton amounted to no more than eight hundred men. Kenny and Crock, *Hubbardton*, 37.
judgment upon the Left of the Brigadier’s troops.” 124 Baron Riedesel’s timely arrival turned the tide of battle in Fraser’s favor. 125 Baron Riedesel, and his small detachment of Brunswickers, departed Hubbardton again on 8 July 1777 to meet up with Burgoyne, and was captured with him at Saratoga. From there he, and his wife Frederika Charlotte, were sent to Charlottesville, Virginia, with the rest of the Convention Army. In 1778, he was allowed to move to New York City on parole but was exchanged in 1780. In 1781, he went to Canada before sailing back to Europe in 1784. He retired from active service in 1793 and ended his days as commandant of Braunschweig.

Narrative Statement of Significance (Provide at least one paragraph for each area of significance.)

Criterion A. The Battlefield of Hubbardton as a site that has made a significant contribution to our history.

Hubbardton Battlefield is eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places under Criterion A for its association with a successful American rearguard action during the American War of Independence (1775-1783). The battle was an American defeat, but despite the American loss, the Battle of Hubbardton on 7 July 1777 represents a turning point in the fortune of the fledgling United States. The battle also aided the efforts to slow down British forces under General John Burgoyne (1722-1792), marching toward Albany, New York. British historians consider the engagement at Hubbardton to be their victory, although some American scholars tend to call it a draw. 126 From either perspective, the battle itself was not tactically decisive, but its outcome became strategically significant in the larger British campaign to split the United States along the Hudson River. In the morning of 7 July, British forces under Brigadier Simon Fraser (1729-1777) surprised the American rear-guard under Colonel Seth Warner (1743-1784) retreating on the Military Road from Fort Ticonderoga Mount Independence, which General Arthur St. Clair (1737-1818) had abandoned on 5 July. In light of the defeat at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and the concurrent loss of Fort Anne, historians of the Northern Campaign have tended to focus on the short-term “defeat” of the engagement – American forces had higher casualties (371 killed and wounded) in absolute numbers than British forces (189 killed and wounded).

This analysis, however, ignores not only the fact that the clear majority of American casualties were prisoners of war, and that Britain suffered a much higher percentage of killed, and wounded (22 percent), as compared with the Continentals (13 percent). It also disregards the fact that Warner had achieved the purpose of his mission, which was to slow down pursuing British forces, and to allow General St. Clair’s army to escape encirclement by Burgoyne’s forces. The

124 Napier, 300.
126 See for example John Williams, The Battle of Hubbardton, 44.
battle at Hubbardton allowed St. Clair to unite his forces with those of General Philip Schuyler (1733-1804) near Fort Edward around 12 July. Many of the American soldiers who escaped the stubborn resistance at Hubbardton would go on to fight at Bennington in August, and Saratoga, in October.\(^{127}\)

It is in this context that the withdrawal of Continental Army forces in mid-morning of 7 July 1777 needs to be viewed. The American forces achieved their goal of slowing down Fraser, and more. They inflicted heavy casualties on the British Light Infantry and on the grenadiers, some of Burgoyne’s best troops. These losses not only accelerated the erosion of British manpower, but also took the lives, and affected the health of soldiers Burgoyne could least afford to lose. Finding able men with skills, and expertise, impossibly difficult to replace, Burgoyne had little choice but to remain encamped around Skanesborough until the wounded had recovered enough to either march, or be transported, to meet with the main army. During this long delay of almost four weeks at the height of the campaign season, the army consumed valuable supplies that had to be restocked from Canada. On 25 July, the same day Burgoyne departed from Skenesborough for Fort Edward, Baron Riedesel began his march to Skenesborough. Helped by heavy rains, Schuyler had succeeded in reducing the British advance to a crawl; an exhausted British army reached the abandoned Fort Edward on 29 July. It had taken them 21 days to advance 23 miles from Skenesborough to Fort Edward. That same day a 200-man detachment from the 62nd Regiment of Foot, and the Brunswick Prinz Friedrich Regiments, began to evacuate the last 34 wounded from Hubbardton, 22 days (more than three weeks) after the rear-guard action.

To alleviate his growing shortages in foodstuffs, primarily beef and flour, and the wagons and draft animals to transport these supplies, Burgoyne returned on 4 August 1777 to a proposal first made by Baron Riedesel on 22 July and ordered Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum (1727-1777) to Bennington. On 16 August, General John Stark (1728-1822) and his militia not only annihilated Baum’s forces, but severely downgraded a relief expedition under Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich von Breymann as well. Lastly, at Hubbardton, Continentals showed not only that they could fight but also successfully disengage from a pursuing enemy. The extent of British losses, and the firm but skillful resistance offered to some of Burgoyne best troops, indicated a stiffening American resistance that yielded its first victory at Bennington on 16 August.

Burgoyne’s advance had ground to a halt. Unable to retreat to Canada, and disappointed in his hopes of relief from New York City, Burgoyne had no choice but to march on and engage subsequently in the battles of Freeman’s Farm on 19 September and Bemis Heights on 7 October. He finally surrendered at Saratoga ten days later. Taken within the context of July 1777, the Battle of Hubbardton therefore produced long-term positive consequences for the American cause, while turning out to be a pyrrhic victory of a magnitude Burgoyne could ill afford. Moreover, the Battle of Hubbardton paved the way for Vermont’s claim to admission to the United States of America, a demand that was fulfilled in March 1791.

Criterion B. The Battlefield Site at Hubbardton is associated with the life of Colonel Seth Warner, who played a key role in the battle. Warner’s actions represent a significant contribution to American history and the development of Vermont.

Seth Warner. Seth Warner (1743-1784) played a key role in the battle of Hubbardton, fulfilling Guideline #6 of Criterion B. Warner operated as an independent commander at Hubbardton, and made all the American tactical decisions. The skillful delaying tactics, and successful disengagement from British forces in mid-morning of 7 July 1777, following Colonel Hale’s capture near the start of the engagement, and Colonel Francis’ death, was to a large degree due to the leadership skills of American battlefield commander Seth Warner. His actions at Hubbardton fulfill the requirement for an individual who “played a role that can be justified as significant within a defined area of American history….”

When Vermont acquired land at Hubbardton battlefield in 1937, the Burlington Free Press clearly stated a goal of the acquisition was to honor Warner's important role in the establishment of the state by creating at Hubbardton "a permanent memorial to Seth Warner...." As an important battle in Vermont’s history, Hubbardton is closely linked to Warner’s independent command status, and this status has long been acknowledged by historians. Author Bruce Venter in The Battle of Hubbardton concludes that the choice of Warner as the commander of the American rear guard was the right one, since Warner was an experienced commander who knew the terrain and the capabilities of his men. Most importantly, Warner’s action at Hubbardton allowed General St. Clair’s army time to retreat and regroup. Historian Eliot Cohen sees Warner’s actions at Hubbardton as archetypical of those of a militia commander and a citizen soldier. He fought to protect the land and people of Vermont from British invasion, inflicted losses that the Crown Forces could ill afford, then dispersed his force, knowing that he could reform the militia in time of need.

Seth Warner had fought as a young man in the French and Indian War (1755-1763) before settling with his father in Bennington in 1763, on land granted by the Colony of New Hampshire. That almost unavoidably made the Warner family a party in the border conflict between New York and New Hampshire and their respective rights to grant land in the disputed territory. Warner chose the New Hampshire side and, prepared to use force if necessary, joined the paramilitary “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers, where he became second in command to Ethan Allen.

At the outbreak of the American War of Independence, Warner took part in the capture of Fort Ticonderoga on 10 May 1775 and, more importantly, the capture of a number of cannons at

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129 Ibid., 5. This is Guideline #1 for Criterion B.
130 Anonymous, "Urge Battlefield for a Memorial at Hubbardton," The Burlington Free Press (Burlington), Tuesday, March 30, 1937.
131 Venter, Hubbardton, 119-120. For the overall discussion of the Battle of Hubbardton and the role of Warner, see Cohen, Conquered into Liberty, 199-232. For Cohen’s assessment of Warner, see 225-226.
Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation)

Crown Point on 11 May 1775. He was appointed commanding officers of the “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers on 26 July. In the fall and winter of 1775/76, he took part in the Canada Campaign under General Montgomery which ended in failure when the siege of Quebec had to be abandoned in May 1776. It was on the retreat from Canada that Warner learned some of the skills that bore fruit at Hubbardton. In 1795, a biographer wrote that:

Warner chose the most difficult part of the business, remaining always with the rear, picking up the lame, and diseased, assisting, and encouraging, those who were the most unable to take care of themselves, and generally kept but a few miles in advance of the British, who were rapidly pursuing the retreating Americans from post to post. By steadily pursuing this conduct he brought off most of the invalids, and with his corps of the infirm, and diseased, he arrived at Ticonderoga, a few days after the body of the army had taken possession of the post.132

When General Burgoyne’s invasion of New York State began in June 1777, Warner’s “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers was just over 200 men strong and stationed around Fort Ticonderoga. When General Arthur St. Clair decided to abandon Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on 5 July, he appointed Colonel Ebenezer Francis to command the rear-guard, and placed Warner and his regiment between himself and Francis. Upon reaching Hubbardton, Francis was to place himself under the orders of Warner. When Warner decided to spend the night of 6/7 July at Hubbardton he unintentionally set the stage for the Battle of Hubbardton the following day, a battle which had been called a “classic example of a rear-guard action.”133

By early August, Warner and his regiment were around Bennington and under the command of General John Stark (1728-1822). Learning of the approach of a detachment of Brunswickers, Loyalists, Canadians, and Indians under Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum, American forces marched toward the Walloomsac River where they encountered Baum’s forces just across the New York State line on 14 August. In the ensuing battle of 16 August, which destroyed not only Baum’s force, but severely downgraded a relief detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Breymann, Warner commanded the left wing that attacked the so-called Tory Redoubt, an earthwork on the east side of the Walloomsac. Following the Battle of Bennington, Warner took his regiment toward Saratoga, and witnessed the surrender of Burgoyne in October 1777. In March 1778, the Vermont assembly appointed Warner the only brigadier general in Vermont, but his regiment was disbanded in late 1780, and Warner retired from service. He died 26 December 1784 at age 41.

Warner's importance in the early history of Vermont as commanding officer of the “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers, is well-known. In the Battle of Hubbardton, Warner's served as an independent battlefield commander for the only time in the war. At

133 Williams, *Hubbardton*, 5.
Hubbardton, he handled his troops well, and his order to withdraw was timely and well-executed. Most importantly, Warner accomplished his assigned mission of protecting the rear of the American Army. A few weeks later he fought at Bennington, under the command of General John Stark. Warner’s role in the second phase of the Battle of Bennington was decisive when his timely arrival blunted the German advance and turned the tide of the battle, much like Baron Riedesel had at Hubbardton. Warner's experience at Hubbardton may have influenced his decisiveness at Bennington. As Congress, pressured by Governor Clinton and the State of New York, refused to recognize Vermont as an independent state in the summer of 1777, Warner refused to serve under Continental Army command, and so did his fellow Vermonters. The settlers in Vermont trusted Warner and his leadership. When he called for volunteers to march on Bennington in August 1777, they rallied around him in the newly-created militia units. Following the Battle of Hubbardton, Warner’s brigade consisted of his regiment, with Captain Thomas Lee’s Independent Ranger Company annexed to it, William Williams’ Vermont Militia, Captain Benjamin Whitcomb’s Independent companies of Rangers and militia from eastern Vermont from Colonel Joseph Marsh’s regiment.134

Warner’s independent command at Hubbardton was an important consideration when a monument to him was erected over his grave in Roxbury, Connecticut in 1864. The inscription recognized his role in several engagements and draws the distinction between a subordinate and an independent commander. Stating that Warner was “Captor of Crown Point, commander of the Green Mountain Boys in the repulse of Carleton at Long Mill and the Battle of Hubbardton,” the inscription identifies the engagements when Warner exercised independent command and follows with the statement that Warner was “the associate of Stark at the victory at Bennington.”135

For Vermonters, Seth Warner’s character exemplifies the independence they consider a formative element of their state. In 1911, the State of Vermont recognized the importance of Warner when it placed a statue of the state’s Revolutionary War hero in front of the Bennington Battle Monument. Privately funded, the monument was intended to recognize not only Warner’s second-in-command status at the Battle of Bennington, but also his early residency in that town.136 Two years earlier, on 1909, the states of New York and Vermont erected a tablet to Warner and Remember Baker, “eminent Green Mountain Boys and Patriots,” at Isle La Motte on the shore of Lake Champlain.137 Neither of these memorials specifically recognize Warner’s actions at the Battle of Hubbardton. Warner’s importance in the history of Vermont is acknowledged and recognized by the monument erected in Bennington, where he lived for a short time. However, his key role in the early history of Vermont, his significant military

135 “Seth Warner’s Monument,” The Vermont Transcript (Saint Albans, Vermont) June 3, 1864.
136 “Dedicating of the Seth Warner Monument,” Bennington Banner (Bennington) August 17, 1911.
137 “Exercise at Isle La Motte Close Celebration,” Bennington Banner (Bennington), July 10, 1909.
accomplishments, and the state’s role in the American Revolution are commemorated at the battlefield of Hubbardton.138

**Criterion D.** The site of the Battle of Hubbardton has yielded, and is likely to continue to yield, information important in American history.

Hubbardton Battlefield is an incredibly well-preserved archeological site of national significance. The absence of any significant post-battle development greatly enhances the archeological potential of the site to a level rarely achieved on a Revolutionary War battlefield. The ABPP-funded 2010 study built on the work of previous scholars and utilized new information and technology to interpret the battle and the historic site’s landscape. Battlefield archeology is an integral component of the study of fields of conflict. Combining the physical remains of the battle with the documentary record and battlefield topography, archeology strives to reconstruct the events of a military engagement. With good base maps, and easily expandable GIS layers, future archeological studies (particularly metal detector surveys) at the Hubbardton Battlefield will reveal the sum of its significant hidden details.

Fields of conflict are temporary, albeit seminal, events, superimposed on preexisting cultural landscapes. This landscape witnessed a variety of cultural actions – transportation systems, agricultural development, settlement patterns, population change – that exerted influence on the land prior to the engagement, and that continue to exert influences on the field after the battle. Land use such as pasture, and field patterns, farmsteads, and husbandry buildings, change as they give way to subdivisions; roads are altered, vacated, rerouted or widened; woodlands are reduced or removed from the landscape. Despite these landscape alterations, the archeological evidence of conflict is often quite resilient, and can be discovered through archeological investigation. The battlefield at Hubbardton is among the very few battlefields of the American War of Independence that survived the centuries virtually unchanged. Thus, it potentially offers opportunities for archeological exploration that could shed additional light on the material culture in New England during the late eighteenth century. Previous archeological studies at Hubbardton support this conclusion.139 Further, the extensive archeological work completed at Mount Independence provides additional context to the military artifacts recovered at Hubbardton Battlefield.140

To understand and interpret actions on a battlefield, a detailed familiarity with the topography and conditions on the ground, as well as a critical reading of a wide range of primary sources,

138 Boland, Guidelines for Evaluating, 18. This is Guideline #8 for Criterion B.
must be combined with a military analysis of the battlefield. For most battlefields, the narrative of the battle will depend in large measure on the various first-person or eyewitness accounts, and these in turn vary considerably, depending on whether the observer was on the winning or losing side, what rank or role they played (for example, officer, enlisted man, civilian), where they were (on the battle line, at the left flank, a long distance in the rear), what they saw or think they saw, when they recorded the event (hours, days, weeks, months, years, or decades following the event), and how the record was made (published or private). The principle of “Inherent Military Probability” should be applied to any battlefield study. As initially developed by the German military historian Hans Delbrück and further refined by British historian Alfred H. Burne, this principle holds that when accounts of a particular battle are found to be impossible given the constraints of terrain, timing, and other factors, the researcher needs to consider what a soldier of the period was likely to have done in the circumstances. Archeological excavations can provide physical evidence that serves to clarify some of the elements of this confusing battle.

It is also important for the researcher to understand relevant historical military practices that were in force at the time of the engagement, so that, as archeologist Glenn Foard suggests in his study of English battlefields, the principle should be termed Inherent Historical Military Probability. The manuals available at the time of the Battle of Hubbardton provide specifics regarding the spacing between, and among, formations, rates of march, and the specific methods necessary to deploy companies, battalions, and other maneuvering, or firing, formations. These manuals provide something of the “limits of the possible” that governed the actions of commanders in the field, keeping in mind that variations to the manuals were always possible given opportunities arising from such factors as terrain, visibility, and other battlefield conditions.

In 2001 and 2002, archeological surveys conducted by Hartgen Archeological Associates on the battlefield confirmed the presence of battle-related artifacts such as lead shot, buttons, buckles, and other detritus of war (Figures 5 and 6). Three phases of archeological survey were completed on fourteen distinct areas on the battlefield, including two areas on Monument Hill, one in the immediate vicinity of the former museum and one in the wooded area at the base of Monument Hill east of Frog Hollow Road. The other survey areas were dispersed throughout the battlefield, including the area north of the current parking lot, the level terrace south of Sucker Brook, a section of the woods south of the Fuller farm house, the grass fields immediately east and south of the Selleck cabin site, a small portion of the woods south of St. John Road, three wooded areas in the southwest portion of the battlefield, and an area south of the Visitor Center, opposite Monument Hill. The systematic metal detector surveys resulted in the recovery of a low density

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The documentary and archeological records of the battle still have more details to divulge. The 2010 ABPP study demonstrated how GIS mapping, when used in conjunction with the documentary record, and archeological research, can be used to model data and generate new, testable research questions. The study combined hypothesized troop movements, topography, locations of recovered battle-related artifacts, and standard weapon ranges to identify possible fields of fire to interpret how the battle progressed (Figure 7). Kenny and Crock reexamined the Gerlach map’s topography and troop movements. Using the digital elevation model generated from 5-ft contour data, the results of modern archeological surveys, and firsthand battle accounts, four revised battle interpretations were offered that could warrant future investigations and illustrate the importance of the battlefield and its potential for further study.

**Initial Contact.** Assuming a 2.5-ft pace as the rate of movement of Fraser’s infantry and the possibility that Sucker Brook and the unnamed brook on the west side of the Monument Hill have been erroneously merged on the Gerlach map, then the initial contact between the British and American pickets on the morning of July 7, 1777 probably occurred not along Sucker Brook, but along the drainage/ravine running along the western toe lope of Monument Hill and the north and eastern foot of Zion Hill. Early battle historian Henry Hall initially proposed this interpretation, suggesting that the “Gerlach diagram of the battle represents Fraser’s advanced corps as having been attacked along the banks of the west brook.”145 This interpretation fits with the limited time that elapsed between the Americans being aware of the British presence and the actual firing. This also fits with the results of the metal detector survey on the terrace south of the Sucker Brook wetland, which revealed no physical evidence of combat. However, the theory doesn’t fit as well with the metal detector findings in the area along Frog Hollow Road north of St. John Road, where more evidence of combat might be expected under a revised interpretation.

**Monument Hill Battle Line.** The 2010 ABPP study suggests that the American line on Monument Hill, rather than being at the western edge of the hill and oriented north-south, was actually established on the “hill of less eminence” and Monument Hill in more of a diagonal direction from the Selleck place northwest to the top of Monument Hill. Such an orientation would follow the natural ravine west of the Selleck place. The 2010 ABPP study suggested that this interpretation would conform to the few available narrative accounts quite well. Importantly, the orientation conforms to the results of the preliminary metal detector survey in the area on Monument Hill north and south of the former museum building. As reported by

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Hartgen in 2002, “the eighteenth-century military artifacts were generally recovered from the lower portion of the east slope of the hill. These artifacts are associated with both British and American forces engaged in the battle moving down the hill slope towards the east.” 146 The report continued, “no artifacts associated with the American battle line at the crest of the hill were identified” in the area near the stone wall. 147 The results of the metal detection in the portion of Monument Hill south of the former museum suggest the hill was under American fire. In this area, “five of the six fired musket balls are potentially associated with American fire from the east.”148 Finally, metal detection results in the area around the present Visitor Center fit this interpretation of the orientation of the American line and are corroborated by the number of troops the Americans had on hand to hold the line. Documentation suggests that they probably did not have enough men to command the entire crest of Monument Hill and extend a line all the way down to the crossroads.149

**Fighting along Monument Hill Road.** The eyewitness accounts of battle participants, especially the account of Joseph Bird, as well as information taken from previous relic finds in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, support heavy fighting along Monument Hill Road, south from the Selleck place in his wheatfield and to the south of the wheatfield to the Baptist Church and possibly as far as the Allen-Barker House.150 East of Monument Road and the Selleck cabin site, the results of the metal detector survey identified the location of a possible American defensive position. Recovered artifacts included four or five dropped musket balls, possibly associated with American forces, and one fired and one dropped, potentially British. However, in this area the “unfired American musket balls were not recovered in a clear linear alignment close to the present road.” Rather, they were loosely scattered towards the southern portion of the survey area, leading the archeologists to interpret the artifact pattern as reflecting the movement of “American troops under fire hastily retreating towards the safety of the Pittsford Ridge.” 151

**Battle Line Configurations.** Based on topography of the battlefield, it is likely that there were not continuous battle lines for American and British formations, and instead significant gaps existed between some units. Such an interpretation is supported by some voids in the artifact distribution. For example, some of the British attackers may have funneled through the little valley between Mt. Zion and Monument Hill, while the light infantry may have drifted away slightly northwards.152

Continued evaluation of pension records, as yet untranslated and unpublished primary sources in German archives, and other genealogical sources, may refine and expand documentary information on individuals who participated in the battle. Additional archival research could be directed towards identifying historic farm boundaries, as well as in-depth research into the

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147 Ibid, 12.
148 Ibid., 16-17.
150 For Bird’s account, see Hall, *Hubbardton*, 19/20.
residents of Hubbardton, to enhance overall site interpretation. The current battlefield landscape is one that has been created over centuries of agriculture in Vermont. Finally, some more archeological investigation of the property’s pre-contact Native American resources would expand the understanding of its human history and would contribute to a broader study of the use of higher elevation locales by Native people in Vermont.

Several research design questions specific to the Hubbardton Battlefield are apparent, and future archeological surveys may be able to answer these questions. Building on the earlier archeological surveys of 2001 and 2002, can additional metal detector surveys (or subsurface testing) identify, and/or refine, areas of actual combat? Specifically, was there any significant fighting along Sucker Brook? Did any combat occur at the western foot of Monument Hill? Does the stone wall on Monument Hill trace a historic battle line position? How intense was the fighting east of Monument Hill? Did military burials occur on site, and if so, where?

There are several battle-related resources that are mentioned or described in the documentary sources for the battle that have not yet been identified on the ground (Table 2). These specific resources could be the focus of future archeological and historical investigations and, if identified, could support and/or modify interpretations of the battle. The table below was developed by the authors of the 2010 ABPP battlefield study.153

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Possible Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>Near the Whitcomb-Gault Barn site</td>
<td>Natural Feature</td>
<td>Mentioned by Ebenezer Fletcher as the Water Supply British and American Wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British “Works”</td>
<td>Possibly in south part of British post battle camp</td>
<td>Other Built Feature</td>
<td>British Post-Battle Defensive Work (Logs laid on ground)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warner’s Encampment</td>
<td>Near Selleck Cabin and the Baptist Church</td>
<td>Place-name/Location</td>
<td>Initial American Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hale’s Encampment</td>
<td>East Slope of Monument Hill On ‘hill of less eminence’</td>
<td>Place-name/Location</td>
<td>Initial American Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis’ Encampment</td>
<td>Area south of wheat field</td>
<td>Place-name/Location</td>
<td>Initial American Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carr’s Camp</td>
<td>Near the St. John &amp; Frog Hollow Road intersection</td>
<td>Place-name/Location</td>
<td>Depicted on Gerlach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation)

Name of Property

Hubbardton Battlefield

County and State

Rutland County, Vermont

Map

Bridge

Spanned N. Brenton Brook just south of the Wheatfield; See Gerlach Map

Bridge

On American Retreat Route

Hickok House?

The house shown on the Gerlach map south of the battlefield

Residential Structure

Depicted on Gerlach Map

Burial Site (s)

Unknown

Other

Location of military graves

Criterion Consideration F. Hubbardton Battlefield is an example of early efforts to preserve, and commemorate, American Revolutionary War battlefields.

Hubbardton Battlefield is an example of early efforts to preserve and commemorate Revolutionary War battlefields. The commemoration of this site dates to the mid-1800s, fostered by a largely local grassroots effort that included veterans and eyewitnesses to the event. Although not the first battlefield monument erected to commemorate an American Revolutionary War event, the Hubbardton Monument is one of the earliest in the New England states. The battle site was first commemorated by a wooden pole erected in 1840. The current monument was erected in 1859 by the Hubbardton Battle Monument Association. This was followed by official state involvement in the acquisition, development, and management, of the site in the early twentieth century. This later phase of site preservation was a part of a larger national trend in which organizations, and states, sought to place monuments, and create battlefield parks (ca. 1900-1930s), that coincided with both the expansion of automobile-based cultural tourism, and the Colonial Revival period.

As the site of the most significant Revolutionary War battle in what would become Vermont, Hubbardton Battlefield became the site of events commemorating not only the battle, but also recognizing American Independence itself. On 4 July 1807, “the young people of Hubbardton and its vicinity” celebrated Independence Day “on the hill where was fought the memorable battle…between the troops of Gen. FRASER and Col. WARNER.” Prayers, and orations, were delivered in the presence of the “aged veteran, with hoary locks and furrows brow, who had seen the horrors of war, with variegated countenances, expressive of grief, indignation, and joy, at the recollection of scenes so horrid and events so glorious.”

With the passing of the Revolutionary War generation, recognition and acknowledgment of participation in the battle became a feature in obituaries. When Colonel John Chipman died “aged about 87,” the obituary stated he “was engaged in the battle of Hubbardton.”

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154 Rutland Herald 1 August 1807.
155 Vermont Gazette 29 September 1829.
Heman Allen past away at the age of 73 in 1852, his obituary pointed out that his father Major Heber Allen (1743-1782), a brother of Ethan Allen, had fought at Hubbardton.156

For decades, locals remembered the spot where Colonel Francis fell, and this location was routinely pointed out to visitors. An unidentified minister from Plainfield, preaching on the Hubbardton battlefield decades after the war, noted he preached at “...the place where once was heard the din of war & where garments were rolled in blood.” He recorded in his journal that he stood “just by where Col. Frances [sic] of Beverly was shot.”157 When Jared Sparks made a tour of battlefields in New England in 1830, he recorded in his journal that at Hubbardton, “The spot where Francis fell is pointed out.”158 The colonel’s body is believed to be buried under, or at least near, the battlefield monument erected in 1859 on the 82nd anniversary of the battle. The Hubbardton Battle Monument Association “for the purpose of erecting and maintaining a suitable monument” was founded in 1856.159 The celebration in 1859 is said to have attracted “nearly five thousand people,” among them “Father [Amos] Churchill, a veteran of some ninety years” (1774-1865) and Benjamin Hickok (1765-1862).160 In 1875, a wrought iron fence was placed around the monument (Photographs 9 and 10).

The unveiling of the monument was followed by official state involvement in the acquisition, development, and management, of the site in the second quarter of the twentieth century. In 1937, the Vermont legislature created the Hubbardton Battlefield Commission, which acquired 43 acres of land. It was reported in the Burlington newspaper that the purchase of battlefield lands by the state was intended to serve as a “permanent memorial to Seth Warner, the “Green Mountain Boys,” and the continental [sic] troops who fought there....”161 Anticipating visitors, the road from Castleton to the battlefield was widened and improved at this time. In 1943, two easements were executed with bordering landholders to prohibit commercial development on portions of their land.

In the mid-1950s, the first museum building was erected on the battlefield, placed “at the highest point...” with views from its windows “...of the four significant and dramatic phases of the

156 Semi-Weekly Eagle (Brattleboro, VT) 13 May 1852.
157 He also stopped “At Castleton [and] visited the spot where was a fort – its timbers are now visible in the fence of a garden! Fort Warren had been abandoned as early as 1779. Fragment of a journal kept by a minister in the Lake Champlain area, v.p., 1777?. Dartmouth College - Rauner Special Collections Library, Hanover, NH.
158 MS Sparks 141g, 96. Houghton Library, Harvard U. Cambridge, MA.
159 “An Act to incorporate the Hubbardton Battle Monument Association and to repeal a certain Act Therein Mentioned” is printed in Acts and Resolves passed by the General Assembly of the State of Vermont at the October Session 1857 (Montpelier, 1857), 119-120. It repealed the act of 13 November 1856 which had been granted to residents of Castleton rather than Hubbardton.
The museum also included an electric map and a battle diorama. This small stone structure (28 by 20 feet) was erected in time for the beginnings of the period of automobile tourism that linked historical, and natural, places throughout the United States. The museum building, although highly successful, was replaced in 1970 by a Visitor Center situated closer to Monument Hill Road. This building was dedicated by Governor Deane Davis in 1971.163

The Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site was listed in the National Register of Historic Places in 1971.164 As part of their ongoing stewardship of this cultural, and historical, resource, the Vermont Division of Historic Preservation (VDHP) completed a Cultural Resources Management Plan in 2000, and followed up on this planning report with an archeological survey in 2001.165 A study of the battlefield was funded by the American Battlefield Protection Program in 2010, which built on these previous studies. That document compiled historic first-person accounts, conducted a military terrain analysis (KOCOA analysis) of the battlefield and the Gerlach map (Figure 2), summarized the previous archeological studies of the battlefield, and offered recommendations for interpretation, and documentation.166 In 2016, VDHP received a grant from the American Battlefield Protection Program to revise and update the original nomination, reflecting the recent historical scholarship and current understanding of sites of conflict.167

163 Anonymous, "Reception Center at Hubbardton to be Dedicated," The Burlington Free Press (Burlington), Monday, June 29, 1970.
165 For the cultural resource management plan, see Hartgen Archeological Associates, Inc., Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site Cultural Resource Management Plan: Town of Hubbardton, Rutland County, Vermont (The Vermont Division of Historic Preservation, 2001). The archeological survey, including metal detection, was reported in Hartgen Archeological Associates, Inc., Phase IB Archaeological Survey Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site, Town of Hubbardton, Rutland County, Vermont (The Vermont Division of Historic Preservation, 2002).
166 Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton.
167 At the time that Hubbardton Battlefield was listed to the National Register in 1971, essentially the only scholarly treatment of the battle had been written in 1963 by Colonel Ernest R. Du Puy and published in Vermont County Life. Noting that new information had been discovered in the intervening two decades, a second, more definitive account of the battle was prepared by retired U.S. Army Colonel John Williams and published by the state; see The Battle of Hubbardton: The American Rebels Stem the Tide. (Montpelier, Vermont: The Vermont Division for Historic Preservation, 1988, reprinted 2002). In 2015, another updated account of the battle has been published by Bruce Venter; see The Battle of Hubbardton: The Rear Guard Action that Saved America (Charleston, South Carolina: The History Press, 2015).

Scholarship focusing on the history, archeology, and landscape, of battlefields has also begun to influence the ways battlefields are identified, and interpreted. Recent scholarly studies include Clarence R. Geier, Jr. and Susan Winter, editors, Look to the Earth: Historical Archaeology and the American Civil War (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1994); Clarence R. Geier, Lawrence E. Babits, Douglas D. Scott, and David G. Orr, editors, Historical Archaeology of Military Sites: Method and Topic (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University press, 2011); Dana L. Pertermann and Holly Kathryn Norton, editors, The Archaeology of Engagement: Conflict and Revolution in the United States (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2015); William A. Griswold and Donald W. Linebaugh, editors, The Saratoga Campaign: Uncovering an Embattled Landscape (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 2016). Finally, the work of the American Battlefield Protection Program to
The study of historical battlefields requires a unique combination of military history, archeology, and terrain or landscape analysis. Not only is it important to know the who, what, where, when, and how, of the specifics of the battle, but knowledge of the historical development of the place the battle occurred is critical in order to understand the event, and the subsequent changes, that may have taken place. The Hubbardton Battlefield nomination, as amended herein, successfully combines the elements of military history, archeology, and terrain analysis. Due to minimal modern changes to the landscape since 1777, the battlefield conveys what occurred on this site over two centuries ago. The battlefield also has the potential to contain additional archeological evidence that can contribute to the interpretation of the battle.

Assessment of Integrity

The Battlefield at Hubbardton retains an exceptionally high degree of natural, cultural, and visual integrity (Figure 5). Describing the battlefield in the 1870s, researcher Henry Hall could still use Burgoyne’s description of the 1780s as a guide, and, as University of Vermont archeologists Kate Kenny and Dr. John Crock point out, today the battlefield and surrounding areas are remarkably similar to what the battlefield looked like in 1777. With a written contemporary account of the engagement in hand, a visitor can orient himself or herself in the natural setting, find the locations mentioned in the text, follow the lines of vision, and visibility, as it existed in 1777 and, undistracted by modern development features, get the feeling, and mental association, with the events of 1777. Standing on the site of Colonel Francis’ camp at Sucker Brook it is easy to identify landscape features influencing the outcome of the battle. Similarly, standing on the ridge looking down on the brook makes it easy to understand not only the difficulties experienced by British forces ascending the hill but also why Americans chose the location in their efforts to resist the Crown Forces advance.

Hubbardton Battlefield retains a high degree of integrity. The defining features of the battlefield are apparent to the visitor, including Sucker Brook, Monument Hill, Zion Hill, the Castleton Road, Pittsford Ridge and the “Hill of Less Eminence.” The viewshed of the core area of the battlefield is characterized by medium to long views that encompass a broad area of rolling hills, that remain largely unmodified except by light agriculture, and a small number of post-battle, and modern, intrusions (e.g. minimal road development, some utility poles, and a few nineteenth- and twentieth-century structures, including one modern house), all framed by tree-covered ridges


Hubbardton Battlefield retains the most important aspects of integrity for a battlefield: location, setting, feeling, and association. Location is defined as the place where the historical event occurred, and asks question why the historic event occurred here. Hubbardton Battlefield is the place where the battle occurred on 7 July 1777. The location of the battle has been documented through physical evidence gathered through archeological investigations that identified military artifacts dating from the Revolutionary War. The location has also been documented through primary, and secondary, sources such as historic maps, written eyewitness accounts, oral histories, contemporary newspaper accounts, and pension records.

Setting is the physical environment of a historical property or site. Hubbardton Battlefield is remarkably intact and clearly conveys the military action and events of 7 July 1777, and the subsequent encampment of Royal forces on the field following the battle (Table 2). There are some minor intrusions or concessions that occurred on the site during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as modern or improved roads, power lines, an historic schoolhouse, a historic barn, a historic cemetery, a historic church, a historic residence, a modern residence, a Visitor Center with parking and wood fencing, and some stone walls or woodlands, but overall there are no landscape elements that significantly detract from the interpretation of the battle. An understanding of the eighteenth-century road network is easily conveyed, because present-day Monument Road is essentially the trace of the significant north-south road present at the time of the battle. The trace of the Mount Independence military road is evident and walkable, particularly at the saddle on Sargent Hill, and the intersection of the earlier Mount Independence military road with Monument Hill Road is unchanged. Further, the battlefield topography is still readily apparent. Landscape elements such as Sargent Hill to the northwest, the “Hill of Less Eminence,” Monument Hill, Mount Zion Hill, Pittsford Ridge, Sucker Brook, and other drainages are essentially unchanged since 1777, and are imposing features of the landscape. The wooded character of the landscape also contributes to the integrity of setting.

The aspect of feeling of the battlefield is also still intact. The hills, swales, ravines, and woods, all mentioned in contemporary descriptions of the battle, are still present and are evocative of the 7 July event. The agricultural and forested character of the lands surrounding the battlefield, and the generally low density of modern intrusions, conveys the overall feeling of what life in the New Hampshire Grants of 1777 would have been like, with sparse settlement, and low numbers of residents.

The aspect of association is represented as the place where the battle occurred. The battlefield has a direct association with Colonel Seth Warner of Vermont and Colonel Ebenezer Francis of Massachusetts, for the American forces, and significant Royal commanders Simon Fraser and Friedrich Adolf Riedesel. Warner's and Francis' rear-guard action at Hubbardton affected the strategic trajectory of the Northern Campaign, slowing down General John Burgoyne's invasion towards Albany, and setting the stage for later battles of the campaign. The American defeat at Hubbardton on 7 July continues a string of defeats and setbacks since Burgoyne’s invasion of New York State in June 1777. But Hubbardton is not only the very last in this string of defeats - it is also a defeat that could well have ended in victory. At Hubbardton, Continentals and Militia showed that they could fight. The extent of British losses, as well as the firm and skillful resistance offered to some of Burgoyne’s best troops, showed a stiffening American resistance that yielded its first victory at Bennington on 16 August, continued to Freeman’s Farm on 19 September and Bemis Heights on 7 October, and ended with Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga ten days later.

Beyond the obvious military implications of the events of 7 July 1777, the battle also helped shape the political landscape of the polity that would join the United States as the State of Vermont in 1791. On 15 January 1777, representatives of 28 towns in the New Hampshire Grants had gathered at Westminster Courthouse, declared themselves a separate state, and named it “Republic of New Connecticut.” That same day the Manchester meeting created a “civil and political Body” as a self-proclaimed government for the purposes of self-administration and voted that the “district of land commonly called and known by the name New-Hampshire grants, be a new and separate state; and for the future conduct themselves as such.” The delegates based the legal justification for this revolutionary step on “the sole and exclusive and inherent right of ruling and governing themselves in such manner and form as in their own Wisdom they shall think proper.”

Another convention meeting in Windsor on 4 June 1777 changed the name of their state to that of Vermont, and called for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention. At the Constitutional Convention, which held its first meeting on 2 July 1777 in Windsor, the delegates on 8 July 1777 adopted a constitution for their state, but only because a violent thunder-storm prevented them from leaving West's Tavern. News of the British victories at Fort Ticonderoga on 6 July and Hubbardton the following day made many of the delegates anxious to adjourn and reconvene at a later date, but the pouring rain kept them inside the tavern.

As Vermonters created their state as an expression of the “consent of the governed,” as the Declaration of Independence had called it, her citizens actively participated in America’s struggle for independence. In June 1776, a Convention of Town Committees at Dorset on 25 June 1776 formally established a military unit called the Green Mountain Boys “in compliance


172 The text of the Windsor Convention of 4 June 1777 in Eliakim Persons Walton, Records of the Council of Safety and Governor and Council of the State of Vermont to which are prefixed the Records of the General Conventions from July 1775 to December 1777 vol. 1 (Montpelier: Steam Press, 1873), Records, 52-61; the text for the 2 July convention in Windsor ibid. on 62-75.
with the orders of Congress” of 23 June 1776 in the hope that the military contribution of the New Hampshire Grants to the invasion of Canada would be rewarded with the acknowledgement of their existence as a separate state by Congress. That same day the convention pledged “to defend by arms the United American States against the hostile attempts of the British fleet and armies until the present unhappy controversy between the two countries shall be settled.” When the delegates concurrently petitioned the Continental Congress to recognize them as a state and seat its delegates, they had tied the struggle of Vermont for its independence from New York to the struggle of the United States for independence from England.

Vermont was born in the crucible of the War of Independence. The war had been fought on her territory, her population had suffered in the war, and her men had fought, and died, for the common cause. Hubbardton became many Vermonters’ claim to admission to the United States, a demand that was fulfilled in March 1791 and acknowledge by the State of Vermont when it purchased the land on which the battle was fought for commemorative purposes.

173 The Green Mountain Boys, First and Second Canadian (Congresses’ Own) regiments and the German Battalion were the only units in the Continental Army directly under Congress.
174 The first convention in the New Hampshire Grants convened on 26 July 1775, the second on 16 January 1776, the third on 26 July 1776 &c up to the 8th and last on 24 December 1777. Based on a warrant issued from Arlington on 10 December 1775, the second General Convention of Committees of Safety met in Dorset on 16 and 17 January 1776.
9. Major Bibliographical References

**Bibliography** (Cite the books, articles, and other sources used in preparing this form.)


[Churchill, Amos], “A Sketch of the Dangers and Sufferings during the Revolutionary War, of the inhabitants of Town of Hubbardton,” *The Rutland County Herald* (Rutland, Vermont), Friday, December 29, 1854.


Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation)  Rutland County, Vermont
Name of Property  County and State

The National Archives (Great Britain). "Contingent Account of Brigadier General Simon Fraser, 1776-1777." Treasury, Class 1, Volume 572, folios 87-91. National Archives, Kew, UK.


Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation)
Name of Property

Rutland County, Vermont
County and State

Previous documentation on file (NPS):

___ preliminary determination of individual listing (36 CFR 67) has been requested
___ previously listed in the National Register
___ previously determined eligible by the National Register
___ designated a National Historic Landmark
___ recorded by Historic American Buildings Survey #___________
___ recorded by Historic American Engineering Record #___________
___ recorded by Historic American Landscape Survey #___________

Primary location of additional data:

___ State Historic Preservation Office
___ Other State agency
___ Federal agency
___ Local government
___ University
___ Other
   Name of repository: ____________________________

Historic Resources Survey Number (if assigned): __________

10. Geographical Data

Acreage of Property
Previously listed – 1,500 acres
Revised acreage – 1000.52 acres

Latitude/Longitude Coordinates (decimal degrees)
Datum if other than WGS84: __________
(enter coordinates to 6 decimal places)

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**Verbal Boundary Description** (Describe the boundaries of the property.)

The revised boundaries for Hubbardton Battlefield are indicated on the accompanying base map.

**Boundary Justification** (Explain why the boundaries were selected.)
The boundary for the Hubbardton Battlefield consists of the original boundary as established in the National Register nomination (listed to the Register 11 March 1971) in addition to the following amendments. An American Battlefield Protection Program battlefield study in 2010 established a Battlefield Boundary Area and a Core Area.\textsuperscript{175}

The Battlefield Boundary Area boundaries were drawn to encompass the core area plus the two areas of military observation (Sargent Hill and Zion Hill), the area of British approach along the Mt. Independence-Hubbardton Road north and west of the battlefield (including the Sargent Hill Saddle), the North Breton Brook, the area along the road south to Castleton (a limited American retreat route), the west side of Pittsfield Ridge, and the reported post-battle British and Brunswick camps.

The Core Area of the battlefield was defined by identifying those areas where organized maneuver and intense combat occurred. After initial contact was made, this included the unnamed drainage at the foot of Monument Hill, Monument Hill itself, the “Hill of Eminence,” the Selleck Wheat Field, and the general area around the two Mount Independence Road and Monument Road intersections.

The results of that study show that portions of the approach, retreat, and maneuver areas of the battlefield are situated on state-owned lands north, east, and west of the 1971 National Register boundary. To the north, the boundary is revised herein to include those publicly owned lands on Sargent Hill, a large multi-topped hill that dominates the north and northwestern view shed of the battlefield. A saddle on the hill served as the avenue of approach for the British and Brunswick forces. To the east, the boundary is revised to include the publicly owned lands extending up Pittsford Ridge, a long ridge that dominates the eastern side of the battlefield and over which elements of the American forces retreated. To the south, the boundary is revised to include publicly owned lands to the west of Monument Hill Road (the road linking Castleton and Sudbury) including Zion Hill (Mount Zion), a hill with a rocky cliff face overlooking the battlefield. The amendment of the 1971 boundary thus includes lands that the 2010 ABPP study identified as part of the Battle of Hubbardton.

\textsuperscript{175} Kenny and Crock, \textit{Hubbardton}.
Additional Documentation

Submit the following items with the completed form:

- **Maps:** A USGS map or equivalent (7.5 or 15-minute series) indicating the property's location.

- **Sketch map** for historic districts and properties having large acreage or numerous resources. Key all photographs to this map.

- **Additional items:** (Check with the SHPO, TPO, or FPO for any additional items.)

**Figures**

Figure 1. The Hubbardton Battlefield Revised National Register Boundary. Original National Register boundary shown in blue.

Figure 2. *Plan of the Action at Huberton [sic] under Brigadier Gen'l. Frazer supported by Major Gen'l. Reidesel on the 7th July 1777*. Drawn by P. Gerlach, Deputy Quarter Master General. Engraved by Wm. Faden. (G3801.S3 1780 .F3, Library of Congress Geography and Map Division Washington, D.C.) [http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g3801sm.gar01183](http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g3801sm.gar01183).

Figure 3. Trace (shown in yellow) of the Military Road as mapped by Joseph L. Wheeler and Mabel A. Wheeler, *The Mount Independence-Hubbardton 1776 Military Road* (Privately Printed, 1968). The yellow trace is superimposed on a modern aerial of Hubbardton and also includes the Battlefield Boundary and Core area as identified in Kenny and Crocker (2010).

Figure 4. Summary of post-war battlefield features (Kenny and Crock 2010:161).

Figure 5. USGS map showing the summary results of the military terrain analysis of Hubbardton Battlefield (Kenny and Crock 2010:123).

Figure 6. Archeological survey results from the 2000 and 2001 surveys conducted by Hartgen Archeological Consultants, Inc., near the center of the Hubbardton Battlefield (Kenny and Crock 2010:171).

Figure 7. Revised interpretation of the battle, based on topography, historical mapping, documentary sources, archeological data, weapons data, and fields of fire (Kenny and Crock 2010:173).
Hubbardton Battlefield (Additional Documentation) Rutland County, Vermont

Name of Property: Hubbardton Battlefield

City or Vicinity: East Hubbardton

County: Rutland State: VT

Photographer: Wade P. Catts; Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site staff

Date Photographed: July 9-11, 2016; July 14, 2017; August 30, 2017

Description of Photograph(s) and number, include description of view indicating direction of camera:


Photograph 2 of 24. View to the north along the crest of Monument Hill, in the left background showing the Sargent Hill saddle and location of the outcrop. The Military Road passed through the saddle. (Hubbardton Battlefield. East Hubbardton. Rutland County. VT. Wade P. Catts. July 11, 2016).

Photograph 3 of 24. View to the southeast from the intersection of Woods Road and St. John Road showing Pittsford Ridge (to the left of the image) and Zion Hill (right center). (Hubbardton Battlefield. East Hubbardton. Rutland County. VT. Wade P. Catts. July 11, 2016).


Photograph 5 of 24. View to the east from the crest of Monument Hill looking towards the "Hill of Less Eminence" and the Battlefield Visitor Center (left). Pittsford Ridge is in the

Photograph 6 of 24. View to the east from Monument Hill showing Pittsford Ridge. To the right of the image is the Visitor Center and the Hubbardton Battlefield Monument is to the left of that structure (Hubbardton Battlefield. East Hubbardton. Rutland County. VT. Wade P. Catts. July 9, 2016).

Photograph 7 of 24. View to the north along the trace of the Military Road (Hubbardton Battlefield. East Hubbardton. Rutland County. VT. Wade P. Catts, August 30, 2017).

Photograph 8 of 24. View to the north along Monument Hill Road. Entrance to Hubbardton Battlefield parking area is to the left (Hubbardton Battlefield. East Hubbardton. Rutland County. VT. Wade P. Catts. July 11, 2016).


Photograph 13 of 24. View to the northeast showing the Hubbardton Battlefield Visitor Center. The tip of the white obelisk battlefield monument is visible to the right of the structure (Hubbardton Battlefield. East Hubbardton. Rutland County. VT. Wade P. Catts. July 11, 2016).


Photograph 17 of 24. View to the west from Monument Hill Road of the discontinued Frog Hollow Road Segment. The overhead powerline seen to the left center of the image leads to a cut in the trees where the road trace is still visible coming up the hill past the Frog Hollow Cemetery. The tree line in the center distance and right of the image marks the approximate location of the road in this field. (Hubbardton Battlefield. East Hubbardton. Rutland County. VT. Wade P. Catts. August 30, 2017).

Photograph 18 of 24. View to the north northwest along the relocated Frog Hollow Road. The Fuller house (demolished 2017) and barn are in the center distance and the Sargent Hill saddle is in the far distance (Hubbardton Battlefield. East Hubbardton. Rutland County. VT. Wade P. Catts. July 10, 2016).


