Hubbardton Battlefield

**STORY OF THE BATTLE**

Hubbardton Battlefield is nationally significant as the site of an important military encounter during the Northern Campaign of 1777, and a formative event in the development of the Northern Department Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War. A tactical loss for the American forces, historians conclude that, strategically, the battle was an American success because it allowed General St. Clair's withdrawing Northern Army to unite with General Schuyler's forces near Fort Edward on 12 July, thus keeping alive the American army that blocked further movement south by British General John Burgoyne. The battle lasted more than three hours, probably closer to five, and involved soldiers from Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Several important Americans participated in the engagement, including Colonel Seth Warner of Vermont, and Colonel Ebenezer Francis of Massachusetts. Brigadier General Simon Fraser of the British 24th Regiment of Foot commanded the Advance Guard, while Baron Riedesel commanded the Royal Army's Left Wing composed principally of Brunswick formations. The significance of this site is materially enhanced by the high integrity of its natural, cultural, and visual landscape as well as its archeological potential to improve upon or even radically change site interpretation. Archeological surveys conducted on the battlefield in 2001 and 2002 confirmed the presence of battle-related artifacts, such as lead shot, buttons, buckles, and other detritus of war. The Hubbardton Battlefield is an example of early attempts to preserve, and commemorate Revolutionary War battlefields, with a local grassroots effort that included veterans and eyewitnesses to the event. This initial mid-nineteenth-century effort was followed by official state involvement in the acquisition, development, and management of the site in the second quarter of the twentieth century as a historic site. This later phase of preservation was a part of a larger national trend in which organizations, and states sought to place monuments, and create battlefield parks that coincided with both the expansion of automobile-based cultural tourism, and a period of recalling our colonial, and revolutionary past. Hubbardton Battlefield was listed in the National Register of Historic Places in 1971. As part of ongoing research, and stewardship of this cultural, and historical resource, this amended nomination recognizes the battlefield’s larger significance under Criteria A, B, and D, and Criterion Consideration F, with a period of significance from July 1777, when the battle occurred, to 1937, when the State of Vermont purchased the land to establish a commemorative site.

**Historical Context - The 1777 Invasion from Canada**

The summer of 1777 was the third time that the Champlain Valley served as a theatre of war during the American War of Independence. Setting out from Crown Point in August 1775, Irish-born General Richard Montgomery led an American force to the gates of Fort Saint-Jean (St. John), which surrendered on 2 November 1775. Montgomery next turned his army towards Montreal, which surrendered on 13 November. On 2 December, Montgomery joined his troops to those of Benedict Arnold at Pointe aux Trembles, 18 miles upriver from Québec. British Governor Sir Guy Carleton inside Québec City refused to surrender. Montgomery was killed during an attack on the city during the night of 31 December, and the British captured many his men. Benedict Arnold, now in command of American forces in Canada, was however able to maintain the siege of Québec once reinforcements and additional supplies had arrived.
Upon hearing the news of American military successes in Canada, the British government in London embarked on an ambitious plan to attack the rebels from Canada along the Lake Champlain-Hudson River route, and to carry the war into New England. The 10,000-man expedition stood under the command of General John Burgoyne, who arrived in Canada in May 1776. His forces lifted the siege of Québec, and on 8 June 1776 in the Battle of Trois-Rivières routed the American forces attempting to stem the Royal advance. Carleton allowed the approximately 2,000 American survivors to retreat to Montreal, and by 15 June that city, too, was in British hands. Carleton continued to push south into New York State along the Richelieu River towards Lake Champlain. Upon reaching the lake he ordered the construction of a fleet of small vessels, which defeated Arnold’s similar fleet in the Battle of Valcour Island on 11 October. By this time, Carleton had reached a point just north of Mount Independence and Fort Ticonderoga. In view of the lateness of the season Carleton decided to end his pursuit of the rebels and returned to Canada. Although he had re-established British control over the Lake Champlain area by the end of the year, Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were still in American hands, and no British soldier had set foot into the Hudson River Valley.1

Burgoyne returned to England where he succeeded not only in convincing King George III and his government that it was Carleton’s fault that Ticonderoga was still in American hands, but also in getting himself appointed, on 28 February, to lead the 1777 expedition into the Hudson River Valley.2 Burgoyne arrived in Québec on 6 May 1777. When Carleton learned of Burgoyne’s appointment he resigned his governorship in protest, on 27 June, but had to remain at his post for another year before he could return to Britain in mid-1778. Burgoyne’s plan, which he had devised and developed himself, called for British forces under his command to follow the same avenue of attack taken in 1776, but with the aim of capturing Ticonderoga, and marching on to Albany. Here he would meet up with a smaller British force under Barry St. Leger, which was to approach along the Mohawk River valley north-west of Albany in New York State.3 As he continued along the Hudson River, St. Leger would meet up with forces under General Howe marching inland from New York City. Once these columns merged, New England, considered the center of the rebellion, would be cut off from the rest of the United States. Burgoyne was convinced that New England could then be reduced to obedience to the crown rather easily. That unified strategy, however, never materialized. Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, was loath to exercise close control over his field commanders from far-away London, and instead issued instructions that left much of the campaign strategy for 1777 to the generals’ own discretion. Germain had wanted Burgoyne, Clinton, and Howe to cooperate but instead each of them followed

his own plans and fought his own battles. Historians still argue whether Burgoyne knew of Howe’s campaign plans for 1777 when he departed from Québec on 13 June 1777 on his march south toward the Hudson. That same day, Howe moved his forces out of winter quarters at New Brunswick, New Jersey. Rather than move north along the Hudson to meet up with Burgoyne, Howe chose his own campaign, and sailed southward, landed his forces near Elkton, Maryland, and marched on Philadelphia, the center of American political power, which he occupied on 26 September. Barry St. Leger was forced to cease the siege of Fort Stanwix on 22 August after losing his Indian allies, who were dissatisfied with the siege warfare. Sir Henry Clinton carried out some token movements up the Hudson that turned out to be of little help to Burgoyne.4

Equally important for the eventual failure of Burgoyne was his overconfidence in the abilities of the large force under his command, and in his belief that large numbers of Canadians, Indians, and Loyalists would rally round his flag once he entered New York State. The New York loyalists never materialized, and of the around 2,000 militia Burgoyne had hoped to find in Québec, Carleton was only able to raise three small companies. Similarly, Burgoyne was only able to raise half of the 1,000 Indians he had hoped would accompany his forces.5

On 13 June 1777, Burgoyne and Carleton reviewed their forces at Fort St. John just north of Lake Champlain. Burgoyne assumed command of about 7,000 regulars, and 138 pieces of artillery from 3-pound battalion guns to 18-pounders as well as mortars, and howitzers. For the invasion of New York, Burgoyne organized his army into an advance force under Brigadier General Simon Fraser, and two divisions: Major General William Phillips with 3,900 British regulars, and Baron Riedesel with some 3,100 Brunswickers, and Hanauers. Initially things went well for Burgoyne. His men occupied the deserted fortifications at Crown Point on 30 June. Two days later British advance forces reached Fort Ticonderoga. By 4 July most of the American forces had withdrawn to either Fort Ticonderoga or Mount Independence on the Vermont side of Lake Champlain. In the process they had, unknowingly, opened the way for British artillery to move onto Sugar Loaf Mountain, today’s Mount Defiance. American General Arthur St. Clair had mistakenly considered the mountaintop impassable. Claiming that, “Where a goat can go, a man can go. And where a man can go, he can drag a gun,” Phillips’ men had successfully dragged two 12-lb cannons, later


howitzers and 24-lb cannon, to the mountaintop.\(^6\) From here British artillery could bombard the fort as well as Mount Independence, making American positions indefensible. St. Clair had no choice but to hastily withdraw his forces during the night of 5/6 July, leaving behind large amounts of supplies. In the morning of 6 July, British forces occupied Fort Ticonderoga virtually unopposed, and hard on the heels of the retreating Continental Army. The capture of Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence ended the first phase of Burgoyne’s campaign. St. Clair retreated to Castleton, then to Rutland, and on to Fort Edward, and left Colonel Seth Warner as a rear-guard at Hubbardton.

**The Battle of Hubbardton**

**Phase 1: 7 July 1777 from 5:00 a.m. to 6:30 a.m.: Pursuit from Mt. Independence, and Initial Contact**

The retreat from Fort Ticonderoga early in the morning of 6 July was disorderly and confused. Patrick Cogan, quartermaster in Colonel Joseph Cilley’s First New Hampshire Regiment, complained bitterly to General John Stark about American leadership.

Surely we were fifty thousand times better off than General Sullivan was in Canada last year; our men was in high spirits, and determined to a man to stick by the lines till they lost their lives, rather than quit so advantageous a Post [...] there never was a field officer consulted, whether we should retreat or not, which makes them very uneasy; so that the blame of our Retreat must fall on our Commanders; never was soldiers in such a condition without clothes [sic], victuals or drink & constantly wet. Caleb and I are just as our mothers bore us without the second shirt, the second pair of shoes, stockings or coats.\(^7\)

One year later at Fort Ticonderoga, Cilley stated the British on 6 July, “Drove us a long two or three & thirty miles that day, till the Rear Guard got to Bowman's Camp; the men being so fatigued were obliged to stay, and were attacked in the morning by the Regulars, who travell'd all Night, and just got up by the time we were beginning to march in a disorderly manner; our men being in confusion, and made no great of a Battle.”\(^8\) Compared to the pursuing Royal forces, Continental Army troops were at the very least discouraged as they trudged south-east down the Military Road, a grand name for a road trace slashed through a long stretch of wilderness cleared only the previous year - from Mount Independence toward Hubbardton. Behind General Arthur St. Clair’s forces came the rear-guard under Colonel Ebenezer Francis with the remnants of the 11th Massachusetts Regiment, growing larger along the way by the addition of stragglers, sick, and wounded from various units it swept up along the way. St. Clair had initially planned to wait for Francis but having waited a few hours in the afternoon of 6 July decided to move on to Castleton with his main force. Before he continued his withdrawal, St. Clair detached Colonel Seth Warner with his “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers, Colonel Nathan Hale’s 2nd New Hampshire Regiment, and some militia as his rear-guard. This group had orders to join him at Castleton once

---


\(^7\) The letter eventually found its way to the New Hampshire state government. *Documents and Records relating to the State of New Hampshire during the period of the American Revolution, from 1776 to 1783*, ... Nathaniel Bouton, ed., (Concord, N. H., 1874), vol. VIII., 640-41.

\(^8\) Ibid.
Francis reached Hubbardton. Upon arrival at Hubbardton, Francis was to place himself under the command of Warner. Once united, this rear-guard, drawn from the best units St. Clair had available, would constitute a force of somewhere between 1,000 and 1,200 men under Warner and Francis, two experienced, and highly regarded officers.9

Colonel Francis finally reached Warner’s bivouac around 4:00 p.m. The three colonels met in John Selleck’s cabin and decided to settle down for the night rather than march an additional six miles to join up with Continental Army forces under General St. Clair encamped in Castleton. There were several good reasons for this decision. Although his own men were ready to march on, the sick, and wounded in Francis’ detachment were exhausted, and unable to continue marching that day. Leaving them behind in the bivouac was not an option they considered. Warner had faith in the fighting ability of his men and was in a highly defensible position. Furthermore, about 2½ miles south of him, two New Hampshire militia regiments under Colonels Bellows and Olcott were blocking the road.10 These men were on the verge of mutiny, having leveled their muskets at their own officers the previous day when ordered to let the Continental Army pass. Fearing that they might be sacrificed to the pursuing British army while the Continentals saved themselves, these militiamen were almost certain to refuse passage to Warner and his men. Warner knew that he was being pursued by Royal forces, but he also knew that the pursuers would be struggling just as hard as his men over the stumps littering the road from Mount Independence and would likely have to rest a few miles behind him. Having posted sentries along the perimeter, and along the road to Mount Independence, the men went to sleep, assuming that they would join up with the main army the next day. Captain Enos Jones of Colonel Samuel Brewer’s Regiment entered in his diary “…6. [July 1777] 3 o’clock in m: orders came to march. We marched to Hulberton [Hubbardton] with much furtigue [sic], Lodged that night.”11

A “General Return of Troops at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence” dated 28 June 1777 gives Hale 126 men present, and fit for duty, Francis 206, and Warner 99, for a total of 431; 110 were present, and sick, and 332 “on command” for a total of 883. Seven men were sick absent, and three on furlough. The rear-guard that departed Mt. Independence was about 450 strong; adding Hale’s, and Warner’s, 225 men plus some 300 stragglers, sick etc we arrive at a number of around 1,000 men at Hubbardton. For a discussion of troops strengths see appendices A, C, D, and E, in John Williams, The Battle of Hubbardton. The American Rebels stem the Tide. (Montpelier, 1988). Besides Williams this battle narrative is based on Henry Hall, Battle of Hubbardton, ms 149, Vermont Historical Society, Barre, VT; Bruce Venter; see The Battle of Hubbardton: The Rear Guard Action that Saved America (Charleston, South Carolina: The History Press, 2015), and Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton. A brief and easily accessible account is Michael Barbieri, “Ti’s Evacuation and the Battle of Hubbardton.” Journal of the American Revolution (24 July 2014) at https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/07/tis-evacuation-and-the-battle-of-hubbardton/ (accessed 8 July 2017).

10 For a discussion of the role of the militia see also Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton, 21; a detailed discussion, and table of American forces ibid., 29.

11 “Journal of Captain Enos Jones” New England Historical and Genealogical Register vol. 15 (1861), 299-304. Jones was taken prisoner at Hubbardton. Like some of the other sources quoted in this narrative Stone is not listed among the “Primary Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Hubbardton” in Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton, 43. Kenny and Crock list six British/Loyalist, and Brunswick accounts, and eight American accounts.
General Simon Fraser’s pursuing forces had indeed struggled as much as the Continentals and went into bivouac on the Military Road about two miles from Warner’s men. Fraser, lieutenant colonel of the 24th Regiment of Foot with the temporary rank of brigadier while commanding the advance guard, had 22 companies (approximately 850 men) under his detachment. The men included ten companies each of Light Infantry, and Grenadiers, and two companies from his own regiment. He had been the first to enter Fort Ticonderoga shortly after midnight on 6 July, but his pursuit of the retreating Americans had been delayed when some of his men started to help themselves to the American supplies in equipment, food, and above all the liquor, stored in the fort. It was already daybreak before he could set out along the Military Road. Francis, and his forces, was about four miles ahead of him.

As Fraser was resting his men around 4:00 p.m., Baron Riedesel caught up with him. He had orders from Burgoyne to pursue the fleeing Americans with the Brunswick Prinz Friedrich Regiment of Infantry, and a battalion each of Jäger, grenadiers, and chasseurs, totaling a force of 1,100 men. When he met up with Fraser he had with him a company of Jäger, a detachment of grenadiers of about 80 men, and a few chasseurs for a total of around 180 troops. Although riled by the presence of an officer who outranked him, Fraser agreed to march ahead another three miles, and bivouac there while Baron Riedesel bivouacked where he was. Both units broke camp, and continued their pursuit the next morning at 3:00 a.m. If Fraser encountered a large number of enemy troops, he was to inform Baron Riedesel, and await his arrival before attacking. Fraser was convinced that this circumstance would not occur, and instead expected to encounter only about 500 men or so under Colonel Ebenezer Francis.

It was around 4:00 a.m. when Fraser’s column finally got on its way. Lord Francis Napier of the 31st Regiment of Foot recorded in his journal that the column “Marched at daybreak,” which would have been even later, but Napier was not part of Fraser’s force. Civil twilight on 7 July 1777 in the Hubbardton-Castleton area was around 5:45 a.m., civil sunrise about 40 minutes later around 6:20 a.m. Ensign Hille, who was not present at the battle, recorded that “At dawn, Fraser’s corps near Hubbardton met with the very strong rear guard of the Provincials and had a lively fire from 5 - 7:30 o’clock.” Captain Rufus Lincoln reports that on “July 7, 1777. At 5 o’Clock in the morning of the 7th Co[lo] Frances a brave officer who had the Command of the Rear-Guard was overtaken and attacked by Ge[f]ar佐or [sic] with his Brigade.” Eyewitnesses agree that initial contact was made around 5:00 a.m. or shortly thereafter when Warner’s sentries on Sargent Hill opened fire on Fraser’s scouts. As the sentries fell back toward Sucker Brook, Fraser’s scouts slowly moved

12 Julius Friedrich von Hille, an ensign in the Brunswick Prinz Friedrich Regiment, placed Fraser “about 2 leagues this side of the [i.e. his] bivouac. The American Revolution, Garrison Life in French Canada and New York. Journal of an Officer in the Prinz Friedrich Regiment, 1776-1783 Helga Doblin and Mary C. Lynn, trans. and eds., (Westport, 1993), 75.
14 General Fraser’s account in the form of a letter to John Robinson from Skeensborough, dated 13 July 1777, is published in an appendix to Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society vol. 4 (1898-1902), 139-147; the Battle of Hubbardton on 145-147.
15 Garrison Life, 75.
17 Francis Napier also placed initial contact at “About five O’Clock.” S. Sydney Bradford, “Lord Francis Napier’s Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign.” Maryland Historical Magazine vol. 57 No. 4 (December 1962), 300.
along the road to the crest of Sargent Hill. From there, they could see the Continental Army forces encamped about ½ mile ahead of them along Sucker Brook.

**Phase 2: 7 July 1777 from 6:30 a.m. to 7:30 a.m.: British Advance Guard deploys as Americans line up along Sucker Brook**

The battle-lines were drawn, but before he ordered the attack Fraser wanted to know how many Americans he would face (Figure 2). When his scouts returned an hour later at around 6:15 a.m., they brought the unwelcome news that his opponents were considerably stronger than he had assumed. Knowing that Baron Riedesel was less than three miles behind him, he sent aides to the Brunswick officer with the news, and an order to speed up his men. He then went on a reconnaissance with Major Robert Grant. 18 Fearing that Warner would gather strength by the absorption of local militia, Fraser, lacking artillery and low on musket ammunition, and with at most 850 troops plus a few Native Americans under his command, gave orders to attack around 6:30 a.m. 19 Loyalist Joshua Pell, a volunteer in the 24th Regiment of Foot, recorded that on, “7th July, Part of the Advance Corps came up with the Rebels at Hubberton [sic], about six in the morning.” 20 Lt. Henry Sewall of the 12th Massachusetts recorded that, “The British Regulars, Hessians & Indians attacked us a little after Sunrise,” around 6:30 a.m. 21 As Royal forces quickly approached down Sargent Hill, the Continentals encamped in a delaying position along Sucker Brook had little time to prepare for action. Captain Jones wrote that, “7 in m[orning]: the Enemy [sic] came upon us without warning.” 22

Depending on where they were located in the morning of the battle, Americans were either getting ready for breakfast or already preparing for the march when Fraser’s men attacked. Ebenezer Fletcher was completely surprised by the attack. “The morning after our retreat, orders came very early for the troops to refresh and be ready for marching. Some were eating, some were cooking, and all in a very unfit posture for battle. Just as the sun rose, there was a cry, ‘the enemy are upon

---


19 “On July 7, at a distance of 2 or 3 miles, Brigadier Fraser attacked and beat the enemy with his Advance-Guard of about 732 men but without artillery.” Helga Doblin, “Journal of Lt. Colonel Christian Julius Prätorius 2 June 1777-17 July 1777” The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum vol. 15 No. 3 (Winter 1991), 57-68, 65. Prätorius was commanding officer of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment.

20 “Diary of Joshua Pell, Junior an Officer of the British Army in America 1776 – 1777” The Magazine of American History with Notes and Queries Edited by John Austin Stevens, vol. 2 No. 2 (February 1878), 107-12, 107.

21 Diary of General Henry Sewall (1752-1845), from March 1776-31 December 1842. MAHS Ms. N-905. Sewall served as a lieutenant in the 12th MA from 1 January 1777 to 25 June 1779.

22 “Journal of Captain Enos Jones” New England Historical and Genealogical Register vol. 15 (1861), 299-304
Looking round I saw the enemy in line of battle. Orders came to lay down our packs and be ready for action. The fire instantly began.”

Corporal Fox of the 47th Regiment of Foot, who was not present at the battle, had shared another sequence of the battle. Americans “were encamp’d upon a hill and Cooking in Camp. Just leaving they were surprised at that time. when we was [sic] at the bottom of the hill we engaged them. the fire was hot on both sides three quarters of hours our granadiers [sic] and light Infantry made a volly [sic] and a charge and took possession of the ground. they retreated not having time to take their napsacks with them [sic].”

James Whelpley, on the other hand, told Jared Sparks in 1830 that:

The soldiers were slinging their knapsack preparing to march when Francis and Warner heard that the advanced troops of the British were near at hand. They had encamped three miles back during the night, in a valley near the present site of Hubbardton Meeting House, and by an early march had overtaken these rear divisions of Gates’s army.

Firing was heard in the woods at the foot of the hill, or rather across a ravine on the south of Warner’s encampment. He and Francis immediately formed their men and marched to the top of the hill on the side towards which the British under Frazer were approaching. The Americans retreated from the brow of the hill and formed behind a log fence in a wheatfield where they stood till the enemy came up, and the action commenced. The firing was warm and well sustained on both sides. The British line was formed in the edge of a wood having the log fence in front. The two lines were stretched from north to south directly over the top of the hill having a road between them. Warner is said to have placed himself in a conspicuous place during the action, and to have animated his men by his language and his deeds.

Lieutenant Thomas Anbury of the 62nd Regiment of Foot wrote that, “about five, we came up with the enemy, who were busily employed cooking their provisions.”

Private Joseph Bird of the 12th Massachusetts Regiment remembered that he, “was boiling chocolate, and carried it down the road, coming in front Mount Independence; when one of our men jumped up, and cocked his gun to fire, they didn’t let him fire. Then, I turned and looked to see what he was going to shoot at ad [sic] saw the enemy, aforming about 15 rods [about 250 feet] from us.”

---


25 MS Sparks 141g, pp. 93-96. Houghton Library, Harvard College Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Whelpley was born in 1747 in Wilton, CT, and settled in Hubbardton in 1787, where he died in 1838. He did not fight in the Battle of Hubbardton. His Pension Application S 41332 identifies him as a Quartermaster and Captain in 4th Connecticut Regiment, though the debate over his rank and length of service stretches over a number of years.


Francis’ men along Sucker Brook may not have had, “time to take their knapsacks with them,” but Fraser may have quickly regretted his decision to attack. Taking the lead with the two companies of his 24th Regiment, Major Grant was among the first casualties of the battle. Francis’ men had waited behind a crude abatis of felled trees on Sucker Brook. When the smoke from the first volley of Francis’ men cleared, the regiment had taken 22 casualties. Fraser gave orders for his men to deploy from the column in which they had marched on the Military Road to line formation. Switching to battle formation gave Warner’s men valuable time to deploy along the ridge of Monument Hill.

Phase 3: 7 July 1777 from 7:30 a.m. to 8:45 a.m.: Battle for Monument Hill and Monument Hill Road

Captain Moses Greenleaf of Francis’ 11th Massachusetts recorded that he had had breakfast with Colonel Francis up on Monument Hill when,

At seven OCloch [sic] Colo Francis came to me & desired me to parade the Regt, which I did, at ¼ past 7 he came in Haste to me told me an Express had arrived from Genl St Clair Informing that we must march with the greatest Expedition, or the Enemy would be upon us, also that they had taken Skenesbrough [sic] with all our Baggage, ordered me to March the Regt Immediately March’d apart of the Regt at 20 Minutes past 7 the enemy appear’d with Gun shot of us we fac’d to the right then the firing began which Lasted till ¾ past Eight a.m. without Cessation.28

Lieutenant William Digby recalled that on the 7th,

After marching 4 or 5 miles we came up with above 2000 of the enemy strongly posted on the top of a high hill, with breast works before them, and great trees cut across to prevent our approach; but not withstanding all these difficulties, they had no effect on the ardor always shewn [sic] by British Troops, who with the greatest steadiness and resolution, mounted the hill amidst showers of balls mixed with buck shot, which they plentifully bestowed amongst us ...we no sooner gained the ascent, than there was such a fire sent amongst them as not easily conceived; they for some hours maintained their ground, and once endeavoured [sic] to surround us, but were soon made sensible of their inferiority, (altho we had not more than 850 men engaged, owing to our leaving the camp in so great a hurry, half of our companies being on guard and other duties), and were drove from their strong hold with great slaughter.29

Richard Pope of the 47th Regiment of Foot recorded that while Fraser ordered the Light Infantry to take, “a commanding ground on the left …the advanced guards under Major Grant of the 24th Regt. was by this time engaged, & the grenadiers were advanced to sustain them, and to prevent

28 Donald H. Wickman, “‘Breakfast on Chocolate’: The Diary of Moses Greenleaf, 1777” The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum vol. 15 No. 6 (1997), 483-508, 497.
29 James Phinney Baxter, The British Invasion from the North, The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, 1776-1777, with the Journal of Lieut. William Digby, of the 53D, or Shropshire Regiment of Foot (Albany, 1887). The journal for the campaign of 1777 can be found on pages 185-323, the Battle of Hubbardton on 209-220, the quote on page 209.
the right being turned. The Brigadier remain’d upon the left, with part of the light Infantry, when the Enemy from behind Logs and trees, defended themselves long, but at length gave way.” That, however, was not the end of the battle. Brigadier Fraser, who had run “up the hill” in front of him with his Light Infantry when he saw that Warner was trying to turn his left flank, had opened that option to Warner when he had,

ordered the Granadiers to support the right, with directions to prevent, if possible the Enemys’ gaining the road, which leads to Castletown and Skeensborough, our left was much weakened by this manouvre, but I still depended on the arrival of the Brunswick troops; the Light Infantry beat the Enemy from the first hill and drove them to a hill of less eminence, which was their original post, they were pushed so warmly here, that they left it, & when they wished to gain the Castletown road, by filing off to their own left, they were met by the Granadiers who obliged them to attempt a retreat by scrambling up Huberton mountain, and march towards Pitsford falls, here the Granadiers moved on the right flank of the Enemy, and we got possession of the top of this hill before they could, they were now put to flight on their left, but a party that were desireous to gain the road leading from Huberton towards the lower part of Otter Creek by Chimney point observed the weakness of my left, where I was in person, and made some demonstrations to renew the attack. 

As the Continentals rallied behind a log fence on the east side of Monument Hill Road (then Castleton Road), Fraser found himself in a difficult position, and “depending on the arrival of the German Brigade.”

Phase 4: 7 July 1777 from 8:45 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.: Arrival of Baron Riedesel, End of Main Battle, Americans retreat to West Rutland

It was almost 9:00 a.m. before Baron Riedesel’s forces reached the battlefield. Francis Napier attested to Baron Riedesel’s good judgement in deploying his troops when he wrote that, “Major General Reidzel [sic] arriving with the Chasseurs Company and 80 Grenadiers & Light Infantry, took up his ground with great judgment upon the Left of the Brigadiers troops.”

Mond. July 7. The regiment continued its march early in the morning. The Fraser Corps had the têtê and was followed by the Advance Guard of the Grenadiers and Chasseurs. At 9 o’clock in the morning, we came upon the enemy in Hubbardton in the woods behind a strong barricade. The Fraser Corps were the first to get in close combat with the enemy. In the beginning, the enemy did not want to retreat but when Gen. v. Riedesel rushed to the aid of the Fraser Corps with the Advance Guard of the Germans and the Jäger Company, they quickly took to flight. Three hundred were taken prisoners without [counting] the dead. The Fraser Corps had also lost quite a number of people. Of the Braunschweig troops there were about 40 killed and wounded. 

30 Venter, 95.
31 Napier, 300.
32 “The battles of Saratoga from an ‘Enemy’ Perspective (Fragment of a diary from the Lower Saxony State Archives,
Concurrently the 11th and 12th Massachusetts in the center, and southern, parts of the battlefield took cover behind a log fence, “just opposite the west of Mount Independence Road …but didn’t fire much, till the enemy formed on the clearing,” wrote Private Bird of the 12th Massachusetts. While the enemy were forming, Captain Enos Stone:

went forward, and from the rail fence, East of the garden, next to the Selleck House, on the west side of the …road, removed the three top rails, for seven or eight lengths, so that we could have a better chance at them. We drove them back twice, by cutting them down so fast. We didn’t leave [the] log fence or charge them. The action began on our right which soon gave way. They couldn’t drive us from the fence until they charged us. I was near the center, opposite the west road, under Col. Francis. Hale commanded our right. We fought, before they drove us till I had fired nearly 20 cartridges.33

Talking to Jared Sparks in 1830, Whelpley told him:

The Americans held their ground, till Riedesel came up with the Germans on Frazer’s left. This made such fearful odds in numbers, as they were entirely outflanked, that they soon broke and retreated down the hill through the wheatfield into the woods. The British pursued.

A party of Americans under Col. Hale, retreated up a steep hill, half a mile from the battle ground, pursued by the enemy. When he reached the top of the hill, he was encountered by another party of provincials, Canadians, and Indians, who had not been in the action, and who were not known to be in this place. They had preceded St. Clair’s army the day before, and committed depredations, and taken prisoners. The orders were that they should take all the men prisoners, whom they found from home. When St. Clair approached, they had ascended this hill for concealment and defence. It was steep and covered with thick wood, as it is in fact to this day.

It was accidental, therefore, that Hale and his men were met by this party but being thus unexpectedly brought between two fires he was obliged to surrender. In this way nearly all the prisoners were taken, that fell into the hands of the British on that day. Several of Hale’s men fled into the woods and escaped.34

Baron Riedesel’s timely arrival quickly turned the tide of battle in Fraser’s favor. Fraser informed John Robinson that when,

---

33 Quoted in Hall, Hubbardton, 19/20.
34 MS Sparks 141g, pp. 93-96.
Major Bernard [Barner] with some of the German Light troops came up, they entered into action in the handsomest manner possible, the firing slackened immediately & ceased entirely in about six minutes after the arrival of any part of the Germans but before it was altogether over Mr. Redeisell sent me an Aid de Camp to know in what manner I would have the Battalions of his Brigade disposed of. I desired he would succour my left, with all his Chasseurs and one Battalion, and send the other two to support my right, he then came to the rear of the place where I stationed myself; a few scattering shots were still flying from the Enemy, I stepped to the General, and the rebels disappearing. There was no more firing to be heard anywhere [sic].

Joshua Pell wrote that “our Men form’d briskly, ascended the Hill within thirty yards of the Rebels and immediately began a brisk fire, which lasted one hour and half, three Companys [sic] of the Germans arriv’d time enough, to have a share in the action, and behav’d exceedingly well, particularly the Company of Chasseurs; the Rebels was totally routed.” Digby thought, “The action lasted near three hours, before they attempted retreating, with great obstinacy.” The retreat occurred in part because, “A party of Germans came up time enough also to share in the glory of the day, and the regular fire they gave at a critical time was of material service to us.” General James Hamilton in his “Orders” of 10 July 1777, informed his troops that,

On the 7th Brigad. Gen. Fraser at the head of a little more than half the advanced Corps and without artillery (which with the utmost endeavours it was impossible to get up) came up with near Two thousand of the Ennemy strongly posted, attacked and defeated them with the loss on the Ennemy’s part of many of their principal officers, Two hundred men killed on the spot, and a much greater number wounded and Two hundred made prisoners.

Major General Riedesel with his advanced guard consisting of the Chasseurs Company and 80 Granadiers and light Infantry arrived in time to sustain Gen Fraser and by his judicious orders and a spirited execution of them obtained a share for himself and for his troops in the Glory of the Action.

Baron Riedesel, as well as his grenadiers and Jäger, would have vigorously disagreed with the description of the Battle of Hubbardton proffered by their British allies. Fraser had disobeyed his orders and attacked without properly establishing how many Americans he faced. He knew that Baron Riedesel was close behind, yet he had needlessly risked the lives of his men. Baron Riedesel and his men had not come “up time enough also to share in the glory of the day” – they had saved

36 Pell, 108. Captain Enos Jones thought “the ingangement [sic] held one hour 10 minutes” only with “as hot a fire as ever was kept up. many fel on Both sides”.
Fraser’s command from defeat. Baron Riedesel knew it, and so did his men. The anonymous batman of Stabskapitain Friedrich Wilhelm von Geismar of the Erbprinz Regiment, recorded in his diary for 9 July 1777 that,

His excellency Major General von Riedesel himself arrived here, and confirmed the certain news that Brigadier General Frazer encountered in the morning of the 7th a corps of rebels not far from Hubbardton in an earthwork which he immediately attacked with a lively fire and beat back, they nevertheless reformed immediately and in the greatest rage fell upon the left flank of the British, which Brigadier general Frazer had just before weakened in order to strengthen the right wing, this occasioned that the English left wing had to retreat, at that moment however Major General von Riedesel with the Brunswick Jaeger, grenadiers and light infantry arrived, who opened such a heavy fire on them that they preferred not to remain long, thus they retreated immediately. In dead they left behind many officers and more than 200 common soldiers, among them their brave leader Colonel Frances, according to the testimony of the prisoners they had over 600 wounded, many of whom perished in the woods through which they tried to escape.38

Corporal Johann Jakob Schmidt on Baron Riedesel's staff was even more blunt in his assessment of events as he recorded them in his diary about the Battle of Hubbardton:

We succeeded in hacking out the idiotic Englishman Fraser and his people (“den idiotischen Englaender Fraeser”) and lost 180 men. From my group Hannes Mogk from Angersbach and Karl Kimple from Steinhausen were killed. General Riedesel rages with anger because the Englishmen had gotten himself into trouble completely needlessly which we had to pay for with much blood. General Riedesel mentioned to the Colonels Meersbrueck and Baum that only his oath to the King and that his wife Charlotte had followed him here still kept him in Canada.39

Baron Riedesel could not afford to confront Burgoyne quite so openly, but in a letter to the Erbprinz of 10 July 1777, from Skeenesborough he laid bare his emotions:

The affair at Hubbardton has showed me quite distinctly what envy one nation entertains against another. Brigadier Fraser lost 12 officers and about 170 killed and wounded, only because he did not want to wait for me. Yet afterwards he was compelled to call on me to help him and this little help saved him. I would have wished your Serene Highness to be present, you would have been happy about the bravery of our Brunswickers. Our little group acted perfectly and Fraser himself had to report to Genl. Burgoyne in writing that we had saved him. I would never

39 Excerpts from the Diary of Corporal Johann Jakob Schmidt from Lauterbach (Oberhessen) on Major General Riedesel's Staff, February 20, 1776 October 15,1783. Donald M. Londahl-Smidt Collection.
have thought that the Rebels fought so stubbornly as they did that day. Having one bullet and four small ones in the musket, they fire and poor Lieutenant Cruse was wounded with one such shot.  

The timely arrival of Baron Riedesel had saved Fraser, but Digby pointed out another reason for the American defeat. “On Coll Frances [sic] falling, who was there [sic] second in command, they did not long stand.” The death of Francis some time during the engagement as described by Bird dealt a severe blow to American morale.  

The other circumstance was the developments, “on our right which soon gave way,” upon the arrival of Baron Riedesel’s Brunswickers.

Shortly after 10:00 a.m., American forces were in full retreat across John Selleck’s wheat field, and up Pittsford Ridge, halting occasionally to fire at the pursuers who chased them all the way to the summit of Pittsford Mountain. It was 5:00 p.m. in the evening before Crown forces broke off their pursuit. An anonymous non-commissioned officer from one of Baron Riedesel’s regiments wrote that, “On the retreat, the enemy threw their muskets ad [sic] equipage away, which caused some of our [men] to make quite a booty. The prisoners brought in resembled bandits rather than soldiers but were so confused that they begged for their lives like children.” Although the retreat did not turn into an outright rout, Lieutenant Sewall probably was not the only officer who was wondering where he was. The retreat was more like a flight. Lieutenant Henry Sewall only found out the next day where he was:

[H]aving “rec’d 2 balls thro my Cloaths – Retreated precipitately thro the Woods, over the Mountains & arrv’d in the evening at a house in Rutland – Our party consisting of about 100 (?) was composd of different Regts promiscuously collected under the Command of Col°. Warner [sic].” The next day, “About 7 o’Clock, on

40 Saratoga National Historical Park Collection, Courtesy of Park Ranger and historian Eric Schnitzer.
41 For accounts of the death of Francis see Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton, 63-65.
42 For a detailed analysis of events on the American right see again Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton, 68-70. Colonel Hale’s 2nd New Hampshire, and the wounded, and sick among its ranks, viz. Ebenezer Fletcher, had been stationed along the Military Road and Sucker Brook, and taken the brunt of the British attack; on the question in how far the supposed cowardice of Colonel Hale when captured by the British, and the role this, may have played in the American defeat see Williams, Hubbardton, 32-34.
43 St. Clair was aware of the battle raging in his rear. Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin reported for 7 July “in the morning a heavey fire in the rear for some time near an hour a heavey battle, but as the rear consisted of the feeble part of the army they, after an obstinate resistance were obliged to give way to superior numbers. the body of the army Marchd to Rutland, dind at Col. Meedses where we were Joind by a No. of Col. Warners Men & those that had been in action [sic].” The Revolutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin 1775-1778 Thomas Williams Baldwin, ed., (Bangor, 1906), 109/10. St. Clair sent Major Henry Livingston to the two militia regiments with orders that they support Warner but the men flatly refused, see Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton, 71. Not surprisingly conspiracy theories soon arose with some of Colonel Joseph Cilley’s First New Hampshire Regiment convinced that they had intentionally been abandoned: “The Rear Guard were mostly Invalids, and our Gen° took away the main Body, and even refused to send assistance when the Cols, begged him to do it.” Documents and Records New Hampshire, 641.
44 Enemy Perspective, 8. Digby wrote that “Our men got more plunder than they could carry, and great quantities of paper money which was not in the least regarded then, tho had we kept it, it would have been of service, as affairs turned out. I made prize of a pretty good mare.” Digby, 211.
our Retreat found out where we were, & which way the main body of the army had gone, - & that Skeensboro was taken by the Enemy – Got down to Otter Creek – Rain’d [sic].

Phase 5: 8 July 1777 to 31 July 1777: The Battlefield after the Battle

During the hours and days immediately following the victory over the Continentals, General Burgoyne faced two urgent tasks: 1) burying the dead of both sides, and 2) tending to the wounded. As Burgoyne’s aides surveyed the battlefield and the reports from Fraser came in, the high cost of the victory became apparent. In the hours following the battle, Crown forces collected their dead, and burying parties dug graves for the 34 fallen British non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men, and the 10 dead Brunswickers. The American corpses apparently were left to rot where they had fallen. “In the spring of 1784 the inhabitants turned out and made a general search over the battle-ground, and woods adjoining, gathering up what bones they could find, which had lain bleaching in the sun, wind, and rain for 7 years (amounting to many bushels), and buried them. Since that time there have not been many found. But, occasionally, when they have been discovered, they have been carefully taken care of, and buried.”

Adding up the human cost, Lord Napier recorded that Lieutenant James Douglas of the 29th Regiment of Foot serving with the Light Infantry was killed, as were two sergeants and 17 rank and file. Additionally, the Light Infantry suffered five wounded officers, two wounded sergeants, and 70 wounded rank and file. Of the Grenadier Battalion, 13 rank and file were killed, and seven officers and four sergeants wounded, as were 37 rank and file. One of the wounded officers, Captain Francis Samuel Stapleton of the 9th Regiment of Foot serving in the Grenadier Battalion, later died of his wounds. Additionally, Major Grant of the 24th Regiment of Foot and Lieutenant Haggard of the Marines doing duty with the Grenadiers were also killed, as were four enlisted men of the 24th Regiment of Foot. Two sergeants of the 24th were wounded. Also killed were ten Brunswickers, who also suffered one lieutenant, one sergeant and 12 rank and file wounded. The battle cost Burgoyne five officers killed, and twelve wounded, and 44 rank and file killed, and 128 wounded for a total of 189 casualties. Total American casualties were higher but exact figures are difficult to ascertain. The best estimate indicates that 41 soldiers were killed, and 96 soldiers wounded. An additional 234 Americans were taken prisoner, some of them wounded, for a total casualty rate of 33 percent when prisoners are included but only 12 percent in dead and wounded.

---

45 Diary of General Henry Sewall (1752-1845), from March 1776-31 December 1842. MAHS Ms. N-905. Sewall served as a lieutenant in the 12th MA from 1 January 1777 to 25 June 1779.
46 All figures taken from Napier, pp. 300-303. Williams, Hubbardton, Appendix I, arrives at 50 killed, and 134 wounded British, and 10 killed, and 14 wounded, Brunswickers, a casualty rate of 21 percent, and 13 percent, respectively.
47 Hemenway, The Vermont Historical Gazetteer, 751.
48 All figures from Napier, 301-2.
49 Riedesel reported the casualties as 144 wounded, and 34 killed, for a total of 177; among them four British officers killed, and 16 wounded. For a discussion of casualties see also Hall, 3-5.
50 Williams, Hubbardton, Appendix I. For a thorough discussion of American casualties see Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton, 98-104.
The days leading up to the Battle of Hubbardton had been miserably hot. During the aftermath of the battle, however, torrential rains moved into the area and lasted for days. Baron Riedesel and his Brunswickers departed in the morning of 8 July, leaving Fraser, his wounded, and prisoners behind in the rain. Digby recorded that, “we had no covering to shelter us, our poor huts being a wretched security against the heavy rain [that] poured on us. …we made sort of huts covered with the bark of trees for our wounded, who were in a very bad situation, as we had nothing to assist them till the return of an express which was sent to Ticonderoga for surgeons.”

When Fraser’s men departed on 9 July, they left behind some 140 wounded Crown forces, and dozens of wounded, and sick Americans, with a small guard commanded by Sergeant Roger Lamb. He “was directed, that in case I should be either surrounded or overpowered by the Americans, to deliver a letter, which General Burgoyne gave me, to their commanding officer. Here I remained seven days with wounded men, expecting every moment to be taken prisoner.”

Ebenzer Fletcher was one of the captured wounded Americans. He remembered that “The enemy soon marched back to Ticonderoga and left only a few to take care of the wounded. I was treated as well as I could expect. Doctor Haze [i.e. Hayes] was the head Doctor, and he took true care that the prisoners were well treated. Doctor Blocksom, an under surgeon, appeared to be very kind indeed: indeed: he was the one who had the care of me: he never gave me any insulting or abusive language.” In a letter to his friend Mellish written “In the Woods of Huberton, 25 Miles From Mount Independ.” on 13 July 1777, John McNamara Hayes provides a graphic description of the desolate situation in Hubbardton.

It happened in the most unfortunate place in the World, as assistance by either land or water could not be procured less than 25 Miles, and that no Cart Road. I was sent for & arrived the 8th. In the Morning: after travelling five and twenty miles thro’ a Wood with a Guide and here remain with the Wounded to give them every assistance in my power; which you must allow can not be great, without an House or any other necessary on the face of the Earth […] were it not for the defeat of the Rebels and the Rout they were put to, which obliged them to leave their Blankets, Napsacks & a few Camp Kettles, I know not what wood become of the Wounded; The Most of them are in sheds made of Boughs, which are no defense from Rain and wind, unfortunately set in these three or four days past almost constantly. I have not a pleasing prospect of their Recovery, and as Opportunity & their Situation admits, I send them to Mount Independant, where the Rebels were building a Noble Hospital. I never experienced more uneasiness at seeing the Wounded Suffer, nor do I wish ever to be in so Disagreeable a situation again […] My hands embued in Blood, My face as dirty, my beard as long as a Capuchen fryar with every thing filthy on me is my present Situation.

---

51 Digby, 211.
52 Lamb’s Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War as quoted in Digby, 220.
53 Fletcher, Narrative, 20.
54 “The Correspondence of John McNamara Hayes Surgeon to the Canadian Army September 1776-December 1777” Saratoga National Historical Park Collection, Courtesy of Park Ranger and historian Eric Schnitzer. For a general overview see Paul Kopperman, “The Numbers Game: Health Issues in the Army that Burgoyne led to Saratoga.” History Cooperative Database, copy in Saratoga National Historical Park Collection, Courtesy of Park Ranger and historian Eric Schnitzer.
Beginning on 11 July, Brigadier Fraser recorded expenses for tending to the sick, and wounded, left behind in Hubbardton, “To Cash paid for Cattle at Huberton for the Corps, & some left with the Sick. 15 [pounds]. 17 [shillings]. 6 [pence].” Or on 16 July: “To cash paid Several Guides & express’s from Skeansborough to Huberton, employed about the wounded preceeding this date. 6 [pounds].” The last entry referring to wounded dates to 31 July: “To Cash paid Remington of Castletown for flower & other necessaries furnished to the wounded at Huberton. 8 [pounds].10 [shillings].”

Those that could be moved were transported to Skenesborough (today Whitehall, New York) about 16 July but the severely wounded British, and American, troops remained in Hubbardton until 29 July when, “a detachment of the 62nd and Pr. Fr. Regmts., consisting of 200 men” under Ensign von Hille was sent to Hubbardton, “to transport the sick together with the hospital to Mount Indep. from there. -- The detachment did not arrive in Hubbardton before July 28. It had been assumed that the stretchers for the transport had already been prepare instead, they were just starting to fabricate them. Although this day was lost anyway, an attempt was made by the detachment to speed up the work so that all the stretchers could be ready for all those wounded there, 34 officers and privates, partly Englishmen and Germans, partly provincials, on July 29 at noon. When the stretchers were ready, the march back was started immediately.” Sometime during the night, “a mortally wounded Provincial died”, and it was only late in the evening of 30 July that, “everyone had arrived in the camp and a hospital had been established on Mount Independence. It was generally thought that the 31 stretchers with the gravely wounded, each one of whom was carried by 4 soldiers on their shoulders” presented a sad, and distressing, sight.

**Outcome of the Battle**

Ordered by General St. Clair on 30 July to take the sick and wounded by boat to Skenesborough, Colonel Pierce Long skirmished successfully with Burgoyne’s vanguard as he approached Skenesborough. Having met up with American forces under Colonel Henry van Rensselaer, Long and Rensselaer’s forces mauled a British advance party commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hill of the 9th Regiment of Foot in the Battle of Fort Anne on 8 July. Upon arrival of the 20th Regiment

---

55 There are numerous references to the wounded left behind at Hubbardton in Fraser’s account books, viz. on 17 July: “Paid horses & express Sent to Huberton with nurses necessaries & provisions to the wounded. 5. 10.0[**sic**].” National Archives Great Britain, Treasury, Class 1, Volume 572, folios 102-113. The transcription of Fraser’s account was kindly provided by Todd Braisted.

56 “July 13 A number of horses were transported to Skenesborough for the army and taken to Hubbardton from there. For their escort, the reg. provided one subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corp., 1 ens.[**ign**], 54 privates; the 62nd Reg. provided 1 capt., 1 subaltern, 2 serg., 1 ens., 46 privates. With the help of this detachment, the sick and wounded of the army were taken to the hospital there.” Prätorius, “Journal”, 66.

On 11 July 1777, Burgoyne’s ADC Francis Carr Clerke had informed Riedesel that, “General Burgoyne desires you would order a Detachment of a Captain & 100 men from Brigadier General Specht’s command, to march to Hubberton; there to wait till a detachment of the same Number arrives from Ticonderoga with Horses; this Detachment from Brig’ General Specht to receive the horses and conduct them to Castleton, where a Detachment from Skeenes borough will arrive, to escort them hither. The Detachment from Brig’d. General Specht will march to morrow morning.” Lidgerwood Collection, File 107, Letter HZ-1, Part 1, Morristown National Historical Park, Morristown, New Jersey.

57 *Garrison Life*, 77. Fletcher wrote that “On the 22d of July, a number of men came down from Ticonderoga, with horses and litters sufficient to carry off the remainder of the wounded.” Fletcher, 22.
of Foot, and artillery, under Phillips outnumbered, and outgunned, American forces set Fort Anne on fire, and withdrew.

As Burgoyne established his headquarters at Skenesborough on 6 July, he had to choose between two alternative routes to reach Albany (Figure 3). He could backtrack to Fort Ticonderoga where his army’s equipment, particularly the heavy artillery, was still onboard vessels on Lake Champlain. From there he could portage them to Lake George, and sail on the lake to Fort George, where the equipment and supplies could be carried overland to Fort Edward on the Hudson River. If all went well, Burgoyne would reach Albany before the onset of winter. Alternatively, he could march directly overland from Skenesborough to Fort Edward. Although historians still debate the merits of Burgoyne’s route selection, to march overland on the longer route to Fort Edward leaving American-held Fort George in his rear, the route had the advantage of easier water transport once the difficult portage to Fort Edward was accomplished. More importantly, Burgoyne, for political reasons, believed that he could not backtrack with his troops to Fort Ticonderoga as it would have appeared like a retreat, and encourage American resistance. Critics later claimed that Burgoyne had also been swayed by Loyalist Philip Skene, in whose house he was staying, and whose property would greatly benefit from a road to Fort Edward.58 Having heard the news of the surrender of Fort Ticonderoga, General Philip Schuyler, commanding officer of the Northern Department, hurried to Fort Edward, and found it garrisoned by about 700 regulars and 1,400 militia, and in a poor state of defense. General St. Clair reached Fort Edward on 12 July with the remnants of his forces. With the fort's defenses beyond repair, Schuyler’s only option was to delay Burgoyne’s advance by making roads to Fort Edward impassable by felling trees across the roadway and tearing down bridges. Helped by heavy rains, Schuyler succeeded in reducing the British advance to a crawl.59

Although American forces suffered about 50 percent more casualties than Royal forces at Hubbardton, the costly fight there, combined with the engagements at Skenesborough and Fort Anne, proved to Burgoyne that Americans could put up stiff resistance. British successes had done little to increase the flow of Loyalists to join the British forces. Indeed, while the influx of militia made up American losses, Burgoyne had no opportunity to replace the 1,500 men he had lost by mid-July. Only about 200 were combat casualties, but Burgoyne also had to place a 400-man garrison at Crown Point, and another 900 in Ticonderoga. Burgoyne, convinced that all that remained to do was sweep scattered American forces before him on his way to Albany, decided to halt his campaign to gather supplies, re-establish his supply lines with Canada via Lake Champlain, and make Fort Edward his base. Most of his equipment, artillery, and ammunition, was still onboard vessels off Fort Ticonderoga, waiting to be transferred to Fort George. Fort George, still held by the Continental Army behind him on Lake George, had to be taken to establish secure lines of communication and supply.

But there was another, little-mentioned, reason for the long stay at Skenesborough. The victory at Hubbardton had cost Burgoyne dearly. The 60 British and 10 German troops killed, and 134 British and 14 Brunswickers wounded, came almost exclusively from the British Light Infantry, and

58 Skene owned more than 60,000 acres around Skenesborough, today’s Whitehall. Skene as well as Franz Joseph Pfister, another proponent of the route via Skenesborough, and 55 other Tories, were at Fort Edward on 1 August.
59 A Congress angry over the loss of Fort Ticonderoga relieved Schuyler of his command on 4 August, and replaced with Horatio Gates, who assumed command of the Northern Department on 19 August.
Grenadier battalions, which were Burgoyne’s best and most difficult to replace troops. The Americans lost only between 30 and 41 men killed, and 96 wounded. However, the presence of more than 230 American prisoners, many of them sick or wounded, and in need of care, constituted a mixed blessing for Burgoyne, and helps explain his long sojourn in Skenesborough from 6/7 to 23 July 1777, when the advanced corps moved to Fort Anne while the rest of the army followed on 25 July.

NOTES ON THE COMMANDERS

Several of the commanders associated with the Battle of Hubbardton are deserving of mention for their actions during the battle. On the American side, Ebenezer Francis of Massachusetts was outstanding, while on the British side, Simon Fraser and Friedrich Adolf Riedesel, Freiherr zu Eisenbach, were responsible for the way the battle was fought.

Seth Warner. Seth Warner (1743-1784) played a key role in the battle of Hubbardton, fulfilling Guideline #6 of Criterion B. Warner operated as an independent commander at Hubbardton, and made all the American tactical decisions. The skillful delaying tactics, and successful disengagement from British forces in mid-morning of 7 July 1777, following Colonel Hale’s capture near the start of the engagement, and Colonel Francis’ death, was to a large degree due to the leadership skills of American battlefield commander Seth Warner. His actions at Hubbardton fulfill the requirement for an individual who “played a role that can be justified as significant within a defined area of American history.”

When Vermont acquired land at Hubbardton battlefield in 1937, the Burlington Free Press clearly stated a goal of the acquisition was to honor Warner's important role in the establishment of the state by creating at Hubbardton "a permanent memorial to Seth Warner...." As an important battle in Vermont’s history, Hubbardton is closely linked to Warner’s independent command status, and this status has long been acknowledged by historians. Author Bruce Venter in The Battle of Hubbardton concludes that the choice of Warner as the commander of the American rear guard was the right one, since Warner was an experienced commander who knew the terrain and the capabilities of his men. Most importantly, Warner’s action at Hubbardton allowed General St. Clair’s army time to retreat and regroup. Historian Eliot Cohen sees Warner’s actions at Hubbardton as archetypical of those of a militia commander and a citizen soldier. He fought to protect the land and people of Vermont from British invasion, inflicted losses that the Crown Forces could ill afford, then dispersed his force, knowing that he could reform the militia in time of need.

60 Venter, Hubbardton, 112.
61 The dates are based on “Appendix C: Table showing daily positions, and movements, of Stark, Schuyler, Lincoln, Burgoyne, Baum, Breymann, and St. Leger, in the Campaign preceding Bennington, July-Aug., 1777” in: Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association vol. 5 (1905), 94/95.
63 Ibid., 5. This is Guideline #1 for Criterion B.
64 Anonymous, "Urge Battlefield for a Memorial at Hubbardton," The Burlington Free Press (Burlington), Tuesday, March 30, 1937.
65 Venter, Hubbardton, 119-120. For the overall discussion of the Battle of Hubbardton and the role of Warner, see Cohen, Conquered into Liberty, 199-232. For Cohen’s assessment of Warner, see 225-226.
Seth Warner had fought as a young man in the French and Indian War (1755-1763) before settling with his father in Bennington in 1763, on land granted by the Colony of New Hampshire. That almost unavoidably made the Warner family a party in the border conflict between New York and New Hampshire and their respective rights to grant land in the disputed territory. Warner chose the New Hampshire side and, prepared to use force if necessary, joined the para-military “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers, where he became second in command to Ethan Allen.

At the outbreak of the American War of Independence, Warner took part in the capture of Fort Ticonderoga on 10 May 1775 and, more importantly, the capture of a number of cannons at Crown Point on 11 May 1775. He was appointed commanding officers of the “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers on 26 July. In the fall and winter of 1775/76, he took part in the Canada Campaign under General Montgomery which ended in failure when the siege of Quebec had to be abandoned in May 1776. It was on the retreat from Canada that Warner learned some of the skills that bore fruit at Hubbardton. In 1795, a biographer wrote that:

Warner chose the most difficult part of the business, remaining always with the rear, picking up the lame, and diseased, assisting, and encouraging, those who were the most unable to take care of themselves, and generally kept but a few miles in advance of the British, who were rapidly pursuing the retreating Americans from post to post. By steadily pursuing this conduct he brought off most of the invalids, and with his corps of the infirm, and diseased, he arrived at Ticonderoga, a few days after the body of the army had taken possession of the post.66

When General Burgoyne’s invasion of New York State began in June 1777, Warner’s “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers was just over 200 men strong and stationed around Fort Ticonderoga. When General Arthur St. Clair decided to abandon Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on 5 July, he appointed Colonel Ebenezer Francis to command the rear-guard, and placed Warner and his regiment between himself and Francis. Upon reaching Hubbardton, Francis was to place himself under the orders of Warner. When Warner decided to spend the night of 6/7 July at Hubbardton he unintentionally set the stage for the Battle of Hubbardton the following day, a battle which had been called a “classic example of a rear-guard action.”67

By early August, Warner and his regiment were around Bennington and under the command of General John Stark (1728-1822). Learning of the approach of a detachment of Brunswickers, Loyalists, Canadians, and Indians under Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum, American forces marched toward the Walloomsac River where they encountered Baum’s forces just across the New York State line on 14 August. In the ensuing battle of 16 August, which destroyed not only Baum’s force, but severely downgraded a relief detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Breymann, Warner commanded the left wing that attacked the so-called Tory Redoubt, an earthwork on the east side of the Walloomsac. Following the Battle of Bennington, Warner took his regiment toward

---

67 Williams, Hubbardton, 5.
Saratoga, and witnessed the surrender of Burgoyne in October 1777. In March 1778, the Vermont assembly appointed Warner the only brigadier general in Vermont, but his regiment was disbanded in late 1780, and Warner retired from service. He died 26 December 1784 at age 41.

Warner's importance in the early history of Vermont as commanding officer of the “Green Mountain Boys” Regiment of Continental Rangers, is well-known. In the Battle of Hubbardton, Warner's served as an independent battlefield commander for the only time in the war. At Hubbardton, he handled his troops well, and his order to withdraw was timely and well-executed. Most importantly, Warner accomplished his assigned mission of protecting the rear of the American Army. A few weeks later he fought at Bennington, under the command of General John Stark. Warner’s role in the second phase of the Battle of Bennington was decisive when his timely arrival blunted the German advance and turned the tide of the battle, much like Baron Riedesel had at Hubbardton. Warner's experience at Hubbardton may have influenced his decisiveness at Bennington. As Congress, pressured by Governor Clinton and the State of New York, refused to recognize Vermont as an independent state in the summer of 1777, Warner refused to serve under Continental Army command, and so did his fellow Vermonters. The settlers in Vermont trusted Warner and his leadership. When he called for volunteers to march on Bennington in August 1777, they rallied around him in the newly-created militia units. Following the Battle of Hubbardton, Warner’s brigade consisted of his regiment, with Captain Thomas Lee’s Independent Ranger Company annexed to it, William Williams’ Vermont Militia, Captain Benjamin Whitcomb’s Independent companies of Rangers and militia from eastern Vermont from Colonel Joseph Marsh’s regiment.68

Warner’s independent command at Hubbardton was an important consideration when a monument to him was erected over his grave in Roxbury, Connecticut in 1864. The inscription recognized his role in several engagements and draws the distinction between a subordinate and an independent commander. Stating that Warner was “Captor of Crown Point, commander of the Green Mountain Boys in the repulse of Carleton at Long Mill and the Battle of Hubbardton,” the inscription identifies the engagements when Warner exercised independent command and follows with the statement that Warner was “the associate of Stark at the victory at Bennington.”69

For Vermonters, Seth Warner’s character exemplifies the independence they consider a formative element of their state. In 1911, the State of Vermont recognized the importance of Warner when it placed a statue of the state’s Revolutionary War hero in front of the Bennington Battle Monument. Privately funded, the monument was intended to recognize not only Warner’s second-in-command status at the Battle of Bennington, but also his early residency in that town.70 Two years earlier, on 1909, the states of New York and Vermont erected a tablet to Warner and Remember Baker, “eminent Green Mountain Boys and Patriots,” at Isle La Motte on the shore of Lake Champlain.71 Neither of these memorials specifically recognize Warner’s actions at the Battle of Hubbardton.

---


69 “Seth Warner’s Monument,” *The Vermont Transcript* (Saint Albans, Vermont) June 3, 1864.

70 “Dedicating of the Seth Warner Monument,” *Bennington Banner* (Bennington) August 17, 1911.

71 “Exercise at Isle La Motte Close Celebration,” *Bennington Banner* (Bennington), July 10, 1909.
Warner’s importance in the history of Vermont is acknowledged and recognized by the monument erected in Bennington, where he lived for a short time. However, his key role in the early history of Vermont, his significant military accomplishments, and the state’s role in the American Revolution are commemorated at the battlefield of Hubbardton.72

**Ebenezer Francis.** Colonel Ebenezer Francis (1743-1777) is a significant individual who fought and died at Hubbardton. His actions in the battle, like those of Seth Warner, helped to check the advance of the royal forces, and his leadership abilities were exemplary, noted by American, British, and Brunswick participants. Francis’ death in the battle contributed to the collapse of the American will to fight. He was thirty-three years old at the time of his death. A monument to the memory of Ebenezer Francis is located at North Beverly Cemetery in Beverly, Massachusetts. The inscription includes a statement that “he entered the Continental service & was distinguished as a brave & energetic officer” and that “his early and deeply lamented death deprived the Army of the Revolution of a bright ornament.”73

Ebenezer Francis was from Medford, Massachusetts and living in Beverly at the time of the Lexington Alarm, where he served as a lieutenant in the militia. In May 1775, he became captain in Colonel John Mansfield’s Massachusetts regiment, a position he held until the end of the year. On 6 November 1776, he became colonel of the 11th Massachusetts Regiment with which he took the field in the summer of 1777 to oppose the invasion of New York State.

Colonel Francis played an important role at the Battle of Hubbardton, inspiring his regiment and leading by example. During the retreat from Fort Ticonderoga in the night of 6 July, General Arthur St. Clair placed him in command of the rear-guard, an indication of the high trust St. Clair put in Francis’ command abilities. Francis’ late arrival at Hubbardton on 6 July was one of the reasons why Warner decided to spend the night there. Francis’ men encamped along Sucker Brook and were preparing their breakfasts, when the 24th Regiment of Foot attacked them a little after 7 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel George Reid of the 2nd New Hampshire Regiment told his brother that "it was not over ten minutes from the time we had the first notice untill [sic] we received a verry [sic] heavy fire from the enemy.”74 Under Francis’ leadership this disparate group of soldiers, created from a large number of units, and consisting to a large degree of sick and wounded soldiers, put up a spirited resistance for between 20 and 30 minutes: their first volley caused 21 British casualties, among them Major Robert Grant of the 24th Regiment of Foot. Colonel Francis’ death late in the engagement sapped American morale and their will to fight. Lieutenant Digby pointed out that “On Coll Frances falling, who was there second in command, they did not long stand [sic].”75 Author Bruce Venter describes Francis as “a bulwark for the American forces.”76

---

72 Boland, *Guidelines for Evaluating*, 18. This is Guideline #8 for Criterion B.
75 James Phinney Baxter, *The British Invasion from the North, The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, 1776-1777, with the Journal of Lieut. William Digby, of the 53D, or Shropshire Regiment of Foot* (Albany, 1887). The journal for the campaign of 1777 can be found on pages 185-323, the Battle of Hubbardton on pages 209-220.
General Burgoyne thought Francis to be “one of their best officers,” as Francis’ leadership and stalwartness at Hubbardton ensured the tough fight that so surprised Baron Riedesel. An anonymous British officer identified him as “an officer of reputation amongst them,” both for his courage as well as common sense. A single lapse of this common sense may have cost him his life. When Jared Sparks made a tour of battlefields in New England in 1830, he recorded in his journal that, “When the Americans gave way Warner and Francis walked deliberately off the ground together in the rear of their men,” Whelpley told Sparks as they walked the battlefield. “When they had got to the foot of the hill, three or four hundred yards to the south east of the place of action, the enemy began to press close upon them. Francis proposed to quicken their step, to which Warner replied, that he had never yet run from a Red Coat, and never would. Almost at that instant Francis was shot and fell dead. Warner escaped unhurt.” Upon reaching the site, “The spot where Francis fell is pointed out” to Sparks.

After the battle, Baron Riedesel is said to have personally officiated at the burial of Francis as a show of respect. For decades, locals remembered the spot where Francis fell, and routinely pointed it out to visitors. An unidentified minister from Plainfield preaching on the Hubbardton battlefield decades after the war, “the place where once was heard the din of war & where garments were rolled in blood,” recorded in his journal that he stood “just by where Col. Frances [sic] of Beverly was shot.” When the Hubbardton Battle Monument Association erected the current monument in 1859, Francis had entered the pantheon of Vermont’s Revolutionary War heroes. A biographical essay recalled his sacrifice at Hubbardton while his remains were honored with a burial under, or at least near, the battlefield monument.

Simon Fraser. British General Simon Fraser (1729-1777) shared with Ebenezer Francis the fate of having been killed during Burgoyne’s Northern Campaign. Fraser’s role at Hubbardton is significant. Without Fraser, the Battle of Hubbardton would not have happened. Operating as an independent command, all British forces’ strategy and tactics in the battle stemmed from Fraser alone. He was the one who recommended that Baron Riedesel move to support the left of the line, a move which ended the battle soon after. Most historians agree that Fraser and his detachment were saved from defeat only by the timely arrival of Brunswickers under Baron Riedesel. In the end, he kept the field, but at a very high cost. That high cost in dead and wounded not only prevented the British from reaching St. Clair, but also severely weakened Burgoyne’s Advanced Corps, the only men in Burgoyne’s army with any measurable experience. To lose these elite soldiers hurt Burgoyne far more than the American losses hurt the cause of American Independence. General Schuyler’s losses could be replaced, Burgoyne’s losses could not.

Born in the Scottish Highlands in 1729, Fraser fought at Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747 in the Dutch Army before joining the British Army as a lieutenant in 1755 at the beginning of the French and Indian War. Fraser’s regiment was deployed to Canada, and he took part in the siege of Louisburg

78 MS Sparks 141g, 96. Houghton Library, Harvard U. Cambridge, MA.
79 Dartmouth College - Rauner Special Collections Library, Hanover, NH.
81 Venter, Hubbardton, 118-120.
in June/July 1758, and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, in September 1759. In 1768, he became Lieutenant Colonel of the 24th Regiment of Foot. At the outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1776, his regiment transferred to Quebec in Canada. Governor Sir Guy Carleton promoted Fraser to Brigadier in 1776, and Sir John Burgoyne put Fraser in charge of the Advance Corps for the Northern Campaign of 1777.

When Fraser entered New York State in June 1777, his detachment consisted of his own 24th Regiment of Foot, a Grenadier Battalion, a Light Infantry Battalion, a company of marksmen, as well as a few Canadian militia, and Indians, for a total of around 1,800 men.82 At Fort Ticonderoga on 5 July, his men were the first to enter the abandoned fort, and the first to pick up the pursuit of the retreating Americans, on 6 July. Early next morning, on 7 July, Fraser’s detachment, now consisting of around 850 men, encountered Continental Army forces under colonels Warner, Francis, and Nathan Hale.83 These American forces numbered between 1,000 and 1,200 men, forming the rear-guard of General St. Clair’s forces, and were about to march for Manchester. After a brief hesitation, Fraser decided to attack the American forces that he estimated at only about 500. In the ensuing battle, the Americans proved surprisingly resilient to the repeated attacks by Fraser’s Light Infantry, and grenadiers.

On 9 July, Fraser departed Hubbardton to join General Burgoyne, and fought with his men at Freeman’s Farm on 19 September, as well as at Bemis Heights on 7 October. It was in the morning of 7 October that the 48-year-old Fraser was shot and mortally wounded. Fraser died later that day and was buried in Saratoga Battlefield National Park, where a memorial plaque marks his grave.

At Hubbardton, Fraser’s decision to attack the Americans without waiting for the re-enforcements under Baron Riedesel influenced the outcome of the Northern Campaign. Arguably, General Fraser took unnecessary casualties that cost Burgoyne valuable time at the height of the campaign season. Fraser did not achieve his goal, and orders, of destroying the American rear-guard. Later in the summer, when Burgoyne ran low on supplies, he ordered the expedition to Bennington. Burgoyne’s decision to send a detachment for needed supplies led to the destruction of Baum’s detachment at the Battle of Bennington and sealed the fate of the Royal Army in the Hudson Valley.

Friedrich Adolf Riedesel. Friedrich Adolf Riedesel, Freiherr zu Eisenbach (1738-1800) was studying law in Marburg when he entered the service of the Landgraf of Hesse in 1755. Initially stationed near London, Baron Riedesel befriended several British officers whom he would later meet again in America. Recalled to Germany at the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in 1756, he

82 General Fraser’s account of the Northern Campaign in the form of a letter to John Robinson from Skeensborough dated 13 July 1777 is published in an appendix to Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society vol. 4 (1898-1902), 139-147; the Battle of Hubbardton on 145-147.
83 Kenny and Crock estimate that Fraser’s Advance Corps consisted of ten companies of British light infantry (about 550 men) under Major Alexander Lindsay, the Earl of Balcarres (of the 53rd Regiment), ten companies of British grenadiers (about 570 men) under Major John Dyke Acland of the 20th Regiment, and eight battalion companies of the 24th Regiment (about 440 men) under Major Robert Grant, providing an estimated total of 1,816 officers and men. However, Fraser left about 540 men (possibly including several whole companies of the 24th Regiment) at Ft. Ticonderoga and Mount Independence after their capture on 6 July. Therefore, only about 1,276 of his men assembled for the pursuit of the Americans to Hubbardton. Interestingly, Fraser claimed that his force of British soldiers at Hubbardton amounted to no more than eight hundred men. Kenny and Crock, Hubbardton, 37.
was attached to the staff of Ferdinand Duke of Brunswick and fought in the Battle of Minden in 1759. By 1761, he was the colonel of two Brunswick regiments. Wounded in August 1762, he spent the rest of the war, and the years until the outbreak of the American War of Independence, in Wolffenbüttel. Promoted to Lieutenant General, Baron Riedesel sailed with the Brunswick troops numbering around 4,500 to Quebec in March 1776. Arriving in June he spent the winter of 1776/77 in Canada.

In June 1777 Burgoyne placed Baron Riedesel in command of all German and Native American troops for the Northern Campaign. Baron Riedesel proved to be an experienced officer with an eye to both the political traits of the war as well as the need to adapt to the military needs occasioned by fighting in the American wilderness. His experience as a battlefield commander showed in the morning of 7 July on the battlefield of Hubbardton. It was almost 9:00 a.m. before Baron Riedesel’s forces reached the battlefield. Francis Napier attested to Baron Riedesel’s good judgement in deploying his troops when he wrote that “Major General Reidzel arriving with the Chasseurs Company and 80 Grenadiers & Light Infantry, took up his ground with great judgment upon the Left of the Brigadier’s troops.” Baron Riedesel’s timely arrival turned the tide of battle in Fraser’s favor. Baron Riedesel, and his small detachment of Brunswickers, departed Hubbardton again on 8 July 1777 to meet up with Burgoyne, and was captured with him at Saratoga. From there he, and his wife Frederika Charlotte, were sent to Charlottesville, Virginia, with the rest of the Convention Army. In 1778, he was allowed to move to New York City on parole but was exchanged in 1780. In 1781, he went to Canada before sailing back to Europe in 1784. He retired from active service in 1793 and ended his days as commandant of Braunschweig.

---

84 Napier, 300.