


The Battle of Hubbardton

The American Rebels Stem the Tide

by John Williams




I applaud the decision of the Vermont Division for Historic Preservation to reprint John Williams's *The Battle of Hubbardton: The American Rebels Stem the Tide*. Williams's masterful publication meets the criteria of what is desirable for those who cherish heritage tourism and visits to our nation's landmark battlefields. The book tells the story of a vital facet of the Revolutionary War on the northern frontier in a fascinating narrative. Equally important are the original illustrations and maps that trace Burgoyne's campaign and the ebb and flow of the Hubbardton battle. Absence of illustrations and maps such as grace *The Rebels Stem the Tide*, Williams's excellent choice as his book's subheading, are too frequently the bane of publications featuring the Revolutionary War. Colonel Williams's publication is an invaluable tool in enhancing visits to a battle field located in a handsome rural landscape evocative of its 1777 environment.

EDWIN C. BEARSS
Historian Emeritus, National Park Service

The Battle of Hubbardton

*The American
Rebels Stem the Tide*

by John Williams



Published by the Vermont Division for Historic Preservation

The Vermont Division for Historic Preservation

Montpelier, Vermont

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First edition published 1988

Reprinted 2002

Printed in the United States of America by Sharp Offset Printing, Rutland, Vermont

ISBN: 0-9619912-3-2

Producers: Kailyard Associates and Maureen O'Connor Burgess Design

Maps: Armand Poulin

Illustrations: Edward Epstein

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Acknowledgments

This work was initiated at the request of William B. Pinney, when he was director of the Division for Historic Preservation, in the Vermont Agency of Development and Community Affairs. (The Hubbardton Battlefield Park is under the jurisdiction of that agency.) Pinney's experience in battle during World War II and his time spent at the Command and General staff school in Kansas gave him a firm foundation for perceiving the intricacies of revolutionary war battles.

Eric Gilbertson, Pinney's successor, and John Dumville, Historic Sites Operations Chief, have read, analyzed, and critiqued the study and have hiked the entire battlefield with me. I am thankful for their decision to have me complete the work.

Weston Cate, Jr., former director of the Vermont Historical Society, made available the files and facilities of that organization, for which I am especially grateful. His staff was always helpful and encouraging.

Edward Hoyt, former director of the Vermont Historical Society, and former editor of State Papers in the Secretary of State's office, made available his personal Saratoga Campaign files pertaining to Hubbardton and assisted me in essential research, uncovering a substantial amount of material heretofore unknown about the Battle. Of special interest is the information revealed in the U.S. pension records, particularly with respect to Hale's men who fought in the Battle and the discovery of Henry Hall's *Battle of Hubbardton*, in which he quotes the narrative of a veteran of the Battle, Joseph Bird, who stated he was with Francis when he was killed on Pittsford ridge. Without Mr. Hoyt's many discoveries the work would have been futile, but it should be made clear that he does not agree with all of my conclusions.

The late John P. Clement, a former president of the Vermont Historical Society and Rutland journalist, to whom this work is dedicated, was undoubtedly the foremost authority on the Battle of Hubbardton. He left his considerable collection of papers to the Vermont Historical Society, many of which were invaluable to me. I am most appreciative for their use.

The late Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy, U.S.A., Ret. wrote a monograph on the Battle of Hubbardton, completed in 1960 but unpublished, which has been a valuable framework and guide. So much additional material has been found since then, however, that it is no longer authoritative in all aspects. My thanks are due for this generally excellent work done by an eminent historian and author. Colonel Dupuy should be credited with having written the first comprehensive monograph on the Battle.

I am particularly indebted to Joyce Williams for typing and proofreading my many drafts, and for her patience and forbearance throughout the time-consuming project.

It would be impossible for me to express adequately my gratitude to J. Robert Maguire of Shoreham, Vermont, for his support and encouragement, for hiking

the entire battlefield with me, and for his careful reading and constructive criticism of the manuscript. He contributed a translation of a portion of Max von Eelking's book, *The German Allied Troops*, and a holograph letter from Fraser to von Riedesel. He introduced me to Stephen G. Strach, Fort Necessity National Battlefield, National Park Service, an expert on the Brunswick troops, whose papers proved highly valuable in confirming the German action at Hubbardton.

John Parke of Essex, New York, edited the second draft. I am especially thankful for his sound suggestions, recommendations, and many corrections.

Dr. John W. Krueger, editor of *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, read, recommended changes, and edited the third draft. I appreciate his contribution, particularly because of his long association with Fort Ticonderoga and because he currently is teaching U.S. History at Norwich University, the University of Vermont, and State University of New York at Plattsburgh.

I am indebted to Rebecca Davison for her helpful rearrangement and consolidation of phases, paragraphs, and sentences, thereby greatly improving the flow of the narrative, as well as for her incisive editorial work. Her ability to bring together all of the contributing elements, including the designer, Maureen Burgess, illustrator, Edward Epstein, and cartographer, Armond Poulin, made the book possible.

Thanks are also due to the staffs of Bailey/Howe Library and the Wilbur Collection at the University of Vermont, as well as to the Brownell Library in Essex Junction, particularly for their perseverance in obtaining out of print works on library loan. The library at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, provided invaluable and authoritative material on the historic and the tactical aspects of a rear guard action, for which I am forever grateful.

Editor's Note

John Williams' long career in the U.S. Army, his tenure as the Editor of State Papers for Vermont, and his abiding interest in history set him on his course to delve into the complicated and misunderstood Battle of Hubbardton. Colonel Williams has pursued his study in a scholarly manner and attacked the mass of minute details and confusing sources with vigor and lucidity. He has spent many hours tracking down facts and piecing together this complex military action with the hope that new light might be shed on this significant event in the history of Vermont. This small book certainly does not claim to be the definitive study of Hubbardton. It will have fulfilled its purpose if it adds some measure of understanding to this piece of our history and stimulates further investigation.

A Brief Chronology of the Revolutionary War

1770	March 5	Boston Massacre
1773	December 16	Boston Tea Party
1774	September 5 to October 26	First Continental Congress, Philadelphia
1775	April 19	Battles of Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts. American victories.
	May 10	Second Continental Congress, Philadelphia
	May 10	Capture of Fort Ticonderoga, New York, by Ethan Allen
	June 15	Washington named Commander-in-Chief, Philadelphia
	June 17	Battle of Bunker Hill, Boston. British victory.
	August 28 to December 31	American expedition against Quebec. British victory.
1776	March 17	British evacuate Boston.
	July 4	Declaration of Independence adopted, Philadelphia.
	August 27	Battle of Long Island. British occupy New York.
	October 11	British win Battle of Valcour Island, New York but fail to retake Fort Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence, Vermont.
	December 26	Battle of Trenton, New Jersey. American victory over Hessian troops.
1777	January 3	Battle of Princeton, New Jersey. American victory.
	July 6	Burgoyne recaptures Fort Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence.
	July 7	Battle of Hubbardton, Vermont. Successful American rear guard action, but conceded to be a British victory.

	August 16	Battle of Bennington, Vermont. American victory just over the boundary in New York.
	September 19	Battle of Freeman's Farm, New York. American victory
	October 7	Battle of Bemis Heights, New York. American victory.
	October 17	Burgoyne surrenders at Saratoga, New York.
	December to June 1778	American troops winter at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.
1778	February 6	Franco-American Treaty signed in Paris as a result of Saratoga victory.
	June 18	U.S. capitol at Philadelphia reoccupied by the Americans. British had been there since September 26, 1777.
	December 29	Savannah, Georgia, taken by the British
1779	September 16 to October 20	Americans fail to retake Savannah.
	May 12	British take Charleston, South Carolina.
1780	July 10	General Rochambeau and French troops arrive at Newport, Rhode Island.
	September 5-7	French Admiral de Grasse defeats the British fleet off Chesapeake Bay.
1781	September 28	American siege of Yorktown, Virginia, begins.
	October 19	British General Cornwallis surrenders at Yorktown
1782	July 11	British evacuate Savannah
	December 14	British evacuate Charlestown
1783	September 3	Peace treaty signed by Great Britain and the United States in Paris.

Sources: Hugh F. Rankin, *The American Revolution*, and Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Compact History of the American Revolution*.




Figure 1.
Strategy of the Burgoyne Campaign

This diagram shows the three-pronged attack planned by the British to conquer the Champlain, Mohawk and Hudson valleys that converge on Albany. Howe failed to start up the Hudson; St. Leger was stopped half way to Albany; and Burgoyne was stopped at Saratoga. (Based on a map from *The Mount Independence-Hubbardton 1776 Military Road* by Mabel and Joseph Wheeler, J. L. Wheeler, Benson, Vermont 1968.)

Introduction




By 1775 the American rebels had taken Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point from the British, strategic points of entry to the New England colonies. The British attempt in 1776 to recapture Fort Ticonderoga failed, but in July of 1777, they swept down from Canada taking the Fort and pursuing the retreating Americans south. On July 7, 1777, a rear guard action by the Americans at Hubbardton, Vermont, successfully stalled the advancing British, allowing the main army to safely retreat through West Rutland, Vermont, to Fort Edward, New York.

The battle between American rear guard troops and British and German forces was the only revolutionary war battle fought on Vermont soil. At the time, the ultimate British objective was to separate New England from the other colonies. Hubbardton was the first of several battles offering resistance to the British invasion from Canada. The victory at Bennington followed on August 16, 1777, and the last two decisive battles near Saratoga resulted in a British surrender on October 17. (See Figure 1.)

To understand the Battle of Hubbardton more fully, we must first return to July 5, 1777, at Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain and to Major General Arthur St. Clair, the American commander of both that Fort and Mount Independence, directly across the Lake in Vermont. St. Clair had recently returned to the Fort, from the winter campaigns in New Jersey with General Washington. For three weeks St. Clair commanded what was considered by the Americans and the British as the impregnable guardian of the Champlain Valley—the thoroughfare between Fort Edward on the Hudson River and St. Jean on the Richelieu River.

The Ticonderoga position included the Fort itself and its companion the hastily built defenses of Mount Independence, sometimes referred to as Fort Independence in Vermont. These defenses were connected by a great boom and






Figure 2
Fort Ticonderoga
and Mount
Independence

(Drawing by Ellen
Viereck. From
Independence Must Be
Won by Phillip and Ellen
Viereck, John Day, Co.,
New York 1964.

Reproduced with
permission from the artist
and publisher.)

a floating bridge across a narrow neck of the Lake. It was an elaborate defensive system, far beyond the physical capability of the American garrison. The entire complex was dominated by Sugar Hill (later renamed Mount Defiance by the British) on the New York side, which the Americans had insufficient troops to occupy. St. Clair's Northern Army consisted of ten Continental and four three-month militia regiments, two of which had just been gathered and had entered the Fort two days previously.¹

British Lieutenant General John Burgoyne's expeditionary force, some 7,400 strong was pushing south from Canada, menacing the approximately 4,000 American troops and the fortifications on both sides of the Lake. The British were west on the New York side of the Lake, and their allied German troops on the east in Vermont.² (The Germans were serving the British army but under the command of their own officers, subordinate only to General Burgoyne.) The British and German troops were well armed, well trained, and well fed, and tempered by a year of campaigning in the north. They had been in pursuit of the Americans who were retreating from the disastrous attack on Quebec in December of 1775.

St. Clair's troops were commanded by a number of officers who had retreated ahead of the British from Quebec, among them Colonel Seth Warner. But for the most part the men at Fort Ticonderoga were not veterans, and the army was weakened by the convalescence of hundreds of men who had had the measles, and by about one hundred who were in the hospital, mostly with wounds.³ Although some units were well armed and clothed, most were poorly clad, many were not in uniforms and many were short of bayonets.⁴

On the morning of July 5 on the top of Sugar Hill (the hill the Americans lacked the troops to occupy), the British were manhandling twelve-pounder cannon. When mounted, these would command the American positions at Fort Ticonderoga just below, and the western portions of Mount Independence, just across the narrows of Lake Champlain. At the same time, and even more significantly, the German troops were moving to outflank Mount Independence on the Vermont shore in an attempt to close the only route of withdrawal of St. Clair's troops to the south.

The Germans did not succeed. St. Clair and his troops withdrew from Mt. Independence just in time. Actually, the Germans upon hearing of St. Clair's evacuation came across East Creek by boat. (East Creek separates the Mount Independence peninsula from the main Vermont shore. See Figure 2.) Although the cannon on Sugar Hill never presented a major threat to Americans, especially at Mount Independence, which is mostly out of effective range, the British troops had an ideal observation post for selecting targets for the large number of cannon on the lower level aimed toward the Fort and Mount Independence.

The Battle of Hubbardton occurred when the British and their German allies overtook the American rear guard that was protecting the main body of General Arthur St. Clair's retreating Northern Army. The rear guard delayed the pursuing British and was just about to continue its withdrawal— as a rear guard should—when the British attacked, forcing the Americans to turn upon them in self-defense. It was a terrific battle at close quarters, and the Americans nearly had the upperhand when the supporting German Brunswick troops arrived, forcing the Americans to withdraw across the mountains to the east. The British blocked the Castleton road to the south and continued their encirclement to the northeast as far as Pittsford ridge. A desperate, running fight along and below the ridge concluded the Battle, as the Americans struggled to

free themselves from the cul-de-sac that almost entrapped them. The Americans had fired the first shot at 5:00 a.m. The last scattering shots along the ridge were over by 10:00 a.m.

The principal characters involved in this military drama on the American side were Colonel Seth Warner, commander of the entire rear guard at Hubbardton as well as his own Green Mountain Boy Continental regiment and some Vermont militia; Colonel Ebenezer Francis, commander of the rear guard during its march from Mount Independence to Hubbardton, as well as his own 11th Massachusetts Continental regiment; and Colonel Nathan Hale, commander of the 2nd New Hampshire Continental regiment, who was also in command of a large group of invalids, walking sick, and stragglers. The total number of rear guard troops is estimated to have been nearly 1,200.⁵

On the British side were Brigadier General Simon Fraser (killed in action at Saratoga three months later), commander of the elite and fast moving Advance Corps; Major General Baron Friederich von Riedesel, commander of the German Brunswick troops; Major Alexander Lindsay, the Earl of Balcarres, successor to Fraser at Saratoga and commander of the light infantry; Major John Dyke Acland (wounded on Pittsford ridge) and commander of the grenadiers; and Major Robert Grant commander of the British Advance Guard.

The Battle, although it involved a relatively small number of troops, was much more important in the Burgoyne Campaign of 1777 than generally realized. As the first pitched battle of the Campaign, it gave the British their first view that year of the fighting qualities of the colonial rebels. Although the British must be credited with breaking up the rear guard, they failed to defeat it, as evidenced by the escape of roughly sixty-seven percent of the American troops, with many of the men fighting again at Bennington and Saratoga. The British had overtaken the rebel "tiger" who turned on them in a most unexpected and ferocious manner. This deadly opposition was what they could expect from that point on. Fraser spoke of being in the "most disaffected part of America, every person a spy," and Burgoyne spoke of "a gathering storm" on his left.

The Battle was the first meeting in close combat between the British/German troops and the Americans in the Saratoga Campaign of 1777. The British losses in light infantry at Hubbardton may well have weakened them for Saratoga. The Americans observed the efficiency of the British maneuvers that enveloped their left flank and the German maneuvers on their right flank. Learning their lesson well, the Americans went on to use these very tactics at Bennington on August 16, 1777.

There can be no doubt that the Battle was well fought on both sides. Major Alexander Lindsay, only twenty-four at the time, led the British light infantry and is said to have had thirteen musket ball holes in his clothing—though he was only slightly wounded. He testified later, "Circumstanced as the enemy was, as an army very hard pressed in their retreat, they certainly behaved with great gallantry." General Philip Schuyler, the American commander of the Northern Department, and St. Clair's immediate superior, wrote to Colonel Warner after the Battle, asking him to "thank the troops in my name for behaving so well as you say they did at Hubbardton." On behalf of the British, General Burgoyne pronounced the Battle a "signal engagement," and he wrote that the Germans "entered the action in the handsomest manner possible."

The Battle is a classic example of a rear guard action. This security measure, which guards retreating troops, has been learned through experience, sometimes disastrous, gained through the centuries. Both Colonel Ebenezer Francis, who commanded the rear guard during the forced march from Fort Ticonderoga


and Mount Independence, and Seth Warner who commanded the reinforced rear guard at Hubbardton, were following a certain set of military concepts. To fully appreciate the Battle of Hubbardton, it is important to understand these concepts:

- The rear guard of a retreating force is concerned primarily with delaying the enemy's advance and must conduct its action in a manner that will permit its own withdrawal to successive positions. Warner, as the overall commander of the rear guard, was on the point of withdrawing when the British overtook him in march column.
- The ideal result is to force the enemy to deploy all his troops preparatory to launching an attack. The rear guard should then withdraw in unmolested and good order just before the attack is actually launched. Warner and his troops forced the British to deploy all of their troops at Hubbardton including their reserve, the grenadiers.
- The rear guard commander should be an officer of considerable experience and of sound tactical training and judgement. The rear guard often takes up defensive positions and fights delaying actions, which are a result of his decisions alone, so he must be able to judge with a high degree of accuracy how long he can safely hold and when and how the various elements of his command must begin to withdraw to successive positions in the rear. Warner met these requirements, but circumstances obliged him to delay a few minutes too long while waiting for the return of a large patrol he had sent out earlier that morning.
- When necessary to the security of the main body, the rear guard is required to fight to the finish. Warner was not required to sacrifice his troops since the main body was sufficiently far away by the close of the Battle as to be secure from further pursuit.
- Finally, the rear guard avoids close combat whenever possible. Warner did try to avoid close combat when he was overtaken. He withdrew ahead of the British and German bayonet attacks and disengaged when his troops were behind the shelter of a high log fence east of the Castleton road.

The following description of the Battle of Hubbardton shows that the American withdrawal at the end of the main battle on Monument Hill was not a rout as some have contended. The Americans held their ground, fighting from successive positions, as a rear guard should. They stubbornly held each position until time to withdraw to the next. It was a remarkable performance against professional, select British troops and a pivotal point in the colonists struggle for independence.

Phase 1

*July 6, 2:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Americans evacuate Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence
and march to Hubbardton with the British in pursuit*



Under the cover of darkness, General Arthur St. Clair evacuated his troops from Fort Ticonderoga. As with any nighttime withdrawal, when thousands of men are involved, there is confusion and some disgruntlement. "Such a retreat was never heard of since the creation of the world," wrote one soldier named Cogan, a member of Colonel Cilley's 1st New Hampshire Regiment, to General Stark a few days later. "Such order surprised both officers and soldiers . . . they left all the continental cloathing there; in short every article that belonged to the army. . . ."6 Not realizing the odds against them or the relative strength of the forces on each side, some of St. Clair's men were belligerent, complaining because they had not stood and fought. Nevertheless, the last of American troops moved out of the south gate of Mount Independence at about 4 a.m. on July 6.

The supply train, the baggage, and the genuinely sick, supported by one regiment under the exceptionally competent Colonel Pierce Long, moved south up the Lake to Skenesborough (now Whitehall, New York). After crossing the floating bridge the remainder of the garrison assembled at Mount Independence. After the last of St. Clair's troops moved out of the south gate, they marched on the military road, a crude cart track not suitable for hauling artillery, southeast across the hills and through the forests, toward Hubbardton, Castleton, and Skenesborough. St. Clair planned to reunite his forces, baggage, supplies, and sick at Skenesborough. Later he would join General Philip Schuyler's forces south of Fort Edward, where it was expected that another stand against the enemy would be made.

The stout boom across Lake Champlain would, St. Clair undoubtedly believed, delay the British naval flotilla from pursuing him at once by water. A cannon, manned by a small detachment on the Mount Independence side, was to sweep the bridge and delay any enemy crossing in pursuit of his troops.

The Hubbardton military road, which had been cut through the woods only the year before, skirted small settlements and occasional clearings. From Orwell, the location of Mount Independence, it extended generally south-eastward, avoiding the swampy northern end of Lake Bomoseen, then through the hills to Hubbardton (now East Hubbardton) to join the older Castleton road leading south.

St. Clair's attempts to maintain an orderly movement of the main body of troops were at first futile. He placed his inexperienced militia units between the more disciplined and experienced Continental brigades, but the militia still proved difficult to control. The commander and his aides moved along the column trying to restrain the men as they frequently broke formation. Not until the column reached Lacey's camp, just north of Lake Bomoseen, was St. Clair finally able to restore order.

Colonel Ebenezer Francis, a competent, energetic, and brave leader, followed St. Clair's troops as a rear guard. Francis's troops consisted of selected elements of his 11th Massachusetts Regiment, plus picked units from several other regiments,⁷ totaling some 450 men. He was ordered to gather before him "every living thing," meaning every American soldier and beast. He was to command the rear guard only as far as Hubbardton. At that point, General St. Clair would name Colonel Seth Warner to take command of Francis's rear guard plus Warner's and Hale's Continental regiments.⁸ St. Clair, evidently, foresaw the possibility of being overtaken, with a battle ensuing. Warner, who knew the country well and who had demonstrated his ability in rear guard actions all the way from Quebec to Ticonderoga the previous year, was the right man to command the rear guard at this point. From all reports, the rear guard under Francis had moved out of Mount Independence in excellent order, with the best units and officers available, under an outstanding commander.⁹

There was confusion in the Northern Army ahead, however. Captain Moses Greenleaf reports in his diary that forty-eight rounds of ammunition per man were drawn on July 5 along with four days of provisions.¹⁰ This is contrary to other reports of limited rations; Cogan claims that they "hurled thro' the woods at the rate of thirty-five miles a day" and adds that the troops were "obliged to kill oxen belonging to the inhabitants wherever we got them; before they were half-skinned every soldier was obliged to take a bit and roast it over the fire, then before half done obliged to march . . ." ¹¹ There is no doubt that most of the men were short of rations, even though Greenleaf's men appear to have drawn theirs.

At Lacey's camp, about two and one half miles west of Hubbardton, St. Clair received disturbing information. A party of Indians and Tories had already reached Hubbardton, suggesting that the pursuing British had eyes and ears in advance of themselves, and in advance of the Americans as well.¹²

Despite this news, the main body of troops moved on. About noon the head of the column reached the saddle, south of the summit of Sargent Hill and was descending to Sucker Brook in order to reach Hubbardton about 1 p.m. The military road on which they were marching linked with an older road that ran from Castleton and joined with the old Crown Point road further to the north. (See Appendix L.) Hubbardton appeared to be deserted. They discovered the Indian and Tory raiders had moved on toward Castleton, after capturing several of the local townsmen. A new problem then presented itself to General St. Clair. It was obvious that the raiding party had not come from Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. He therefore concluded that it must have come from the north, from the Otter Creek Valley. St. Clair wondered, with understandable concern, whether additional British troops were directly on top of him.

In actuality, the raiders numbered only about fifty, a detachment that had been sent up Otter Creek several days previously while General Burgoyne moved his British troops up the Lake. When St. Clair's troops eventually arrived at Castleton, they would drive the raiders out, but none of this was apparent to St. Clair at the time, and the threat of an attack from the north in addition to pursuit from Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence occupied the General's thoughts.

St. Clair waited several hours for Francis's rear guard to catch up to him. The rear guard was expected to stay a reasonable distance behind the main body of troops in its protective role until ordered to join them. Colonel Francis was delayed because of an exceptionally large number of stragglers from the regiments ahead. There is contradictory evidence as to whether St. Clair moved on to Castleton some seven miles ahead, before Colonel Francis came up, or whether he remained until his actual arrival. Testimony at St. Clair's court martial trial states that "after waiting a length of time, two or three hours, for the rear guard and the stragglers, [St. Clair] moved on with the main body leaving the command with Colonel Warner, with orders to follow as soon as the whole came up."¹³

In any event, when St. Clair departed, he left Warner and his Green Mountain Boys Regiment, plus some militia, and the 2nd New Hampshire Regiment under Colonel Nathan Hale, as reinforcements for Francis's rear guard when they arrived. The three regimental commanders and their three Continental units (particularly Francis's rear guard with its selected companies) were no doubt the best drawn from St. Clair's ten regiments, commanded by officers with combat experience and selected for the immediate task at hand. Altogether Warner's rear guard totaled approximately 1,000 to 1,200 men.¹⁴

Although Hale was the official commander of the 2nd New Hampshire Regiment, he was delayed in joining Warner because of the large number of sick, disabled, and stragglers, who St. Clair had assigned to his regiment. (In the entire Northern Army, 532 men were listed as "Sick, Present," or roughly eighteen percent of the rank and file as of June 28, 1777. These were the men who made Hale's job so difficult.¹⁵ G.W. Nesmith states in his book *New Hampshire at Hubbardton* that Hale was six miles behind the other American troops.¹⁶ Finally, when Francis arrived about 4 p.m., Warner took command of the entire rear guard. Upon Hales's arrival at the bivouac area that afternoon, the three

commanding officers gathered at the log cabin of John Selleck, which stood at the junction of the military and Castleton roads at what is now East Hubbardton.¹⁷ (See Figure 3.)

Warner did not move up to Castleton as ordered. Why he didn't is a point of debate among historians, but we may venture a guess that he "disobeyed" his orders for several good reasons: his troops were too exhausted, especially the sick and disabled; two of the militia regiments from the main army were camped on the road at Ransomvale, blocking his passage;¹⁸ and he was in a good defensive position.

One can only speculate as to Warner's estimate of the situation. We can be quite sure that he had posted his security and that he was characteristically unperturbed, or at least gave that indication. Although some soldiers were ready to move on, many were still exhausted by the twenty-mile march in roughly nine or ten hours over the crudest of roads. Francis's rear guard needed to rest. The sick, disabled, and stragglers had to be considered. Many had been left behind of necessity since to have encumbered the rear guard to the extent of being overtaken by the British would have been foolhardy. The troops had to rest and eat. Cattle wandering in the fields had to be slaughtered. It would be dark, no doubt, before these men could be moved again in any orderly manner.

This assessment was based on experience. Warner had employed rear guard tactics against both the Indians and the British during General John Sullivan's retreat from Quebec the previous spring.¹⁹ To some extent it had been through Warner's persistent efforts and demonstrated leadership that so many Americans had returned safely from that smallpox-ridden disastrous retreat. Fortunately, a number of his officers and men were also veterans of that campaign.

Competent and much respected, Seth Warner was only thirty-four, kindly, rough-hewn, standing well over six feet, and broad shouldered. He had been an outstanding troop leader since 1775, when the leading "old men" of Vermont assembled at Dorset and selected him—instead of Ethan Allen—as the commander of the Green Mountain Boys. He had been Allen's strong right arm in the prerevolutionary border disputes between New York and Vermont. Warner had also proved himself as a soldier and regimental commander with General Montgomery during the invasion of Canada in 1775 and 1776. He was described by Daniel Chipman as an individual distinguished for his cool courage and perfect self-possession on all occasions.²⁰ During the retreat from Canada, he had demonstrated time after time his capability of picking up the wounded, the sick, and the invalids along the way while still keeping his distance from the pursuing British. With entire units decimated by smallpox, this had been a superhuman task that would cruelly shorten Warner's life.

Ebenezer Francis, in some respects like Warner, was in his early thirties, tall, imposing, brave, experienced, and capable.²¹ He had started as captain of a militia company in 1775, among the colonial troops besieging British-held Boston. Remaining in service, he had been commissioned in 1776 as a colonel in the Continental line. Francis was dynamic, outspoken, and hard-driving. His 11th Massachusetts, a seven-company regiment, was perhaps the best disciplined of all the Continentals in St. Clair's force.

Nathan Hale, thirty-four, was a native of New Hampshire. He was first constable there and moderator of several annual town meetings. As captain of a company of Minutemen in 1774, he marched his company to Cambridge on the alarm of the Battle of Lexington in April of 1775. That same year he was commissioned major of the 3rd New Hampshire Regiment; lieutenant colonel of the




Figure 3
Phase 1
Location of Battlefield

The map shows the battlefield with respect to Lacey's Camp, Lake Bomoseen, and the towns of Hubbardton and Castleton. (Based on a map from *The Mount Independence-Hubbardton 1776 Military Road* by Mabel and Joseph Wheeler, J. L. Wheeler, Benson, Vermont.)

2nd New Hampshire in 1776, and colonel in 1777 when the legislature appointed him commander of the 2nd New Hampshire Continental Regiment. Hale had participated in Washington's campaigns of 1776 in New York and New Jersey.²² (He was not the Nathan Hale who said, "I have but one life to give to my country.")

These three commanders were feeling the heat of the British pursuit. Ebenezer Fletcher, a fifer in Captain James Carr's Company of Hale's 2nd New Hampshire, had just recovered from measles and "not being able to march with the main body . . ." fell to the rear. The young soldier wrote later, "By sunrise the enemy had landed from their boats, and pursued us so closely as to fire on our rear. A large body of the enemy followed us all day, but kept so far behind as not to be wholly discovered."²³

Warner knew that pursuit in force was close enough to interfere with his plan for continuing an orderly withdrawal. His experience in the retreat from Canada must have convinced him nevertheless that the British regulars, with all their equipment, could not keep up the pace across country the Americans had set.

We also know Warner posted security because General Fraser, Commander of the British troops, reported that ". . . the Enemy's Centry's . . ." were the first to open fire on his advance scouts.²⁴ The security was posted more than likely well out along the military road and assuredly over the ridge of the western flank of Sargent Hill. They could at this critical location observe the advance scouts of the British ascending the hill from the west. This was not possible from any other position. From this point the group of soldiers or pickets that were guarding the troops from surprise attack could fire and then drop out of sight down the road toward Sucker Brook, while the approaching enemy was obliged to continue their uphill march, suspicious of ambush ahead. No other location for a security post would have made any military sense. It was an ideal observation and listening post.²⁵

Down the military road, and south of Sucker Brook, hastily thrown up log defenses were in place to delay the enemy along the natural defensive line of the Brook. Joshua Pell, a British officer, wrote about coming up with the Americans "very strongly posted." He added ". . . the Rebels consisted of near two thousand, and form'd behind the enclosures, which in this Country are compos'd of large Trees, laid one upon the other and made a strong breastwork. . ."²⁶ Major General von Riedesel in his *Memoirs and Letters and Journals* mentions that "Brigadier Fraser, with one-half of his brigade and without artillery, met two thousand rebels strongly fortified. . ."²⁷

Pressure from directly north, as suggested by the Indian and Tory raid at Hubbardton on the morning of July 6, posed yet another incalculable danger. It seems likely that Warner was alert and concerned when he dispatched a force of roughly two hundred men north toward the Crown Point road to reconnoiter and assist local families to evacuate. But the scouts apparently discovered no further threat from that direction and returned at 7:00 a.m., thus contributing to Warner's delay.²⁸


Warner's mission as rear guard commander was to secure the main body of St. Clair's Northern Army from attack, to delay the enemy pursuit until the main body could retreat to Castleton, and to reorganize and prepare to fight farther south.²⁹ At Hubbardton, six miles north of Castleton, Warner was astride the road over which pursuit must come and on well-watered terrain suitable for both bivouac and defense. His very strong position on high ground, Monument Hill, could be abandoned or defended.

A salient consideration for Warner, however, was the presence of the two militia regiments only about two and one-half miles south at Ransomvale. Because of these troops, Warner possibly felt that he was in compliance with orders and the doctrine of rear guard employment in maintaining a reasonable distance from the main body. The two militia regiments of Colonels Bellows and Olcott were just within the Castleton line. Until those regiments moved, Warner undoubtedly considered that he could not safely go forward. John P. Clement, one of the most knowledgeable scholars on the Battle of Hubbardton, writes: "Under the circumstances, it is logical to conclude that Warner acted as a rear guard commander should act."³⁰ Clearly, Warner was confident, as was reflected later in the long and stubborn defense put forth by his officers and men during the battle.

Phase 2

5:00 a.m. to 6:30 a.m

American pickets fire on British scouts and withdraw. British reconnoiter the American camp while waiting for the German troops.



Forty-eight-year-old Brigadier Simon Fraser is described in the *British Dictionary of National Biography* (1809) as an active, intelligent, and prudent officer. He was the most experienced subordinate commander in Burgoyne's army. Fraser was both a gallant soldier and a cool daring troop leader.³¹ His habits of thoroughness and careful preparation before action were qualities common to most successful senior officers. His long service at home and abroad was impressive. A portion of his early service had been with the 60th Royal Americans. That unit was organized during the French and Indian War in 1756—very likely as a result of Braddock's defeat by the French in 1755. Fraser had served with Wolf at Louisburg and at Quebec, and he was, of course, familiar with American methods of fighting. His general officer rank of brigadier was temporary while he commanded the brigade, the so-called Advance Corps.³² His actual rank was lieutenant colonel of the 24th Foot (Infantry).

Fraser's command was divided into three components: two companies of his own 24th Regiment, a light infantry battalion of ten companies, and a grenadier battalion of ten companies—twenty-two companies in all. (A column of twos, suitable for marching on the crude cart track of a military road, would have extended approximately three-fifths of a mile, probably a mile when intervals between companies and battalions were not closed up.)

Under the organization then in practice in the British army, each battalion consisted of eight line companies and two flank companies. One of these flank companies was light infantry, composed of the most active and capable soldiers, while the other was a grenadier company composed of the huskiest men. For campaign purposes, the light infantry and grenadiers were detached from their regiments and assembled into provisional battalions, making up the elite of the British infantry. In Burgoyne's army these crack battalions were each ten companies strong, seven taken from the British regiments of Burgoyne's army, and three from those remaining in Canada under General Carleton.³³

On July 6, after midnight, General Fraser, with a detachment of his corps, had been the first to enter Fort Ticonderoga and discover the American evacuation. His men led the way to Mount Independence overcoming a squad of American artillerymen who were supposed to cover the bridge by firing on the British but who apparently had been made incompetent by Madiera found at the site and who fled. Fraser, complying with Burgoyne's specific orders, organized a pursuit of the Rebel troops. His operations were hampered, however, by many of his soldiers who were busy plundering the American camp. "It was with very great difficulty I could prevent horrid irregularities . . . that about five o'clock I got everything tolerably well secured; I could not get any certain intelligence of the number of Rebels, who went by land; yet I believed their rear guard to be within four miles of me . . ." ³⁴

The evidence suggests that Fraser sent advance scouts (Indians and Tories) ahead despite his disorderly troops since he mentions them the next day when they "discovered" the American pickets who fired and withdrew.

Gathering the Advance Corps, minus the guard and other detachments that had been left at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, Fraser pursued the retreating Americans, "resolved to attack any body of the rebels that I could come up with."³⁵ The task force—approximately 850—marched without provisions as there had been no time to issue rations or fill canteens. Nine miles into the march, the British found "about 20 Rebels, all very much in liquor." From these prisoners Fraser learned Francis's name and that he was one of the best officers in St. Clair's command. An officer was sent back to Burgoyne to inform him of the progress and to request reinforcements.³⁶

reinforcements.³⁶

Fraser and his men marched through the sweltering heat for four more miles before halting at a stream where two bullocks were slaughtered, "which refreshed the men greatly." One of the prisoners informed him that Francis "would be glad to surrender to the King's troops, rather than fall into the hands of Savages," so Fraser sent this man ahead to contact the American rear guard. Fraser later complained that "Francis paid no attention . . . although within two miles, except by doubling his diligence in getting away."³⁷

About 4:00 in the afternoon, Fraser halted once again to give his men a brief rest. He was joined by a new and most unexpected addition to his pursuing forces. Major General Baron Friedrich Adolph von Riedesel, commander of the German division of Burgoyne's army and General Burgoyne's second in command, came up from the rear.³⁸

Von Riedesel later explained that Burgoyne had instructed him to march part of his corps in support of Fraser and then push on to Skenesborough. He immediately set his troops in motion—a regiment of infantry and a battalion each of jagers (riflemen), grenadiers, and chasseurs (light infantry), totaling about 1,100 men. Von Riedesel had preceded them, with a company of jagers, and a detachment of grenadiers and chasseurs, roughly 180 men.

The German's arrival was a surprise to Fraser. He later wrote that "I felt much hurt to be embarrassed with a senior officer." He also felt let down by Burgoyne, for not ordering the remainder of his Corps to join him and for not sending "any provision, ammunition, or supply of surgeons or materials to take care of the wounded in case of an action."³⁹ These were all grave oversights or omissions by Burgoyne and were cause enough for the delay that was so out of character with Fraser's accustomed decisiveness and drive.

Fraser stated that with von Riedesel's permission he would move on about three miles, bivouac, and start again about 3:00 the next morning toward Hubbardton. He stated once more that "I had discretionary powers to attack the Enemy wherever I could come up with them, and that I determined to do it."⁴⁰

Von Riedesel, thirty-eight, husky, alert, intelligent, and somewhat florid, was an officer of distinction, with some twenty years of successful military service. He tactfully deferred to Fraser's apparent impatience. His slow-moving German detachment—heavily equipped and armed as they were—would not cover any more ground that night. They would bivouac where Fraser was, and at three the next morning they would move out, prepared to give close support. Fraser and his troops marched on another three miles to Lacey's camp, where they bivouacked for the short night. Francis's American rear guard had departed only a few hours before.

On July 7, at three the next morning, Fraser set his troops in motion again. Likewise, von Riedesel's Brunswick troops assembled ready to march, although this is hard to reconcile when one considers the many hours they consumed in marching roughly six miles to the scene of the battle. Von Riedesel himself moved out in advance with his selected force of jagers, chasseurs, and grenadiers. It is fortunate for the British that he did so, as we shall see.⁴¹

The rising sun lit the hill crests as the British column ascended toward a notched cleft in the saddle on the western flank of Sargent Hill.⁴² Fraser reported the time as 5:00 a.m. In front, the small platoon of Tory and Indian scouts was reconnoitering through the woods when, according to Fraser, it was fired upon by American pickets: ". . . my advanced Scouts descryed the Enemy's Centry's who fired and joined the main body."⁴³ (By "main body," he meant the squad, platoon, or company in support of the advanced pickets.) These

supporting troops were located about one-half mile down the military road at Sucker Brook, the initial delaying position. The American pickets were located in the saddle of the divide.⁴⁴ (See Appendix L.)

The British advance guard ascending the western side of Sargent Hill could not have seen the American bivouac over half a mile south.⁴⁵ After the American shot or shots were fired, Fraser called in his commanding officer of the Tory and Indian scouts and directed him to reconnoiter the American camp. The military road ran through the saddle of the hill and had high ground on both sides of it—ideal terrain for an ambush. The land was rugged, hilly, mostly forested with marshes down along Sucker Brook, which were to be avoided. Logically, the reconnaissance would have taken place to the west of the American camp, well out on its flanks to avoid detection.

The Tory scouts and Indians must have gone well toward the rear of the American position almost a mile away in order to have determined that the Americans were in much greater strength than had been anticipated by Fraser. Elements of the scouting party may have looked down on the entire position from Mount Zion. Between three and four hundred feet above Sucker Brook it has a commanding view of Monument Hill. It is also probable that Tory spies within the American bivouac were in liaison with their counterparts in the British scouting party and might have rendezvoused with them.⁴⁶

It is apparent that when the information came back to Fraser, he was reluctant to attack until the Germans came up. He was too experienced and well-trained an officer to attempt an attack against a numerically superior force, even though the training and efficiency of his troops were greater.

It is made quite clear in von Riedesel's memoirs that "in case General Fraser found the enemy too strong for him he was to wait for General Riedesel and thus offer a united front to the enemy."⁴⁷ Von Riedesel had received his orders directly from General Burgoyne to support Fraser in case of attack.⁴⁸ Certainly, Fraser would have been reluctant to act against the carefully thought-out plan of the commander-in-chief.


To form some idea of what he was facing, Fraser went to a lookout on the south side of Sargent Hill. The reconnoitering party had been out for roughly an hour, which meant that it would have been about 6:15 a.m. Fraser still delayed, hoping for the arrival of von Riedesel and his troops. Fraser's impatience did not cloud his better judgement at least for the moment, ". . . I had intelligence, which appeared to me probable, that the Rebels were in force near me, and gathering strength hourly; I was then in the most disaffected part of America, every person a Spy."⁴⁹

Fraser was continually sending word to von Riedesel. Upon decamping, he sent a message back to the German commander that he was on his march and would wait for him at Hubbardton.⁵⁰ Max von Elking in *The German Allied Troops in North America (1776-1783)* writes that Fraser was not in favor of attacking the enemy unless the Germans arrived since he now considered himself to be weaker. It must be understood that his forward position in the saddle of Sargent Hill was still one-half mile from Sucker Brook where the "first fire" took place (other than the alerting fire by the American picket at 5:00). It was one thing to attack Francis's force of 450 with his well-trained 850 troops; it was quite another to find himself facing a force of 1,100 to 1,200, particularly, as Fraser himself stated, when he was without replenishment of ammunition, additional surgeons, and rations. But sometime between 6:15 and 6:30 Major Grant persuaded him to attack without the German reinforcements.

Phase 3

6:30 a.m. to 7:20 a.m.

Major Robert Grant and the British advance guard drive in the American pickets. British deploy from column to line formation as Americans delay them along Sucker Brook



Fraser's trepidation about attacking the rebels without German reinforcements seems to have been all too well warranted.⁵¹ The overly-eager and ill-fated Major Grant led the attack on the Americans, which included two companies of the 24th Regiment, followed by Major Alexander Lindsay's 53rd Regiment, with ten companies of light infantry, and followed by Major Acland's 20th Regiment, with ten companies of grenadiers. General Fraser was with the light infantry.⁵² This column of some 850 men snaked across the hills halfway back to Lacey's camp down the western slopes. (See Appendix L.) deploying such a force on such relatively steep wooded slopes must have been at best a tactical nightmare.⁵³

Grant's advance guard easily dislodged the American pickets who had fired





Figure 4 Phase 3 British Delayed by the Rebels at Sucker Brook



Contours are from Bomoseen Sheet 1944.

on them earlier and was driving them in toward the delaying troops along Sucker Brook when he was shot and killed. (See Figure 4.) Twenty-one of his men were also casualties. The retreating American pickets or the delaying troops were responsible for inflicting these early casualties and quite likely made Fraser further regret his hasty decision. Thomas Anburey, an officer with Fraser, writes of the incident.

Major Grant, of the 24th Regiment, who had the advance guard attacked their [the American] picquets, which were soon driven into the main body. From this attack we lament the death of this very gallant and brave officer, who in all probability fell a victim to the great disadvantages we experience peculiar to this unfortunate contest, those of the rifle-men. [He means musketeers since the Americans were not equipped with rifles.] Upon his coming up with the enemy, he got upon the stump of a tree to reconnoitre and had hardly given the men orders to fire, when he was struck by a rifle ball, fell off the tree, and never uttered another syllable.⁵⁴


This encounter opened the rear guard action by the Americans at the Sucker Brook defensive line. By 6:30 a.m. the Americans were successfully delaying the British. While the British spread out from a march column into line formation extending several hundred yards to the right and left of the military road, the American units on the south side of the Brook were conducting the so-called attack. (See Figure 5.)

This "attack" was in reality more a delaying tactic on the part of the Americans. Their musket fire, the terrain, and a crude *abatis* (a barricade of felled trees with branches facing the enemy) afforded the Americans some protection and slowed down the British troops.⁵⁵ This, of course, was the object—to force the enemy to deploy, thus gaining additional time for Warner's forces to assemble into march column on the Castleton road or Monument Hill plateau and continue the withdrawal. The action was successful since the British deployed right and left of the crossing, a time consuming maneuver for British troops of that period.

Phase 4


7:20 a.m. to 8:45 a.m.

British attack Monument Hill earlier than expected. Americans counterattack. Battle for Monument Hill and the Castleton Road takes place.



The British attack on Monument Hill and Castleton road was a pivotal point in the Battle. Here the Americans tried for the last time to stall the British advance, which would allow St. Clair's main army to get a healthy headstart south.

At about the time that Fraser's advance guard was descending Sargent Hill, colonels Warner, Francis, and Hale were at the Selleck cabin near the junction of the Hubbardton military road and the Castleton road. Warner had received the latest intelligence about the enemy and was preparing to move out immediately when a mounted courier arrived with a message from St. Clair that the



Warner Waits for His Patrol to Return

Contours are from Bomoseen Sheet 1944

British had broken the boom at Ticonderoga, sailed up the Lake to Skenesborough, and captured or destroyed the remnants of the American fleet.⁵⁶ St. Clair, who had intended to rejoin his troops under Colonel Pierce Long at Skenesborough, was cut off from General Schuyler and his troops in the Hudson Valley.⁵⁷ St. Clair now had to move east before moving south in order to avoid a probable enemy attack from Skenesborough in the west. At the same time, he had to continue his retreat from Fraser's pursuit on the northwest. Warner and his troops were to join him in the Rutland area instead of Castleton. As we know, it was apparently Warner's intention to move out immediately when his patrol returned at 7:00 a.m. and when he received the information that the two militia regiments two and one-half miles ahead at Ransomvale had moved.⁵⁸

By about 7:00 Warner's regiment was ready to continue the withdrawal. His scouts had informed him as to the strength of Fraser's force, and he was well aware that an attacking force, even though superior in training and other factors, needed a numerical superiority of about two to one in order to be successful. The approximate ratio of 850 British soldiers to 1,100 to 1,200 Americans was not in Fraser's favor.⁵⁹ He was aware that the presence of his relatively powerful force commanding the plateau of Monument Hill and astride the Castleton road had already delayed Fraser's smaller force and caused him to reconnoiter, to wait for Von Riedesel, and to redeploy.

Colonel Francis, whose troops were already in formation by 7:00,⁶⁰ was next in line north of Warner whose men also were in formation and ready to march. Hale's men, farthest to the north, and on the American right flank as the Battle developed, had not yet assembled. They were closest to the British as they attacked up the northern slope of Monument Hill,⁶¹ and since they had not assembled, they were not as prepared as were Warner's and Francis's troops. Thus Hale's 2nd New Hampshire regiment undoubtedly absorbed the brunt of the initial British attack. He had placed his understrength regiment under the temporary command of his second in command, Major Titcomb, and had returned in haste to his primary responsibility, the very large group of invalids, walking sick, and stragglers located along Sucker Brook with Captain Carr's outpost company. He urgently needed to put these men in motion toward the Castleton road ahead of the British.

From this point on the Battle moves swiftly and with a great deal of confusion. Descriptions of this portion of the Battle vary, but by taking the various accounts and making a composit, a relatively clear picture of what happened emerges. (See Figure 6.) The following describes the Battle from the vantage points of both British and American observers. The reader should keep in mind that the actions described in each of these perspectives are happening simultaneously.

The British Perspective

Fraser describes the Battle, as he saw it, in a letter to a member of his family. His account is cursory and omits many essential details in the development and ending of the Battle. Fraser wrote that ". . .the whole [his Advance Corps] were in order of march when we found ourselves so near the Rebels. I was at

the head of the Light Infantry Battalion, it had then a pretty steep hill on the left flank [Monument Hill]; I halted the Light Infantry, faced them to the left and with the whole in front I ran up the hill with them, and we met the Rebels endeavoring to get possession of it . . . "62 Since the Americans were already in possession of the hill, Fraser means they were advancing toward the crest to prevent the British from seizing it.

As Fraser's advance guard on his right flank attacked the west slope of Monument Hill, Warner's troops counterattacked. Fraser had intended to hold the grenadiers in reserve. But now, with the advance guard in trouble, he committed these troops and hoped for the arrival of the Germans to fill the vacancy. He moved the grenadiers around the American left flank to the west and south. Fraser reports, ". . . I found my advanced guard engaged . . . I ordered the Granadiers to support the right [the advance guard], with directions to prevent, if possible the Enemy's gaining the road, which leads to Castletown and Skenesborough."63 (See Figure 5.)

Fraser demonstrated his ability as a tactician when he formed a detachment of the light infantry to lead the grenadiers. (The Gerlach map in Appendix K, shows Lindsay at "D" detached to cover the right wing.) He appears to have placed both of them under Major Lindsay, with Major Acland commanding the grenadiers. The light infantry detachment provided the speed required to reach and outflank the Rebels at the Castleton road. Meanwhile the light infantry regiment under Fraser forced the Rebels from the crest of the first hill (west slope of Monument Hill) and drove them to a smaller hill (a gentle rise near the summit). Fraser then continues his report that the Rebels left this position after being strongly pressed.

The grenadiers provided the strength to hold the Castleton road and extended the line all the way to the top of Pittsford Ridge. Fraser mentions in his letter that ". . . when they [the Rebels] wished to gain the Castleton road by filing off to their own left, they were met by the Granadiers who obliged them to attempt a retreat by scrambling up Huberton mountain [Pittsford ridge], and march toward Pittsford falls, here the Granadiers moved on the right flank of the enemy [behind the Americans], and we got possession of the top of this hill before they could . . ."64 Anburey confirms Fraser's account, "The grenadiers were ordered to form to prevent the enemy's getting to the road that leads to Castletown, which they were endeavouring to do, and were repulsed, upon which they attempted their retreat by a very steep mountain to Pittsford. The grenadiers scrambled up an ascent which appeared almost inaccessible, and gained the summit of the mountain before them."65

Fraser's decision to commit the grenadiers, his reserve, around Warner's left flank sealed off the Castleton road from further American withdrawal, and at the same time strengthened the advance guard on his (Fraser's) immediate right. This was a brilliant maneuver, and one of the keys to the British's eventual success. The envelopment not only sealed the road but continued across it to the northeast for one-half mile to the summit of Pittsford ridge. The envelopment had encompassed approximately 220 degrees when measured from the starting position along the military road near Sucker Brook. (See Bomoseen Map, Appendix L.) This maneuver blocked the American withdrawal to the south and east, and forced them ever farther north as they withdrew. (See Figure 6.)

It appears probable that the light infantry detachment went only as far as a few hundred yards east of the Castleton road, while the grenadiers went on to the top of Pittsford Ridge.66 Thomas Anburey in his *Travels Through the Inte-*





Figure 6 Phase 4 Battle for Monument Hill, Withdrawing Rebels Turn on Their Pursuers



Contours are from Bomoseen Sheet 1944.

rior *Parts of America*, vividly describes the battle along the ridge.

. . . they attempted their retreat by a very steep mountain to Pittsford. The grenadiers scrambled up the ascent which appeared almost inaccessible, and gained the summit of the mountain before them; this threw them into great confusion, and that you may form some idea how steep the ascent must have been, the men were obliged to sling their firelocks and climb up the side, sometimes resting their feet upon the branch of a tree, and sometimes on a piece of rock; had any been so unfortunante as to have missed his hold, he must inevitably been dashed to pieces.

Anburey continued his description of the battle:

Although the grenadiers had gained the summit of this mountain, the Americans had lost great numbers of their men, with their brave commander Col. Francis, still they were far superior in numbers to the British, and the contest remained doubtful till the arrival of the Germans. . . .⁶⁷

Outflanked on the south and east, Fraser describes a group of the Rebels who were desperately seeking escape to the north and who were reforming for an attack on the left flank of his light infantry, which they observed as exposed. Francis's withdrawal and Fraser's pressure carried the British infantry toward the Castleton road in a blunt penetration, which left the British left flank exposed.⁶⁸ Fraser speaks of "the weakness of my left." The Rebels were attacking briskly, he reports, so briskly that he sent a message to Riedesel that immediate support was essential to avoid defeat. Von Eelking recorded in his memoir of von Riedesel that, ". . . an aide arrived with a message from Fraser, to the effect that he feared his left wing would be surrounded. Riedesel sent word back to him that he was at that very instant about to attack the enemy's right wing."⁶⁹

Fraser's account leaves out a great many crucial details of the Battle. He fails, for instance, to mention that there was a delay, what his reconnaissance reported, the driving in of the pickets, the death at the "first fire" of his close friend and subordinate Major Grant, and the twenty-one casualties that resulted from that initial skirmish. He also omits the Americans delaying action at Sucker Brook, or his own visual reconnaissance of the enemy positions. Significantly, Fraser omits any mention of the detachment of light infantry, under Lindsay, which led the grenadiers around the American left flank (southern flank).⁷⁰ He writes nothing of Francis's and Warner's counterattacks that met and repulsed two British attacks up the slopes of Monument Hill, although he implied this when he wrote, ". . . we met the Rebels endeavoring to get possession of it. . . ." Even Burgoyne, who was not present, mentions that the Rebels "long defended themselves by the aid of logs and trees."⁷¹

The American Perspective

If we were to look no further than Fraser's account, we would have a picture of a British rout. Fortunately there are other accounts of this Battle that fill-in many of the details Fraser leaves out. By piecing these together it becomes clear that the Americans, although at the unfortunate cost of many lives, accomplished what they had set out to do: put some distance between their army and the British troops. Below are descriptions of the Battle from the three different American positions.

Colonel Francis

Francis absorbed the main British assault, and his command, which included the original rear guard, provided the strongest opposition. As we know, these were the select troops from St. Clair's ten regiments. Francis's sector comprised the battlefield area as it is recognized today on the central summit of Monument Hill. (Francis's monument on the battlefield marks the area where the rear guard made its strongest effort.) He was the only regimental commander to lose his life during the Battle. His gallantry under fire was noted by the British, Germans, and Americans.

As with the other commanders, Colonel Francis hastily returned from the meeting at Selleck's cabin. He immediately ordered Captain Greenleaf to "march the regiment . . . with the greatest expedition, or the enemy would be upon us . . ." ⁷² Greenleaf wrote in his diary that it was 7:15 a.m. Warner's men just ahead were undoubtedly in march column facing south and were already in motion since Greenleaf stated that immediately upon Francis's orders he started a portion of the regiment marching. "At twenty minutes past 7, the enemy appeared within gun-shot of us; we fac'd to the right, when the firing began, which lasted until 3/4 past Eight a.m. without Cessation." ⁷³

Thus Francis — and no doubt Warner — swung their troops from march column into a line formation to the right and counterattacked toward the crest of the hill, stopping the British with heavy losses. ⁷⁴ (See Figure 6.) The British climbing Monument Hill could not see the Americans on the top until they almost met at the crest. The Americans held this position long and stubbornly, but finally had to withdraw to the "hill of less eminence," as Fraser described it, and thence to the high log fence east of the Castleton road. ⁷⁵ This new position—the gentle rise near the top of Monument Hill between the crest and the road—offered the Americans limited protection. (This is called a *defilade* position where terrain gives troops some protection.) The British promptly reorganized for their second attack when the Americans withdrew to the "hill of less eminence."

The American line was far from uniform and the intensity of pressure varied from flank to flank. Francis had under him seven or more company commanders, captains or first lieutenants who led their units through the woods, and open fields. ⁷⁶ Thus along the line of defense some companies were more involved than others. Francis would have moved from company to company in an effort to help those having trouble or losing ground, or one that had taken more than its share of casualties. He would, of course, also have been in communication with Warner and Hale through his subordinates.

It is difficult to document a second American counterattack, but it seems quite likely that one occurred at the "hill of less eminence," probably by effective musketry. Although not necessarily a sortie, the Americans again repulsed the British. ⁷⁷ Fraser clearly implies in his letter that the Americans held this position until the third British attack. Finally, after this assault, the Americans withdrew to the east of the Castleton road, where they continued their fire from behind the high log fence. Joseph Bird recalled his experience at that position:

We drove them back twice, by cutting them down so fast. We didn't leave [the] log fence or charge them. The action began on our right, which soon gave way. They couldn't drive us from the fence, until they *charged* us. I was near the centre, opposite the west road, under Col. Francis.

Hale commanded our right. We fought, before they drove us till I had fired nearly 20 cartridges.⁷⁸

Bird's account is somewhat confusing, but it is the first-hand account of a soldier who very clearly was in the thick of the battle. Bird's expression "until they *charged* us" probably refers to the British third attack, a charge with bayonets, which the Americans saw no reason to receive, especially since further withdrawal or retreat was implicit in their mission. In fact, having delayed the British to the maximum, it was now the duty of the rear guard to disengage and to extricate itself. The units did not, however, withdraw in an orderly manner; if they had attempted to do so, they would have been mowed down by the British. Both a study of the terrain east of the Castleton road and Bird's account indicate that the Americans scattered to the east and northeast, downhill, across a wheatfield exposed to British fire for about eighty yards to a hedgerow at Hubbardton Brook (Breton Brook). Thus there was an understandable dash to gain shelter beyond, as well as to get out of effective range.

The Americans put up further resistance after crossing the wheatfield. Bird said, ". . . that the wheatfield, last [east] of the log fence, was some 15 rods wide, fenced on the east, by a long brush fence, hard to get over. When I got over, I took a tree and waited for them to come within shot. We fought through the woods, all the way to the ridge of the Pittsford mountain, popping away from behind trees."⁷⁹

After the rebels withdrew from the high log fence just east of the Castleton road, the tables were turned, in a sense. Up to this point the Americans had had the advantage of defilade positions, log and tree defenses and the stone and log fences, from behind which they had directed their fire. Now, from the Castleton road, east toward Pittsford ridge, they were relatively unprotected as they dashed downhill toward what is today the headwaters of North Breton Brook. The stream forks here so that most of the troops had to cross the stony brook bed twice before reaching the first slopes of Pittsford Ridge, which became ever steeper to an almost vertical rise at the summit some 500 feet above Sucker Brook. Here the retreating troops were met by the grenadiers, who had completely enveloped Warner's men on the south, crossed the Castleton road, and advanced northeastward to the ridgeline.⁸⁰ (See Figure 6.) As Fraser mentioned in his letter this wide envelopment of the grenadiers effectively blocked the American attempt to retreat southeastward, or to get back on the Castleton road.

As the Americans were forced to the north by the light infantry detachment and the grenadiers, a running battle through the woods and along the ridgeline developed. It was during this engagement that Colonel Francis was killed. Bird who was close by Francis when he died on the ridge of Pittsford mountain, gave this account: "Col Francis told me to take off my pack. I replied that I could fight with it on. He said, I tell you to take it off. At this time smoke was so thick on the hill [Pittsford ridge], we did not see the enemy until they fired. There being some scattering firing, Francis told the soldiers not to fire, they were firing on their own men. Then came a British volley and Francis fell dead."⁸¹ In his journal, Captain Greenleaf describes Francis's death in greater detail. "Numbers fell on both sides, among ours the brave and ever to be lamented Col. Francis, who fought bravely to the last. He first received a ball through his right arm, but still continued at the head of our troops, till he received the fatal wound through his body, entering his right breast, he dropped on his face."⁸²

Bird escaped down the east side of the ridge. Many were killed along the ridge,⁸³ but no further pursuit occurred. The majority who escaped did so by crossing to the east, finding their way in the direction of the settlements at Pittsford, Proctor, and eventually West Rutland.⁸⁴

The British volley that killed Francis must have come from the top of the ridge which, according to both Fraser and Anburey, the grenadiers and light infantry had gained ahead of the Americans. (See Figure 6.) Francis and his men were undoubtedly climbing in a northeasterly direction with the British just above them. Anburey, who was present with the grenadiers, more or less confirms Francis's death on or near the ridge:

After the action was over, and all firing had ceased for near two hours, upon the summit of the mountain [Pittsford Ridge] I have already described, which had no ground anywhere that could command it, a number of officers were collected to read the papers taken out of the pocketbook of Colonel Francis, when Captain Shrimpton, of the 62nd regiment, who had the papers in his hand, jumped up and fell, exclaiming he was "severely wounded"; we all heard the ball whiz by us, and turning to the place whence the report came, saw the smoke"⁸⁵

It appears that one of Francis's many loyal men remained behind and risked his life to even the score for the life of the much respected Francis.

Colonel Warner

Colonel Warner's regimental sector on the south and southwestern slopes of Monument Hill extended about two hundred yards south of the Selleck cabin and appears to have extended almost as far as the southern fork of the military road. (See Gerlach map, Appendix K.)

As we have seen from Captain Greenleaf's journal, part of Francis's troops were already on the march south when they saw the enemy on their right. Thus it appears likely that Warner's troops just ahead were also marching.

Prior to the march order, which Warner issued to Francis and Hale about 7:00 that morning, the Americans had been camped in a rough semicircle on the northern and southern slopes of Monument Hill. The exception was Captain Carr's company and the invalid-straggler group to the west of Monument Hill along Sucker Brook. This unit was then withdrawing having been surprised and partially overrun with many prisoners taken.

Francis's men on Warner's right flank held the top of the plateau of Monument Hill starting from Warner's sector, for an estimated 300 yards to Hale's sector, which comprised the northwestern and northern ends of the plateau, occupying about 250 yards. The total front was about one-half mile (800 yards) for the entire distance.

When the British advance guard attacked up the west slope of Monument Hill on the right of Fraser's light infantry regiment, Warner's regiment counterattacked down the hill with sufficient depth or distance that the right flank of the ascending British advance guard was about to be turned. Warner's regiment was able to handle the advance guard and even threaten to defeat it by very nearly turning its flank.⁸⁶ But with the arrival of the British grenadiers and the light infantry detachment a short time later, his forces were divided, and

he was outnumbered; so he gradually, but very stubbornly fell back toward the Castleton road, holding there. To be able to turn the British right, Warner's troops must have been well west of the road by the time the advance guard came within range.

It was at this point that the troops all along the line fell back, disengaged, and scattered. According to Daniel Chipman, Warner ordered them to assemble at Manchester.⁸⁷ To have continued to fight at this phase would have been contrary to his rear guard mission. He had fought the British virtually to a draw, and now was the time to leave the field.⁸⁸ The final withdrawal from behind the high log fence may have been by prearrangement.

The ability of Warner and Francis, and their subordinate officers, to cause their troop units to advance and withdraw, and to hold their ground under the hottest of small arms fire was truly remarkable. The sustained time of the Monument Hill phase of the battle (holding action) was one hour twenty-five minutes according to Captain Greenleaf. It clearly shows that even minimal training, or "exercises" as it was termed in those days, paid off in combat.⁸⁹

By the time Warner and his men had reached the high log fence east of the Castleton road, it must have been obvious to them that they would be trapped by the grenadiers already south of them unless they made full speed for Pittsford Ridge. It became a race then to see who would get there first, the Americans or the British. They retreated across the open wheat field,⁹⁰ much as Francis's and Hale's men under Titcomb were doing, exposed to British fire. Naturally, they moved in a hurry. A hedgerow beyond the wheatfield afforded the first shelter.

Warner had gotten the message by this time that the main body was secure miles ahead and that the two militia regiments at Ransomvale had moved. His job now was to escape, extricate his troops from close combat, and to join the main body at West Rutland by the shortest route possible, which was across the mountains to the southeast. This was quite difficult at that moment because of the presence of the grenadiers at the summit of Pittsford ridge. A running battle ensued below and along the cliffs and through the woods as the British and American troops converged. The Americans were pressed more and more to the north, taking casualties as the British fired on them as they ascended toward the summit.

Colonel Hale

Colonel Hale perhaps had one of the most difficult parts to play in the Battle of Hubbardton. General St. Clair had placed him in charge of the invalids, walking sick, wounded, and stragglers, including some who were intoxicated,⁹¹ from the retreating Northern Army in the forced march from Mount Independence.⁹² By the time they finally reached Hubbardton late on the afternoon of July 6, this unorganized group may have numbered three hundred. They were from all ten of the regiments in St. Clair's rapidly retreating army.

When Colonel Hale finally came up with his group, Warner, now in overall command of the reinforced rear guard, assigned them to an area well west of the military road and along Sucker Brook, downstream, where they could clean themselves up and rest.

They were attached to Captain Carr's company of Hale's 2nd New Hampshire Regiment, already in place as an outpost to secure the extreme left flank on the west. This position was near the site of the Old Manchester Farm road, a likely approach by the British. (See Appendix L.)

A number of the soldiers were recovering from measles and were very weak. Ebenezer Fletcher, a fifer in Carr's company, writes, "Having just recovered from the measles and not being able to march with the main body [Northern Army] I fell in the rear."⁹³ Some no doubt suffered from dysentery, diarrhea, hangovers, and other troop disorders, as well as the aftermath of measles. The day was reported as excessively hot, and the distance marched was well over twenty miles at a grueling pace. After seeing to his group of sick and exhausted men, Hale reported to Warner at the Selleck cabin on the south side of Monument Hill.

The next morning, July 7, about 7:00 Captain Carr's company and the group of sick and stragglers were surprised by the British as they attacked across Sucker Brook. Ebenezer Fletcher, continuing his narrative, reported the opening of the battle as he observed it first hand:

The morning after our retreat, orders came very early for the troops to refresh and be ready for marching. Some were eating, some were cooking, and all in a very unfit posture for battle. Just as the sun rose [down deep in a valley, with steep hills to the east, this could well have been about 7:00], there was a cry "The enemy are upon us." Looking around I saw the enemy in line of battle. Orders came to lay down our packs and be ready for action. The fire instantly began. We were but a few in number compared to the enemy. At the commencement of the battle, many of our party retreated back into the woods. Capt. Carr came up and says, "My lads advance, we shall beat them yet." A few of us followed him in view of the enemy. Every man was trying to secure himself behind girdled trees, which were standing on the place of action. I made shelter for myself and discharged my piece. Having loaded again and taken aim, my piece misfired. I brought the same a second time to my face, but before I had time to discharge it, I received a musket ball in the small of my back, and fell with my gun cocked⁹⁴

Fletcher hid himself under a tree but was discovered by the British after the Battle, brought into camp, and treated well by two doctors who told him that he had some prospect of recovering.

It appears to have been this relatively isolated unit and Hale's group of sick and stragglers out on the extreme west or left flank that were surprised, suggesting strongly that enemy scouts and Indians "took of [off] a Centry . . ." during the night, as was reported by Captain Greenleaf.⁹⁵ The Indians had captured or tomahawked the sentry or picket so that the British attack, which came later, came without warning.

As explained by Fletcher, these troops withdrew, firing at the British from behind trees as they did so. They withdrew into Warner's sector and across the Castleton road, where they were defeated, with many killed and wounded and with many prisoners taken by the pursuing and overrunning British troops under Lindsay and Acland.

The location of Colonel Hale during this early phase of the battle is not clear. Since he was still responsible for the sick and stragglers group in Captain Carr's area, and since Carr was one of his subordinate company commanders, it

would appear that he would have exercised early morning responsibilities there, and no doubt he did so, and may have been mid-way between his regiment on Monument Hill and his group of invalids and stragglers down at Sucker Brook when the British attacked.⁹⁶

In any event, Hale had placed his understrength 2nd New Hampshire regiment under the temporary command of Major Benjamin Titcomb⁹⁷, his second in command. Titcomb brought the regiment to Monument Hill while Hale was struggling with his sick and straggler group in the rear. Titcomb was assigned the northern sector of the hill, on the American right flank, the first to face the British assault.

On July 7, shortly after 7:00, as Warner and Francis were assembling for marching, Titcomb had not yet assembled Hale's regiment when the British attacked. One soldier there testified that "the action began on Francis's right, which soon gave way."⁹⁸ It is likely that Hale's troops, temporarily under Titcomb, had not as yet formed for marching and were the ones who initially gave way. But although they were in greater disarray than the other two regiments, the 2nd New Hampshire men apparently recovered and held out as long as the other two commands, suffering more disabling wounds than the other two combined.⁹⁹ After withdrawing behind the high log fence, elements reorganized, and in company with Francis's troops attacked the British left flank that had become exposed. The Americans were bringing pressure on the British left and were about to get behind them when the Germans attacked them from the front, flank, and rear. At this point the Americans disengaged and scattered east toward Pittsford ridge.

Since Hale's men did not leave any description of the action in their sector, our presumption of activity is based upon the pension records of disabling wounded among Hale's men and the killed, as well as upon Bird's statement that Hale's men were on the right flank.¹⁰⁰ That Hale had a dual mission there can be no doubt which may explain the several conflicting accounts as to his actions and locations. (It should be noted that when I speak of Hale as being on the right flank I mean Hale's troops under Titcomb. Hale was more than likely organizing the sick and straggler group.)


Hale and about seventy men were surrounded after the battle and captured when threatened by a ruse. Hadden, recognized as the authority on Hale, wrote, "As proof of what may be done against Beaten Battalions while their fears are upon them, an officer and 15 men detached for the purpose of bringing in Cattle fell in with 70 Rebels, affecting to have the rest of the party concealed and assuring them they were surrounded [by a larger number], they surrendered their arms and were brought in [as] prisoners."¹⁰¹

By the time Hale and his men were captured, the firing had ceased. Certainly, a detachment would not be looking for cattle in the vicinity of a battlefield when the shooting was in progress. Hale and his men, many of whom were seriously wounded, were like the rest of the retreating Americans trying to reach a road or trail across the mountains toward Rutland. There can be no doubt that Hale acted to save the lives of his men.¹⁰² Actually, the feigning of a larger concealed force was more a reality than a deception when we consider that von Breymann's 1,000 Germans had just arrived at the very close of the most violent phase of the Battle.

Phase 5

8:30 a.m.- 10:00 a.m.

*Germans rescue the British. End of main battle at 8:45 a.m.
Americans retreat toward West Rutland.*



The British had been engaged in combat with the Americans on Monument Hill since 7:20 a.m. Fraser had sent an urgent second message to von Riedesel that the Americans were in such force that he would not be able to withstand them without reinforcements. Von Riedesel and his Brunswick detachment finally arrived at the northern end of the hill about 8:30 a.m. Fraser must have felt great relief when at last he saw the Germans coming to rescue his vulnerable left flank. He writes almost jubilantly that the Brunswick troops





Figure 7 Phase 5 End of the Main Battle for Monument Hill, British Rescued by the Germans



Contours are from Bomoseen Sheet 1944

attacked "in the handsomest manner possible."¹⁰³ (See Figure 7.)

It was this exposure of the British left flank that made the action on the American right flank so interesting. Had it not been for the arrival of the Germans, the Americans might have turned the flank, reached Fraser's rear, and, as he feared, defeated him.¹⁰⁴ Just before the Germans appeared, the Americans had rallied and moved against the British left flank with telling effect. Von Riedesel observed that the Americans were forcing the British to the south at this point, and called this the third American counterattack.¹⁰⁵

The perception of being trapped in a virtual cul-de-sac seems to have caused Francis's and Hale's men, on the American right flank, to renew the battle for their disengagement, just before the arrival of the Germans. It was apparent to the Americans that escape to the south or east was impossible. Thus a last desperate effort was made to cripple the exposed British left flank so that disengagement could be made before the enemy recovered.

About 7:20 a. m., when Fraser was making his attack up Monument Hill, von Riedesel and his advance group of jagers, chasseurs, and grenadiers were ascending the far side of Sargent Hill on the trail from Lacey's camp. The approximately 180 Brunswick troops marched over the rough cart track. Their uniforms were unquestionably covered with sweat on this extremely hot day. General von Riedesel had received Fraser's message to speed up his pace since the enemy appeared too strong for him to handle alone. He therefore sent back word for his slow-moving main body to quicken its advance.

At about 8:15 a. m., he reached a clearing on Sargent Hill with a commanding view of the battle field on Monument Hill. He saw at once that the British left flank was vulnerable to attack since it was exposed and was being driven to the south by the American right flank.¹⁰⁶ On the Hubbardton military road, meanwhile, the halted Brunswick detachment, recovering from their exhausting march, with their thick-barreled, short rifles beside them, were waiting orders to attack. They were not to be disappointed.

Von Riedesel accordingly ordered his troops to attack the American right. His one hundred jagers moved across the area in a frontal attack on the Rebels. Approximately eighty grenadiers moved wider to the left to partially envelop the Americans. They turned south, after crossing the Castleton road, outflanked the northern part of Monument Hill, and assaulted the American right and rear. As an added touch of deception to confuse the Americans and to inspire his troops, he ordered his little German band to play.¹⁰⁷ It was a well conceived plan and apparently well executed. A courier rode back to Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich von Breymann, commanding the Brunswick main body, with an urgent message to accelerate his advance. The Germans advanced in the vicinity of the present cemetery and little marsh. The strange sounds of the German band and the jagers singing hymns were heard from near the American right flank. The music was heard, in fact, as far away as Pittsford Ridge, half a mile east of the Castleton road. Even the British grew anxious when they heard the music. "We were apprehensive," wrote Lieutenant Anburey, a British officer with the grenadiers, "by the noise we heard, that a reinforcement had been sent back from the main body of the American Army for the support of their rear guard."¹⁰⁸

But even under the German attack, the American pressure seemed to increase. In his essay on Hubbardton, Henry Hall writes

Then all the drums are made to beat full music, and the yagers quickly went down and heartily attack the 400 Americans, who were opposite

them. The Americans receive them with an equally resolute salute or discharge. This collision had scarcely been fairly begun before Capt. Geusau [von Geysso] and the rest of the vanguard arrived at their post, and quickly advanced with drums beating and bayonets level, for a charge upon the right wing of the Americans, in spite of the American's fire growing fiercer.¹⁰⁹

At this moment of apparent success for the Americans, the Germans brought their rifle fire into effect and attacked the American right flank where Hale's (under Titcomb) and Francis's troops were located, which caused the Americans to pull back behind the log fence east of the Castleton road. Shortly thereafter they broke away to the east across the wheatfield. The accuracy and shock of rifle, as compared to musket, fire may explain why Hale's troops suffered more disabling wounded than Warner's and Francis's commands combined. It may also explain why these men were said to have panicked, if indeed they did.

Max von Eelking's account of the German support puts it in the context of General Burgoyne's order after the fall of Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga).

Brigadier Fraser, with twenty companies of English grenadiers and light infantry shall march to Castletown and Skeensborough and attack the enemy who have retreated by land. General Riedesel with his corps of reserves, under Breyman, and the infantry regiment [of] Riedesel, shall follow the corps of Fraser and support it in case of attack. The fleet and the rest of the army, shall pursue their way to Skeensborough by water, and attack the fleet of the rebels and that part of their army which have taken their way thence by water.¹¹⁰

Further on von Eelking describes how the Germans proceeded in carrying out Burgoyne's order.

General Riedesel, that he might lose no time, took a company of jagers and an advanced guard of eighty men from Breyman's corps and hastened on, leaving orders for the rest of this corps and his own regiment to follow on immediately.... In case General Fraser found the enemy too strong for him he was to wait for General Riedesel and thus offer a unified front to the enemy.

In the meantime a second officer arrived from Fraser and reported to the Brunswick general that the former had met the enemy in such force that he would not be able to withstand him unless he was speedily reinforced.¹¹¹

Once within range, the jagers, firing the only rifles used at Hubbardton,¹¹² advanced slowly toward the American right flank. The Massachusetts and New Hampshire troops were then at the very point of turning the British left flank. If it had not been for the intervention of the Germans, Fraser's exposed left flank might have been turned and with it the possibility of a British defeat.¹¹³

The Americans saw that they would be enveloped on their right flank unless they pulled back at once. They felt the telling shock of the rifle fire coupled with the advancing jagers with fixed bayonets, no doubt in cadence with the little German band and the troops singing. Before the Americans retreated they fired a volley reported by the Germans as brisk and increasing in intensity. At this point the entire line behind the high log fence disengaged and scattered. (See Figure 8.)





Figure 8 Phase 5 Rebels Escape to the North East, Battle along Ridge



Contours are from Bomoseen Sheet, 1944.

This was about 8:45 a.m., according to Captain Greenleaf, and the Battle for Monument Hill was over.¹¹⁴ The running battle along the cliffs of Pittsford ridge to the east would not sputter out for almost an hour. The grenadiers remained on the ridge until 5:00 that evening, expecting an American counterattack.

"About five o'clock in the afternoon," Anburey writes, "the grenadiers were ordered from the summit of the mountain, to join the light infantry and 24th regiment, on an advantageous situation; in our cool moments, in descending, everyone was astonished how he had ever gained the summit. For my own part, it appeared as if I should never reach the bottom; but my descent was greatly retarded by conducting Major Acland, who was wounded in the thigh."¹¹⁵

Concluding Statement



The British claimed a tactical victory in breaking up the American rear guard, but they could not claim they had defeated it since about sixty-seven percent of the troops escaped. The re-formed American regiments and many of the same troops fought again at Bennington and Saratoga. The ability of the Americans to take and hold successive positions on command of their officers, particularly when all were aware that withdrawal was implicit in their mission, was impressive. It was a remarkable achievement, and one fully recognized by the British. The Americans had stopped the British pursuit of St. Clair's force and thus had accomplished their mission. There was no further pursuit of either the rear guard or the main body of troops beyond Pittsford ridge.

St. Clair's escape defeated Burgoyne's objective of overtaking the Northern Army and squeezing St. Clair between his forces at Skenesborough and the pursuing troops under Fraser and Riedesel.

On the other hand, Warner's rear guard was broken up—or more than likely it disengaged on Warner's order—and men retreated individually or in small groups in the direction of West Rutland. The rear guard was withdrawing in accordance with its mission, but it must be conceded that after leaving the high log fence east of the Castleton road, military organization for the most part ceased. It is speculation whether the withdrawal was prearranged or on order.

In total casualties the Americans appear at first glance to have lost more men than the British: roughly 371 Americans to 208 British and Germans combined. But the number of men who were killed on both sides was 41 Americans and 60 British. Likewise, approximately 96 Americans were wounded, while 148 British-German were wounded. The British losses in killed and wounded came to about 22 percent of their men engaged, while the Americans killed and wounded were close to 12 percent. The Germans killed and wounded were close to 13 percent. The difference in casualties was in the 234 or so American prisoners (mostly the sick, invalids, and stragglers group) taken by the British and Germans; the Americans apparently took no prisoners. The British outflanking of

the American left flank on the south rounded up the bulk of the Americans who were blocked in their attempted withdrawal to the south and east, and partially blocked by the Germans who executed a smaller envelopment of the American right flank on the north.

All factors considered, the Battle appears to have been a draw although many see it as a British victory. The British were of necessity impressed with the ability of the Americans to inflict unacceptable casualties upon them in such a brief period, and thus decisively halt the British pursuit. They remained at Hubbardton for two days after the Battle taking care of their wounded and burying their dead. Burgoyne's strategic plan to overcome St. Clair's North Army in a pincer movement between his troops at Skenesborough and the pursuing troops under Fraser and Riedesel was defeated by the stand made by Warner, Francis, and Hale at Hubbardton. The Fraser-Riedesel end of the pincer remained open. It is also true that St. Clair received intelligence of the capture of Skenesborough in time to reverse course and proceed to Rutland before the Battle started. It can well be debated, however, that but for the delays inherent in the rear guard defense St. Clair might have been further along toward Skenesborough. He might not have been able to turn east to Rutland had Fraser and Riedesel defeated or by-passed Warner's troops and come up in St. Clair's rear. This was undoubtedly Burgoyne's intention.

The conclusion is inescapable. The Battle of Hubbardton was significant in that it kept alive St. Clair's Northern Army to join Schuyler near Fort Edward on the Hudson on or about July 12, admittedly by a circuitous route, and it allowed Warner to reform at Manchester. Burgoyne foresaw his fate shortly after Hubbardton when he wrote about the active and rebellious race "hanging like a gathering storm" upon his left. He must have envisaged the intelligence about Herrick's famous rangers, and the other troops, who would shortly form at Pawlet to threaten his ever-lengthening supply line.

In Dupuy's words, "The stage had been set for the inevitable end at Saratoga. Therein lies the real significance of the Battle of Hubbardton, the only action fought on Vermont soil during the American Revolution."¹¹⁶

Endnotes

The following are abbreviations used for repositories and library collections: VHS, Vermont Historical Society; Wilbur, Wilbur Collection, University of Vermont; B/H, Bailey/Howe Library, University of Vermont; VSL, Vermont State Library.

1 *Court Martial of Major General St. Clair*, White Plains, New York, August 25, 1778. (VHS:New York Historical Society Collection, 1880), p.31. See also Appendix A: "General Return of the Troops at This Post...28 June 1777" and Appendix B: Notes to justify 4,000. See also Appendix C: "Return of the 11th Massachusetts Battalion [Regiment] Commanded by Colonel Francis," that shows seven companies and Appendix E: the returns of arms and equipment in Colonels Warner's and Hale's regiments, and Appendix G on forty Blacks in St. Clair's force, four of whom were at Hubbardton with one killed.

2 John Burgoyne, *A State of the Expedition from Canada*, London, 1780. (VHS), p. 8. Cites troop strength as British 3,724, German 3,016, Canadian and Provincial 250, Indians ca. 400, totaling 7,390.

3 *Court Martial*, p. 51.

4 Richard Varick, "Letter to Philip Schuyler," June 17, 1777, (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149). See also E.A. Hoyt's MS critique of R. Ernest Dupuy, *Battle of Hubbardton*, (unpublished monograph). (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), pp.4,5.

5 *Court Martial*, p. 73, "...with the stragglers and infirm amounted to near 1,200...." This was reported as Warner's troop strength.

6 James N. Hadden, *Journal and Orderly Book: A Journal Kept in Canada and upon Burgoyne's Campaign of 1776 and 1777*, Cogan, "Letter to Gen. John Stark." (VHS:Vault), p.486.

7 *Court Martial*, pp. 77, 80, 85.

8 *Ibid*, pp. 65-66.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 66. See also Captain William C. Hall, *The History of the Civil War in America*, Vol.1, "Campaigns of 1775, 1776, and 1777." (VHS:/London, 1830), p. 377.

10 Moses Greenleaf, *Diary*, July 5, 1777. (VHS:MS).

11 Hadden, p. 486.

12 Walter H. Crockett, *Vermont: The Green Mountain State*, Vol. 2. (VHS:New York: Century History Co., 1921), p. 70. See also Abby M. Hemenway, *The Vermont Historical Gazetteer*, Vol. 3. (VHS:Rutland, VT: Tuttle Company, 1877), pp. 749-750. Mary B. Fryer, *The King's Men: Soldier Founders of Ontario*. (Toronto: Dundurn Press, Ltd., 1980), p. 362.

13 *Court Martial*, pp.13, 73. This testimony was introduced before the House of Commons in 1779 during the investigation of Burgoyne's campaign in America.

14 *Ibid*. Warner's command "amounted to near 1200," with the stragglers and infirm. See also Appendix D.

15 *Ibid*, p. 51.

16 G.W. Nesmith, "New Hampshire at Hubbardton," *The Granite Monthly*, Vol. 1, February, 1879. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), pp. 279-281.

17 *Court Martial*, p. 87.

- 18 Actually these militia units were a part of the main body of troops. St. Clair had left these units at Ransomvale the night before, apparently with the intention of making them available to Warner in case he needed them. It is possible that he wanted them placed between the strong rear guard and his main body as a measure for controlling them since most of the march discipline problems had occurred in the militia regiments.
- 19 R. Ernest Dupuy, *Battle of Hubbardton* (unpublished monograph). (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), p. 7.
- 20 Daniel Chipman, *Memoir of Colonel Seth Warner*. (VHS:I.W. Clark, 1848), pp. 78,80. See also Leon Dean, *Green Mountain Boy, The Life of Seth Warner*. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1944).
- 21 Greenleaf. See also Crockett, p. 65 and Henry Hall, "The Battle of Hubbardton," (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), pp. 26-28.
- 22 Hadden, pp. 483-504, including Appendix 5 for Hale.
- 23 Ebenezer Fletcher, *The Narrative*. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149).
- 24 Simon Fraser, *General Fraser's Account of Burgoyne's Campaign*, "Letter to John Robinson," Vol. 4. (VHS:Proceedings, 1898-1902).
- 25 John Clement, Letters to E.A. Hoyt on the Battle and Gerlach map. (VHS:Vault), p. 3. See also John Clement's Notes and Narrative on history of the Battle, ca. 1960. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149).
- 26 Joshua Pell, Jr., "Diary of Joshua Pell, Jr., : An Officer of the British Army in America, 1776-1777," Vol. I. (*Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, July 1929), pp. 8,9. See also Crockett, p. 73.
- 27 Max von Eelking, *Memoirs, and Letters and Journals of Major General Riedesel, During His Residence in America*, Part I. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), p. 118.
- 28 John Clement, Notes and Narrative on the history of the Battle ca. 1960. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149). Clement mentions Warner's patrol of about 100, possibly 200 men early on July 7, 1777. See also Abby M. Hemenway, *The Vermont Historical Gazetteer*, Vol. 3. (VHS:Rutland VT: Tuttle Company, 1877), p. 750. Samuel Churchill, north of the bivouac, was warned by this patrol. See also Enos Stone, "Capt. Enos Stone's Journal," *New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, Vol. XV, (October 1861). (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), p. 8.
- 29 *Court Martial*, pp. 80-81. See also Charles A. Jellison, *Ethan Allen, Frontier Rebel*, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1969), pp. 265-266.
- 30 Clement, pp. 2-3.
- 31 Fraser, p. 139 (footnote). See also *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. 20. (VSL:New York: MacMillan Co., 1908), pp. 222-223.
- 32 Dupuy, pp. 11-12.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 12. See also E.A. Hoyt, Critique of R. Ernest Dupuy's "Battle of Hubbardton", p. 10, and correspondence between John Williams and E.A. Hoyt, 1982-83. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149). See also Lord Francis Napier, *Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign*, Maryland Historical Society, Vol. 57, December, 1962. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), pp. 301, 302.
- 34 Fraser, p. 144.
- 35 *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.
- 36 Dupuy, pp. 13-14.
- 37 Fraser, p. 145.

- 38 Ibid. See also Dupuy, p. 14.
- 39 Ibid. Note Fraser's disappointment at not receiving the remainder of his corps, provisions, ammunition, or supply of surgeons. Lack of ammunition alone would justify what is considered to have been his wait for Riedesel from 5 to about 6:30 a.m., July 7.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Eelking, p. 114.
- 42 U.S. Geological Survey Map, Bomoseen Quadrangle, 1944.
- 43 Fraser, p. 145. See also Samuel Adams Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion of 1777*, Boston, 1889. (VHS), p.48. And Samuel Williams, *The Natural and Civil History of Vermont*, Vol. II, Burlington, 1809. (VHS), pp. 106-107. "Fraser came up with the Americans about 5 a.m.." "Fraser began the attack, about 7 o'clock expecting every moment to be joined by von Riedesel."
- 44 Clement, p. 3.
- 45 A walk across the battlefield will make it clear that the British could not have seen the American's encampment.
- 46 Hemenway, pp. 749-750, and 511. "Captain Sherwood, the Tory, was reported to have been in Hubbardton and Castleton on July 6. On the next day he was reported as lurking in the hills east of Hubbardton during the battle. Thus, it is speculated that he helped guide the grenadiers on their outflanking maneuver to the top of Pittsford ridge." See also Crockett, pp. 78-79. "Soon after the battle Capt. Sherwood and his detachment appeared on the scene, made prisoners of the family [Churchills]. . . ." And Mary B. Fryer, *The Kings Men: The Soldier Founders of Ontario*, (Toronto, ON: Dundurn Press, Ltd., 1980), p. 362.
- 47 Eelking, pp. 114-115. See also Max von Eelking, *The German Allied Troops in America*, Hanover, 1863, trans. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), p. 11. Fraser was to wait for Riedesel in case he met the enemy in greater strength than his own.
- 48 Ibid., p. 114, Burgoyne's orders to Fraser and Riedesel.
- 49 Fraser, p. 146.
- 50 Ibid. In fact, Fraser sent several messages to Riedesel that he needed his support.
- 51 Henry Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, ca. 1877. (VHS: John Williams Papers, MS 149) p. 18. See also Mary B. Fryer, *The Kings Men: The Soldier Founders of Ontario*, (Toronto, ON: Dundurn Press, Ltd., 1980), p. 362 and Hemenway, p. 759.
- 52 Pell, p. 9. See also Fraser, p. 145 and Lord Francis Napier, *Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign*, Vol. 57. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149) p. 302.
- 53 Maria Hull Campbell, *Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General William Hull*, New York, 1848. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), pp. 74-76 and Appendix pp. 273-277. The British force moved down the restricted rough road in a column of twos, with flank guards against ambush. Fraser mentions that they were in column, and the Gerlach Map (Appendix K) confirms this.
- 54 Thomas Anburey, *Travels Through the Interior Parts of America*, Vol. 1, London, 1789 (see also 1923 edition). (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), p. 327.
- 55 Pell, pp. 8-9. See also Crockett, p. 73 and Capt. William C. Hall, *The History of the Civil War in America*, Vol. 1, 2nd Ed., London, 1830. (VHS:John

Williams Papers, MS 149), p. 377.

56 Greenleaf.

57 Don R. Gerlach, "The Fall of Ticonderoga in 1777: Who Was Responsible?" (*Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol. 14, Summer 1982), pp. 151-152.

58 Charles M. Thompson, *Independent Vermont*, Boston, 1942. (Wilbur), pp. 284-291. See also Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, p. 19. Quotations from Greenleaf and Ethan Allen provide evidence that both Warner and Francis had formed their men for marching when the British appeared on their right. See also Clement, Notes and narrative, p. 4, 7, and Clement's letter to Dupuy, November 11, 1961. (VHS/John Williams Papers, MS 149).

59 Anburey, p. 329. See also Pell, p. 9 where he mentions "eight hundred men"; Fraser, p. 146, says "850 fighting men"; Eelking, p. 118, says "Brigadier Fraser with one-half his brigade and without artillery, met two thousand rebels strongly fortified." The British early estimate of Warner's troop strength was about 500, see Pell, p. 8. But on the American side St. Clair's court martial records state "...with the stragglers and infirm [Warner's troop strength] amounted to near 1200...." p. 73.

60 Greenleaf, "At 7, he [Francis] came to me and desired me to parade [march] the regiment...."

61 Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, p. 20, says "Hale commanded our right," See also Charles Thompson, *Independent Vermont*, Boston, 1942. (Wilbur), pp. 284-271. Clement, Notes and Narrative, p. 5, "Warner placed his own regiment in a line astride the road. Northward, he placed Francis's Massachusetts [rear guard] regt., and north of that Hale's New Hampshire regt."

62 Fraser, p. 145. See also Lord Francis Napier, *Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign*, Vol. 57. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), pp. 300-301.

63 Ibid., p. 145, "... at the same time I found my advanced guard engaged...." See also Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, p. 20 in quoting Burgoyne, "...the grenadiers were advanced to sustain them (the advance guard) and prevent the right flank from being turned."

64 Ibid., p.146.

65 Anburey, p.328

66 Fraser, p.146.

67 Anburey, p.328

68 Eelking, p.115. See also Hadden, p. 85 for the exposed British left.

69 Ibid.

70 See Gerlach map, Appendix K, and diagram for Phase 5 of the battle showing the British envelopment of the American left flank, across the Castleton road and extending north east along Pittsford ridge.

71 Burgoyne, p. 12.

72 Greenleaf. See also Enos Stone, "Capt. Enos Stone's Journal," *New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, Vol. XV, (October, 1861). (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), p. 8, ". . .which detained us until 7am: then appeared the Enemy in Sight . . ."

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, p. 19, quoting Allen, "The enemy broke, and gave way on the right and left, but formed again, and renewed the attack."

- Also p. 20, "We drove them back twice, by cutting them down so fast."
- 76 *Court Martial*, p. 31. See also Appendix A, "A General Return of the Troops at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence."
- 77 Fraser, p. 146. See also Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, p. 20. Although Hall's statements leave some doubt as to what actually happened along the American line, realistically it appears that the second American counterattack was in the nature of heavy musket fire from behind crude defenses, followed by a well-executed withdrawal and holding of the new position, rather than a forward movement or sortie. The exception was the initial advance from march formation to repulse the British as they attacked up Monument Hill. Fraser p. 145, states, "I halted the Light Infantry, faced them to the left and with the whole in front I ran up the hill with them, and we met the Rebels endeavouring to get possession of it." It is pointed out that he does not mention that his initial attack was successful, but implies otherwise by remaining silent.
- 78 Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, p. 20. This is the first evidence of Hale since the report that he was delayed by carrying along the invalids and stragglers of the Northern Army and was hours behind when the main body reached Hubbardton. He was also seen in the Selleck cabin the night before.
- 79 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- 80 Fraser, p. 146, "...the Granadiers [sic] moved on the right flank of the enemy" that is, in the rear of the enemy. See also Anburey, p. 328.
- 81 Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, p. 26. See also Anburey, p. 328 and Fraser, p. 146.
- 82 Greenleaf, and Anburey, pp. 328, 331, and Henry S. Commanger and Richard B. Harris, eds., *The Spirit of Seventy-six*. (New York: Harper & Row, 1975, Bicentennial Edition), p. 556. "...Colonel Francis fell...while fighting with distinguished gallantry...."
- 83 Hemenway, p. 751.
- 84 Greenleaf. See also *Court Martial*, p. 73 and Henry Sewall, *Diary 1776-1783*, MS entry for July 7, "...arrived in the evening at a house in Rutland" St. Clair's momentary objective was West Rutland rather than Skenesborough.
- 85 Anburey, p. 332.
- 86 Fraser, p. 145.
- 87 Chipman, pp. 52, 81
- 88 Sir George Otto Trevelyan, *The American Revolution*, Vol. 4. (B/H: New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1929), p. 105. "There ensued a hot and equal conflict, which was Waterloo on an extremely minute scale . . ." p. 132. ". . . Seth Warner's battalion of the Green Mountain Boys, who (at Hubbardton) had behaved with intrepidity . . ." See also Clement, Notes and Narrative, pp. 7, 9, 13. *Court Martial*, p. 31. Warner had 15 subalterns in his regiment and a staff of four. See Appendix A.
- 89 Reverend Enos Hitchcock, DD. *Diary*. (VHS: Rhode Island Historical Society, Publications, New Series, VII, 1899), p. III.
- 90 Fraser, p. 146. "...and when they wished to gain the Castleton Road, by filing off to their own left, they were met by the granadiers [sic] who obliged them to attempt a retreat by scrambling up Huberton [sic] mountain [Pittsford ridge] and march towards Pittsford Falls."
- 91 H.A.S. Dearborn, *The Life of Major General Henry Dearborn*, Vol. 2, (VHS: E.A. Hoyt's Saratoga File/MS: Maine Historical Society), p. 19. See also Campbell, p. 75.

- 92 Nesmith, pp. 279-281. Nearly all the missing in Hale's Regiment reported as 13 were finally found among the dead.
- 93 Fletcher, p. 2. See also, Enos Stone, "Capt. Enos Stone's Journal," *New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, Vol. XV, (October 1861). (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149), pp. 4,8.
- 94 Ibid.
- 95 Greenleaf. "...last night about (?) the Indians took of [off] a Centry which alarm'd our party which were here." See also Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, p. 18 and Hemenway, pp. 749-750.
- 96 Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, p. 20. See also Thompson, pp. 284-291.
- 97 Dearborn, *The Life of Major General Henry Dearborn*, pp. 21-22.
- 98 Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*. p. 20.
- 99 *American State Papers—Class IX Claims*, Washington, D.C. Records of Hubbardton Disabling Wounded with pension claims. (VHS:John Williams Papers, MS 149).
- 100 *American State Papers*
- 101 Hadden, pp. 483-504. This includes Hadden's defense of Nathan Hale who had been much maligned.
- 102 Ibid.
- 103 Fraser, p.145.
- 104 Ibid. p.145.
- 105 Eelking, p.115
- 106 Ibid., See also Hadden, p. 85 for the exposed British left.
- 107 Ibid.
- 108 Anburey, p.
- 109 Hall, *Battle of Hubbardton*, p. 25.
- 110 Eelking, pp. 114-115.
- 111 Ibid. Dupuy, p. 27.
- 112 Ibid.
- 113 Ibid.
- 114 Greenleaf. "...firing...lasted till 8 3/4 a.m." He was describing the firing on and in the vicinity of Monument Hill only. More distant firing along Pittsford ridge continued for possibly another hour as the evidence indicates. See also Napier, p.301. "Fraser's hasty attack met stern resistance for three hours. . . ." and Napier fails to point out that the English faced a worsening situation until Riedesel arrived. He fails to mention the later firing on Pittsford ridge described by Bird and Anburey, implied by Fraser.
- 115 Anburey, p. 332. "About five o'clock in the afternoon the grenadiers were ordered from the summit of the mountain [Pittsford ridge]"
- 116 Dupuy, p. 27.

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Appendix A

A GENERAL RETURN of the Troops at this Post, commanded by the Hon. Major-General ST. CLAIR.

Regiments.	Officers present.												Rank and File.				Wanting to compl.			Altera, since last Return.																						
	Commissioned.						Staff.						Non com.						Sick, Present.			Sick, Absent.			On Command.			On Furlough.			Total.			Serjants.			Drs. & Fifes.			Rank & File.		
	Colonels.	Lieut. Cols.	Majors.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Chaplains.	Adjutants.	Qr. Masters.	Pay-Masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Serjants.	Dr. & Fifes.	Present, fit for Duty.	Sick, Present.	Sick, Absent.	On Command.	On Furlough.	Total.	Serjants.	Drs. & Fifes.	Rank & File.	Inlisted.	Joined.	Dead.	Discharged.	Deserted.															
Marshall's, -	1	1	7	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	20	11	126	36	4	123	3	292	8	3	348	1	1	2																		
Hale's, -	1	1	8	17	1	1	1	1	1	1	31	13	212	58	2	87	3	360	1	3	283	14	1	1																		
Bradford's, -	1	1	6	15	1	1	1	1	1	1	27	10	265	17	51		1	333	5	6	307	104																				
Scammel's, -	1	1	6	11	1	1	1	1	1	1	25	15	153	71	12	126		363	2	1	277	4																				
Cilley's, -	1	1	7	14	1	1	1	1	1	1	24	12	193	88	2	113		396	3	2	244	5	1																			
Jackson's, -	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	11	3	45	11	7	22		85	19	13	555	27																				
Brewer's, -	1	1	8	13	1	1	1	1	1	1	21	10	144	15	1	92		252	11	6	388																					
Francis's, -	1	1	8	20	1	1	1	1	1	1	30	13	206	49	4	161		420	2	3	220																					
Warner's, -	1	1	7	15	1	1	1	1	1	1	24	10	99	25	1	48		173	8	6	467	7	1	3																		
Long's, -	1	1	6	16	1	1	1	1	1	1	18	1	91	38	25			154	6	11	326																					
Leonard's Militia, -	1	1	6	15	1	1	1	1	1	1	26	7	192	63	2	22		279																								
Wells's Ditto, -	1	1	7	11	1	1	1	1	1	1	28	8	197	44	4	64		309																								
Whitcomb's Rangers, -			2	4							6	3	19	14		2		35	1	1	71																					
Lee's Rangers, -	2	1	1	2							3	1	23					23			20																					
Baldwin's Artificers, &c.			4	1							2		124	3		1	2	130																								
Total.	10	11	10	84	169	3	10	12	7	10	8	296	117	2089	532	39	937	6	3604	66	55	3506	162	2	7	1																

Appendix B

Rationale in Support of 4,000 Officers and Men Commanded by Major General St. Clair July 5-7, 1777

2,089 rank and file, present, fit for duty
457 on command at Fort "Ti" (in Garrison)
300 estimated sick, present (p. 31, Court Martial)
2,846 estimated rank and file on July 5 and 6

284 officers
50 staff
296 sergeants
117 drummer and fifers
3,593

900 militia brought in by Warner, July 5 from the N.H. Grants
4,493 TOTAL

-400 troops detached to accompany Colonel Pierce Long by the Lake to
Skenesborough (estimated)*

4,093 TOTAL approximate number with St. Clair, including the rear guard,
upon departure from Mt. Independence, July 6, 1777.

Not included: *On command (detached) one company of Colonel Hales 2nd New Hampshire at Skenesboro and one company of Colonel Francis's 11th Massachusetts at Fort Ann.*

**"There were not above 100 in the hospital, a great proportion of them wounded. There were a number in the regiments not fit for duty on account of the measles, and the consequences of that disorder, which had prevailed much."*

Appendix C

A RETURN of Non-commissioned Officers and private Soldiers in a Battalion of the Massachusetts-Bay Forces, commanded by Colonel EBENEZER FRANCIS; together with a true State of their Equipments.

Companies.	Wanting to complet.														
	Number of Men.	Arms.	Iron Ramrods.	Bayonets.	Gun-slings.	Bayonet Belts.	Knapsacks.	Blankets.	Cartridge-boxes.	Drums.	Fifes.	Brushes.	Priming-wires.	Screws.	Oil-cloths.
Capt. Porter's, -	58	56	40	34	10	12	50	56	54			6	6	2	
Capt. Page's, -	41	40	38	35	15	33	39	23	38	1		8	5		
Capt. White's, -	65	63	40	35	4	4	20	6	62						
Capt. Maybury's, -	75	73	67	67	2	61	53	61	72	1					
Capt. Wheelwright's, -	49	49	34	37	12	18	32	44	40						
Capt. Greenleaf's, -	62	62	51	36	3	17	20	55	55						
Capt. Thoms's, -	63	63	24	26	4	15	47		61			2	2		
Total.	413	406	294	270	50	160	261	245	382	2		16	13	2	
			115	139	359	252	150	168	30	5	7	366	369	404	408

N. B. One Company on command at Fort Ann, which is not inserted in the above Return.

EBENEZER FRANCIS, Colonel.

Appendix D

*Rationale for Strength of Officers and Men at Hubbardton at 1,100 to 1,200 Troops as Stated by St. Clair**

Francis's rear guard of selected units from the several regiments in St. Clair's force, including units from Warner's, Hale's, and Francis's regiments as well as Cilley's and Scammell's regiments.	450
Warner's Green Mountain Boys Continental Regiment (see Dearborn). It is estimated that two of Warner's units had been selected to accompany Francis with the initial rear guard and remained with him. These are included in the 450 selected rear guard above.	150
Plus Captain Carr's 3rd company, 2d New Hampshire, very likely detached to Warner.	60
Plus the <i>estimated</i> militia with Warner.	100
Hale's 2nd New Hampshire Continental Regiment as they arrived at Hubbardton (see Dearborn).	175
Plus invalids, sick, intoxicated bringing up the rear, hours behind the main body (stragglers from St. Clair's Northern Army). It is estimated that two of Hale's companies had been selected to accompany Francis with the initial rear guard, and remained with him. These are included in the 450 selected rear guard above.	300
Estimated Total 1,235	

*NOTE: St. Clair, it has been concluded, had moved on before Francis and his rear guard came up. Most of Francis's 11th Massachusetts Continental Regiment was thus with St. Clair, only two of his companies having been selected for the rear guard. Thus, it appears that Francis's rear guard fought as it had marched, augmented by Warner's depleted regiment and encumbered by Hale's invalids, sick, stragglers, and intoxicated, attached to Captain Carr's company west of Monument Hill and along Sucker Brook, where it was the first unit attacked.

Appendix E

*A RETURN of Arms and Accoutrements belonging
to the Third New-Hampshire Battalion, in the
Service of the United States, commanded by ALEX-
ANDER SCAMMELL, Esq.*

	Good	Bad	Wanting
Arms, - - - -	408	14	0
Bayonets, - - - -	413	0	9
Cartridge-boxes,	294	0	128
Priming-wires and Brushes,	17	0	405
Horns, - - - -	144	0	278
Pouches, - - - -	31	0	391

ALEX. SCAMMELL, Colonel.

Ticonderoga, June 18, 1777.

*A RETURN of Arms and Accoutrements of Colonel
SETH WARNER'S Regiment.*

	Good	Bad	Wanting
Firelocks,	140	40	18
Bayonets, - - - -	46	1	151
Ramrods,	107	55	36
Cartridge-boxes, - - - -	153	7	38
Pouches, - - - -	6	1	191
Waist-belts, - - - -	63	0	135
Slings, - - - -	6	0	192
Scabbards for bayonets, -	48	2	148

SETH WARNER, Colonel.

Ticonderoga, June 17, 1777.

*A STATE of the Arms and Accoutrements in Col-
onel HALE'S Regiment.*

	Good	Bad	Wanting
Muskets,	355	15	0
Bayonets,	359	0	11
Cartridge-boxes,	347	0	8
Priming-wires and Brushes,	21	0	334
Horns,	91	0	264
Pouches, - - - -	28	0	327

WILLIAM ELLIOT, Adjutant.

Ticonderoga, June 17, 1777.

Appendix F

A RETURN of a number of men under the command of Lieut. Colonel Udrey Hay, A. D. Q. M. G. the regiments they belong to, and employments they are engaged in.

<i>Regiments they belong to.</i>	<i>Employments.</i>	<i>Number of Men.</i>	
Colonel Long's, - - -	{ Batteamen, - - -	2	
	{ Millmen, - - -	5	
	{ Teamsters, - - -	6	
		—	13
Colonel Hale's, - - -	{ Batteaman, - - -	1	
	{ At Skeensborough, - - -	7	
		—	8
Colonel Francis's, - - -	{ Batteaman, - - -	1	
	{ Constant Fatiguemen, - - -	17	
	{ Millmen, - - -	5	
	{ Tinman, - - -	1	
	{ At the Landing, - - -	2	
		—	26
Colonel Bradford's, - - -	{ Batteaman, - - -	1	
	{ Constant Fatiguemen, - - -	7	
	{ Gardeners, - - -	2	
		—	10
Colonel Jackson's, - - -	{ Batteaman, - - -	1	
	{ Gardeners, - - -	3	
		—	4
Colonel Cilley's, - - -	{ Batteaman, - - -	1	
	{ At Skeensborough, - - -	2	
	{ Millmen, - - -	6	
		—	9
Colonel Warner's, - - -	Batteaman, - - -	-	1
Colonel Scammel's, - - -	Batteaman, - - -	-	1
Colonel Marshall's, - - -	{ Batteaman, - - -	1	
	{ Constant Fatiguemen, - - -	3	
	{ At Skeensborough, - - -	1	
	{ Gardeners, - - -	7	
		—	12
Colonel Brewer's, - - -	{ Millmen, - - -	2	
	{ Constant Fatiguemen, - - -	13	
	{ Teamsters, - - -	8	
	{ Gardeners, - - -	3	
		—	26
Colonel Wells's, - - -	Millmen, - - -	-	4
Unknown, - - -	At Skeensborough, - - -	-	20
			—
			TOTAL 134

UDREY HAY, D. Q. M. G.

Lieut. Colonel Udrey Hay was not at Hubbardton. This report has been included here because it shows the kind of employment Hale, Francis, and Warner had in their regiments. It should be noted that these figures do not show that forty blacks, some of whom were constant fatiguemen, were also dispersed throughout these regiments.

Appendix G

Blacks at Hubbardton

Four black American soldiers took part in the Battle of Hubbardton:

Titus Wilson (Willson), Peterborough, New Hampshire, Col. Cilley's Regt. He was wounded, captured, and died at Hubbardton on the day of the Battle.

Simeon Grandison, Scituate, Massachusetts, regiment not known.

Asa Perham (Purham, Pearham), Col. Hale's regiment.

Nick (Nicholas) Vintrom (Vixtrom), Col. Hale's regiment, captured July 7.

For authority and references see N.H. Reg'l A/C Books and correspondence between Hoyt and Williams, (VHS: John Williams Papers, MS 149).

Appendix H

Rationale for Lack of Artillery at Hubbardton

Cited below are the statements confirming that there was no artillery at Hubbardton:

In Lieutenant Hadden's journal, p.85, it is mentioned that General Fraser pursued the Americans "leaving his artillery which the road was not capable of receiving."

Lord Francis Napier in his journal of the Burgoyne Campaign (Maryland Historical Magazine, Dec. 1962, p. 304) mentions that General Fraser came upon the Americans "without artillery which with the utmost endeavor it was impossible to get up."

In the *Journal of DuRoi the Elder*, Lieutenant and Adjutant in the service of the Duke of Brunswick, it is recorded: "July 7 . . . although Brigadier Frazer had only have [half] of his vanguard together, and no artillery whatever (it had been impossible to take it along), he made an attack"

There is no reason to believe that the Americans were anymore successful. The rapid march would have precluded drawing artillery over the narrow, crude military road at the pace set.

General Wilkinson in his memoirs, pp. 185-187, mentions "our ordnance . . . [was] dispatched by the lakes for Skenesborough" He also mentions that the firing was "confined to small arms."

Appendix I

*Rationale for Killed, Wounded, and Prisoners**

The inadequacy of American records following the Battle and the nature of the American retreat make an accurate statement of the Americans killed and wounded virtually impossible. The approximate number of prisoners is fairly accurate because the British counted them and some of the American officers who were prisoners learned how many there were.

Having examined twenty sources, almost all of them having different figures, I have decided that those of General Fraser and Joseph P. Cullen are the most realistic for the Americans. Fraser was there after the Battle and undoubtedly knew as well as anyone what the casualties were. Cullen and John T. Bradley—on Tables of Battles in the text—have made the most recent study, 1972-1976, and the figures for the two are very close although Fraser groups killed and wounded at 150 whereas Cullen estimates killed at 41, wounded 96, total 137. Fraser states prisoners at 230, and Cullen at 234. The totals are close: Fraser 380, Cullen 371.

Thus I have concluded that the following very roughly approximates the actual casualties as sustained on July 7:

	<i>Troops Engaged</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>Total Killed & Wounded</i>	<i>Pris- oners</i>	<i>Total Casualties</i>
Americans	1,100	41	96	137 (12%)	234	371 (33%)
British	850	50	134	184 (21%)	0	184 (22%)
Germans	180	10	14	24 (13%)	0	24 (13%)
TOTALS	2,130	101	244	345 (16%)	234	579 (27%)

Note that the British killed and wounded are higher than the Americans, but the total American casualties are higher because of the 234 prisoners.

* *The Concise Illustrated History of the American Revolution.* National Historical Society, Harrisburg, PA. 1976, p. 23.

Appendix J

Rationale for Colonel Seth Warner's Remaining at Hubbardton Contrary to St. Clair's Order, as Included in the St. Clair Court Martial at White Plains, New York, September 12, 1778

In the Court Martial of General St. Clair (p. 85), it is stated “. . .as we tarried there [Hubbardton] about three or four hours, General St. Clair said he would march to Castle-town with his army, and would leave Colonels Hale's and Warner's regiments to cover his retreat with orders for them to move on moderately.”

Question by Gen. St. Clair: “Do you know whether the rear guard had orders to move on to Castle-town that night?”

Answer by Capt. Woolcott: “. . .it was Gen. St. Clair's orders, delivered by Gen. Patterson, that we were to march to Castle-town. I went into the house [probably the Selleck cabin] where Col. Warner, Col. Francis and Col. Hale were, and having asked Col. Warner whether we were to march any farther, he said he did not that night; tho' there were orders to march, to Castle-town, he did not intend to go any farther because the men were much fatigued.”

Major Dunn's testimony at the court martial also seems valuable (p.113): “. . .the rear guard here was given to Colonel Warner, with orders to halt about one and a half miles short of the main body . . .and to march in the morning by four, and join the main body.”

It thus appears that Col. Warner received an order from General Patterson, one of the brigade commanders, representing General St. Clair, to move up moderately during the night.

The evidence is clear that St. Clair knew later on that Colonel Bellow's and Colonel Olcott's militia regiments, part of the army Warner was ordered to cover, were only two and one-half miles ahead in bivouac at Ransomvale. Certainly St. Clair did not intend for Warner and his rear guard to bypass elements of the main body he had been ordered to secure. Did St. Clair intend to move the two militia regiments toward Castleton to permit Warner to advance? If he did, they failed to move until early morning on July 7, as the evidence clearly indicates. The fact that they remained there apparently with St. Clair's knowledge suggests that St. Clair did not expect Warner to move up on the night of July 6, even though he gave the order. Over a year later in retrospect and in preparation for his court martial, St. Clair and his staff made the best possible case for themselves. In defense of St. Clair it should be said that on July 6 he was undoubtedly in a state of complete exhaustion, probably incapable of his customary reasoning as suggested in the court martial proceedings (p.111).

It is only fair to point out that Warner, now in command of two regiments and Francis's rear guard and facing enemy pursuit, commanded a provisional brigade, and was acting unofficially as a brigadier general. At this level, orders are often discretionary. Warner's opponent, Brigadier Fraser, boasted that he had discretionary orders from Burgoyne to attack the Rebels wherever he found them. Warner, in the final analysis, would have had to make a decision as to whether his force could move effectively. He must have decided it would be better to delay the British and defend from the strong position that he already occupied astride the road to Castleton and on a hill requiring the enemy to climb to reach him. There was no better defensive position between Hubbardton and Castleton.

The evidence is clear that possibly three hundred men,¹ about a third of Warner's reinforced rear guard, were stragglers from the Northern Army ahead.

The stragglers could not move effectively again that night. Had Warner marched by strict interpretation of orders, he would necessarily have left a substantial number of his troops behind, subject to capture or death at the hands of the enemy. Warner's very strong point in the long marches from Quebec was his ability to protect his men in the rear—the sick and injured and wounded—at the same time keep one jump ahead of the British. It was this brand of leadership that undoubtedly caused St. Clair to select Warner from the ten or so colonels and two brigadier generals available to him. General St. Clair must have relied on Warner to exercise his proven judgement.

There is a strong argument that in marching out of range of his supporting rear guard to the extent of seven miles, St. Clair made it virtually impossible for Warner to perform his protective mission. This argument must be considered, however, in the light of the two militia regiments that bivouacked for the night at Ransomvale only two and a half miles away.

It should also be pointed out that the narrow passage between Hubbardton and Ransomvale allowed no opportunity for deployment or defense, the hills rise steeply on both sides. Even at Ransomvale where deployment was possible because of the broader valley, there were no effective defensive terrain features as at Hubbardton. Thus, once Warner left Hubbardton he knew full well that he would not again find nearly as strong a delaying position as he now occupied atop what is now Monument Hill. The strong terrain features at Hubbardton virtually dictated a delaying action there.

The conclusion seems evident: Warner took the most logical course open to him in remaining for the night at Hubbardton.

In summary, blind obedience to St. Clair's order would have been irresponsible—perhaps resulting in the loss of the rear guard—since there was no comparable defensible terrain after leaving Hubbardton, a region well known to Warner but not to St. Clair. Certainly it would have meant deserting a substantial number of his force: the invalids, sick, and injured.

To lend perspective to my judgement on this question, I refer to Ira Allen's "Particulars of the Capture of the Olive Branch," in which he mentions the adjournment of the constitutional convention at Windsor on July 8 due to the capture of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence by the British. He explains that the newly formed Council of Safety crossed the mountains to Manchester, actually to Sunderland. What is interesting is that Warner, the local commander, and Allen, secretary of the Council of Safety, Vermont's only government at the moment, found themselves together only a few days after the Battle of Hubbardton, and a few weeks prior to the Battle of Bennington. Thus Allen and the Council of Safety must have inquired in some depth as to the cir-

cumstances at Hubbardton, and certainly must have heard from Warner. It is significant that Allen makes no mention of his overnight stay at Hubbardton.

The Council of Safety requested Colonel Warner to remain at Manchester, as well as Colonel Herrick with his newly organized rangers, to defend the frontier of the new State of Vermont contrary to the orders of General Schuyler, commander of the northern department, who had ordered them and the Vermont militia to march to Saratoga.

Warner, now commanding the frontier post at Manchester,² with many of his troops who had participated at Hubbardton, suggests a spirited defense of the home front by a commander who had successfully performed his rear guard mission of delay and withdrawal and the preservation of his force; and one who had acted in accordance with his best judgement as the situation dictated at Hubbardton on July 6 and 7.

1 On June 28, 1777, in the general return of the troops under St. Clair at Fort Ticonderoga, 532 troops are shown as sick but present. Thus 300 seems like a conservative figure. The more extreme cases had been sent by boat to Skenesbough.

2 St. Clair to Governor Bowdoin, July 28, 1777, “. . . Colonel Warner now has a respectable body at Manchester”

Appendix K

The Gerlach Map Plan of the Action at Huberton A Tactical Explanation¹

Sucker Brook formed the first natural defensive line north of Monument Hill. Although the stream is a minor obstacle, its banks on the south side offered limited defensive, defilade, positions for delaying the enemy. These were enhanced beyond a doubt by hastily thrown up log defenses and *abatis*, as described by Joshua Pell in his diary.

Thus, when Major Robert Grant and his advance guard ahead of the light infantry and the grenadiers (see the three "A's" north of Sucker Brook) approached the Sucker Brook crossing on the Hubbardton Military Road, the force was apparently halted while Grant reconnoitered from a stump, where he was shot dead. There were twenty-one rank and file casualties reported. The troops were in column but promptly deployed into line on the east and west sides of the crossing probably for several hundred yards. The map shows deployment.

Gerlach delineates this: "A" *Advanced Corps of Brig. Gen. Fraser which was attacked at "B"*. He then shows "B" at four American positions, three on the south side of the brook, one on the north side, possibly the picket that killed Grant. These were undoubtedly company size units into which the pickets had hastily withdrawn. These companies are said by Gerlach to have attacked at "B," that is, they defended the south bank by musket fire from defilade and log and tree defenses.

From the standpoint of the approaching British, the musket fire was appropriately called an attack, since they were on the receiving end. From the American position it was a defensive, delaying action.

The British deployed along the north bank and crossed the brook penetrating the delaying obstacles as the Americans withdrew to their regiments on Monument Hill as shown by the withdrawal lines from "B" to "O." The British now took post at "C," *the position of that Corps while it was forming* (for the assault on the hill). The American units had now withdrawn up the hill to positions shown at "O" to join their parent units. It should be noted that the lines of withdrawal shown by Gerlach are to the center where Francis's original rear

¹ See John Clement's clarifying description in Joseph and Mabel Wheeler, *The Mount Independence Hubbardton Military Road*, (VHS: Benson, VT: J.L. Wheeler, 1968). pp. 221-224.




References

- A. Advanced Corps of Brig^d Gen^l Frazer which was attacked at B.
- C. Position of that Corps while it was forming.
- D. Earl of Balcarrais detached to cover the Right Wing.
- E. The Vanguard & Brunswick Comps^s of Chapeaux coming up with Gen^l Reidford.
- F. Position of the Enemy after Gen^l Reidford arrived.
- G. Retreat of the Enemy.
- H. Position after the Action.
- I. House where the wounded were carried.
- O. Position of the Enemy previous to the Action.

The Gerlach Map

Plan of the
Action at
Huberton



guard was located. The American units shown on the north end show no lines of withdrawal from Sucker Brook, into those units, suggesting that Hale's men, under Titcomb, (on the north or right flank) were not a part of the delaying force at the brook, except for Captain Carr's company and the straggler group mentioned below. Likewise none of the delaying units withdrew to Warner either. The exception is the American unit on the extreme west (left flank), also identified by "B," showing no British units opposing it, though most certainly there would have been deployment that far west. Almost certainly this was Captain Carr's company of Hale's 2nd New Hampshire that apparently was detached to Warner as a security outpost to warn of a possible attack from that quarter as explained in the text. There appears to have been an old road to the Manchester farm in that area that might have been used by the British as an approach road. The three hundred or so sick, invalids, and stragglers brought in by Hale would have been attached to Captain Carr's company since they lacked organization of their own. Captain Carr was one of Hale's officers.

At "D" is shown the *Earl of Balcarras detached to cover the Right Wing*. Strangely, Gerlach does not show the grenadiers, also ordered by Fraser to support the right when it was observed that the advance guard was engaged with Warner's troops and in need of support. "D" extended across the Castleton road, blocking the road from further American withdrawal. It shows only the early phase of the envelopment, omitting the final phase to the top of Pittsford Ridge. Fraser described this clearly. It appears that Balcarras was given command of both the light infantry detachment and the Grenadiers to make the rapid envelopment of Warner's left flank and to secure the road to Castleton.

The American position at "O," *the position of the enemy [the Rebels] previous to the action*, shows the Americans along the crest of Monument Hill. It does not show them assembled to march on the Castleton road, from which they moved to the position along the crest at "O." Gerlach would not have been aware of this. Warner's units are thought to be the two units on the south, just off the crest. Francis's units more than likely are shown as the three next toward the north, and probably Hale's (under Titcomb) are shown as the two at the extreme north facing "E." "E" was *"The Vanguard and Brunswick company of Chasseurs coming up with General Riedesel."* The Germans arrived during the very last phase of the main battle. Gerlach tried to include all phases of the Battle on one map, but omitted the British and German envelopments in their final stages.

At "F" is shown the American position behind the high log fence after General Riedesel arrived. However, it again fails to show the Americans on the right flank threatening the exposed British left, so clearly described by both Fraser and Riedesel.

At "E" the German units are shown advancing on the American right flank, but it is suggestive only and fails to show them threatening the flank and rear of the Americans as clearly described by Riedesel. The diagram shows the German advance parallel to the British but following the contour of the hill.

At "G" *Retreat of the Enemy*, the map fails to show the grenadiers on the ridge ahead of the Americans as described by Fraser, Anburey, and Bird. It fails to show the Americans being blocked on the ridge, although it does depict the grenadiers and light infantry detachment approaching the ridge. Thus the concept is presented, if not the completion of the action. Realistically, the retreating lines would have turned toward the north—as suggested by Fraser—when the Americans found themselves blocked on the south and east. At this position, one of the two units shown appears to represent the detachment of

light infantry under Lindsay, Earl of Balcarras, and the other the grenadiers.

The remote American unit on the extreme west and south, with its lines of withdrawal into Warner's sector, is thought to be Captain Carr's company, as we have said, the security outpost on Warner's left flank. It will be noted that there is a single line of withdrawal to the southeast just ahead of Lindsay's advancing units (at "D" extended), suggesting that some of these men escaped the envelopment that is shown only in its early stage. These would have been some of the invalids, sick, and stragglers, it seems logical to conclude, although most of that group were captured. A line of escape to the southeast is clearly shown from "F," the southern most position shown for the Rebels.


"H," the position after the action represents the defensive positions taken up immediately by the Germans at Fraser's request after Riedesel inquired as to what dispositions of his troops were desired. When the Germans left the next day the British took over these positions for the remaining night.

"I," the *House Where the Wounded Were Carried*, is beyond question the Sell-eck cabin, thought to have been used by Warner as his headquarters.

As John Clement explains, Gerlach and his assistants came up after the Battle was over. He sketched it in the late afternoon of July 7, and left early the next day, in a place full of almost about 570 dead, wounded, and prisoners; as well as exhausted troops. He, too, must have been exhausted.

Gerlach merely tried to capture the general concept of the action without attempting any detail or unit identification. The entire picture could not have been clear to anyone, even Fraser, it appears, much less to the German cartographer who was not present at the Battle and who probably did not speak English. Fraser was killed at Saratoga and thus was not available to correct the map when it was later published in England. In the limited time and under the conditions, he did a remarkable piece of work. The map is a tremendous help. As John Clement said, "There is no other source material that can begin to compare with it," its peculiarities and omissions notwithstanding.


Note: The scale of 200 paces to the inch is based upon the German pace of five feet, measured as the distance of two (2-1/2 feet each) steps, rather than our pace of one long step of 3 feet.



Appendix L

Bomoseen Map The Greater Battlefield Area

The circle encompasses the area from the Saddle where the pickets fired the first shots (north) to the Grenadiers' crossing of the Castleton road (south); from the areas of Captain Carr's company (west) to Pittsford ridge (east). It shows the steepness of the military road, Monument Hill, and Pittsford ridge.



The
Battle of
Hubbardton

*The American
Rebels Stem
the Tide*

by
John Williams